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Slag van North Point

Slag van North Point



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Op 11 September 1814 het die uitkyk by 'n uitkyk toring op Federal Hill in Maryland 'n Britse vloot gesien wat Noordpunt nader. Toe generaal -majoor Samuel Smith, bevelvoerder van die nabygeleë verdediging van Baltimore, die nuus hoor, stuur hy dadelik brigadier -generaal John Stricker en 3200 milisies na North Point. Smith het vermoed dat die Britte heel waarskynlik eers by North Point sou beland as Baltimore aangeval word.Toe die Britse vloot North Point nader, word dit ook waargeneem vanuit 'n koepel op die dak van die Todd House, ongeveer 'n kilometer van waar die Britse troepe het geland. Burgers het 'n stelsel van berede ruiters georganiseer om die Amerikaanse magte op hoogte te hou van die vyand se bewegings. Net voor dagbreek op die oggend van 12 September het meer as 4500 Britse troepe aan die punt van North Point begin land. Generaal-majoor Robert Ross het begin om sy troepe te lei tydens 'n opmars van 12 myl na Baltimore.General Ross word beskou as een van Engeland se voorste militêre bevelvoerders, met 'n wye reeks ervaring en oorwinnings wat in oorloë oor die hele Europa opgedoen is. Voordat Ross na Amerika gekom het, het hy onder die hertog van Wellington gedien en het hy 'n gunstige skriftelike vermelding van die hertog geniet. Hy was nie bewus daarvan dat generaal Stricker, met sy 3200 man, slegs twee myl daarvandaan was met sy ses kanonne op sy plek oorkant Long Log Lane (North Point Road) wat op die Britte wag nie. Admiraal George Cockburn het Ross gewaarsku dat hy en sy begeleier besig was om te kom te ver voor die res van die mag. Hulle word toegeskryf aan die moord op generaal Ross. Die lyk is na vise -admiraal sir Alexander Cochrane se vlagskip gebring en in 'n vat rum geplaas vir bewaring. Paul's Church in Halifax. Die grafte van Dan Wells en Henry McComas word gekenmerk deur 'n monument op die hoek van Aisquith-, Gay- en Monumentstraat in Baltimore.Die dood van generaal Ross was 'n demoraliserende slag vir die Britse landmagte. Brooke was onervare en sou 'n teleurstelling vir die troepe wees. Teen die middag van 12 September het die Britse magte gevorder tot waar hulle die ses Amerikaanse kanonne kon blokkeer wat vandag bekend staan ​​as North Point Road by Trappe Road. Kort na hul aankoms het albei kante 'n kanonvuur uitgeruil, en die geveg was aan die gang. Terwyl die Britte gevorder het, het die Amerikaners druifskote, spykers, ou hoefysters, slotte, stukkies gebreekte muskiete afgevuur - alles wat in 'n kanon se voormond vasgedruk kon word. Die Amerikaners het die vyand reeds vertraag - soos beplan deur generaal Smith. Die gevegte het die middag heen en weer voortgegaan, met Amerikaanse magte wat stadig terugval. In plaas daarvan het hulle geslaap op die slagveld naby die Methodist Meetinghouse, wat as 'n hospitaal gebruik is waar chirurge die gewondes van beide kante af geopereer het. Soos dit blyk, sou die eendaagse geveg in North Point die laaste van die landgevegte wees.*Op die oggend van 13 September het die Britte stadig langs die baan gegaan toe Brooke die indrukwekkende versterkings van "Rodgers" sien. 'Bastion.' Hy kon sy oë nie glo nie. Toe die Britse troepe nader kom, het hulle gou besef dat hulle nie verby Rodgers 'Bastion kon kom sonder groot verliese nie. Dus trek hulle terug en verlaat Baltimore ongedeerd.In 1839, 25 jaar na die geveg, het Jacob Houck 'n akker van die slagveld vir 'n dollar aan die staat Maryland besorg. Vandag is die heilige stuk grond, genaamd Battle Acre, omring deur 'n ysterheining, met die monument in die middel daarvan. in 1814. Hulle is voor die beroemde pagode van die park geleë.


*Op 13 en 14 September val die Britse vloot Baltimore se Fort McHenry aan nadat die landaanval tot stilstand gekom het. Die mislukking van die bombardement, en toe die Amerikaanse vlag nog gesien word, het Francis Scott Key daartoe gelei om 'The Star-Spangled Banner' saam te stel. Sien Slag van Baltimore.


Noordpunt - 12 September 1814

Na die verbranding van Washington, DC, het die Britse magte in die Chesapeakebaai -gebied daarna hul visier gerig op die hawestad Baltimore, Maryland.

Op 12 September 1814 beland ongeveer 4,500 Britse soldate en mariniers op die skiereiland wat deur die Back- en Patapsco -riviere geskep is. Hierdie mag is onder bevel van die veteraan -majoor Robert Ross. Om hierdie bedreiging die hoof te bied, het 'n mag van 3200 Amerikaners onder bevel van generaal John Stricker opgeruk om Ross se magte te onderskep. Met behulp van die strome, heuwels en moerasse na die gebied om sy lyn te beskerm, het Stricker 'n mag van Amerikaanse geweer na die Britse kampe gevorder in die hoop om die vyand in die geveg te lok op grond van sy keuse. Die Amerikaners het vroeë sukses gekry, en hulle het selfs daarin geslaag om Ross te val. Dodelik gewond, het die Britse bevelvoerder die bevel oorgegee aan kolonel Arthur Brooke.


Oorlog van 1812: Die Slag van Noordpunt, 12 September 1814

Tydens die oorlog van 1812 was Baltimore die derde grootste stad in die Verenigde State. Veertig duisend mense het daar gewoon, waaronder agtduisend slawe. Die stad was 'n belangrike kommersiële en militêre doelwit, hoofsaaklik vanweë die skeepswerf, wat 'n paar van die vinnigste en magtigste private persone van die oorlog gebou en onderhou het.

Toe die Britte Washington op 25 September 1814 verbrand, kon inwoners van Baltimore lig uit die vlamme in die naghemel sien. Hulle het geweet dat hul stad die volgende teiken van die vyand sou wees en was vasbeslote om hul huise te verdedig.

Baltimore berei sy verdediging voor

Twee dae na die vernietiging van Washington het vrywilligers uit Baltimore sowel as Maryland, Pennsylvania en Virginia gewerk om die versterkings van die stad te versterk. Die verdediging van Baltimore was onder die algemene bevel van generaal -majoor Samuel Smith (62), 'n rewolusionêre oorlogsheld en begaafde leier. Sy ongeveer 9 000 manskappe was onder meer Brigadier -generaal John Stricker se brigade van Baltimore met 5 000 militieë en 40 artillerie -stukke. Na die fiasko tydens die Slag van Bladensburg, het generaal Winder se manne teruggetrek na Virginia, maar was nou in Baltimore met 'n gemengde brigade van gereelde troepe, milisie en kavallerie. Commodore Rodgers was bevelvoerder oor seevaartbatterye wat deur 1200 matrose beman is, en majoor George Armistead en 1000 gereelde troepe het Fort McHenry beset.

Op Sondag, 11 September, vaar die Britse vloot op die Patapsco -rivier met 50 oorlogskepe en meer as 6000 soldate en matrose aan boord, met die doel om Baltimore, Maryland aan te val. Die aand stuur generaal Smith generaal Stricker en 3200 soldate suid om die vyand te herken en te vertraag terwyl Baltimore hul verdediging versterk.

Die Britse land by North Point

Die vroeë oggend van 12 September het die Britse infanterie hul bote aangeval en by North Point, vyftien kilometer suid van Baltimore, geland. Teen 7 uur was generaal -majoor Robert Ross en admiraal Cockburn weer op Maryland se bodem, hierdie keer met 9 000 troepe, bestaande uit 5 000 infanteriste, 2 000 mariniers en 2 000 matrose.

Die vloot van die Royal Navy was bereid om Fort McHenry aan te val, terwyl die Britse landleër noordwaarts marsjeer. Generaal Ross en admiraal Cockburn was vol vertroue, met die veronderstelling dat die Baltimore -magte net so maklik sou wees as die Bladensburg -burgermag. Intussen het vroue en kinders die paaie noordwaarts uit die stad oorstroom.

Nadat die Britte geland het, het generaal Stricker voorberei om hul opmars na Baltimore te vertraag. Hy het drie verdedigingslinies oor Long Log Lane (nou North Point Road) geplaas, met sy regter anker op Bear Creek en sy linkerkant beskerm deur 'n moeras aan die oewer van die Back River. Sy eerste verdedigingslinie het bestaan ​​uit ses 4-pond op Long Log Lane, met die 5de Baltimore-regiment regs en die 27ste Maryland-regiment aan hul linkerkant, 'n mag van ongeveer 1100 soldate. Driehonderd meter agter die eerste lyn was 'n tweede lyn met ongeveer 900 man in nog twee regimente, en 'n half kilometer agter dit was 'n reserwe -regiment van ongeveer 620 man.

Generaal Ross is vermoor

Om die vyand se opmars te vertraag, het generaal Stricker 'n klein mag van 150 infanterie, 70 gewere, 'n klein sprinkaangeweer en 'n paar kavallerie bevorder. Hulle het die Britte sewe kilometer van Baltimore gevind en met die loodelemente begin skermutseling. Hierdie botsing sou 'n betekenislose aanhef tot die geveg gewees het, behalwe dat 'n skutman daarin kon slaag om generaal Ross, wat kort daarna gesterf het, te skiet. In die minderheid keer die skermutselinge terug na die Amerikaanse lyne.

As senior offisier neem kolonel Arthur Brooke nou bevel oor die Britse invalsmag.

Die Slag van Baltimore begin

Die Britse weermag vind hul pad geblokkeer deur die Maryland -burgermag, en beweeg van hul marskolomme na slaglyne. Hulle het die geveg begin met 'n woedende artillerie -bombardement wat Congreve -vuurpyle insluit. Anders as by Bladensburg, het die burgerlike soldate nie weggehardloop nie.

Terwyl 'n Britse brigade die lengte van generaal Stricker se voorste linie aangegaan het, het kolonel Brooke 'n regiment na regs gestuur, in die rigting van die Back River, in 'n poging om die Amerikaners se linkerkant te oorskry. Om hierdie bedreiging teë te werk, het generaal Stricker beide regimente van sy tweede lyn af gevorder. Hy gebruik die 39ste regiment, met twee kanonne, om sy linkerkant te verleng. Daarna het hy die 51ste regiment, 'n onervare militia -eenheid, reghoekig geposisioneer om die Britse flankmaneuver te bestry.

Na twee ure se swaar gevegte sonder dat een van die partye 'n voordeel kon behaal, het die Britte die volle lengte van die Amerikaanse linies gehef. Teen 'n frontaanval en met 'n flankaanval gedreig, het die linkerkant van die Amerikaanse lyn ineengestort. Die 51ste regiment het 'n losharde vlug gevuur en weggehardloop. Hulle vlug het 'n deel van die 39ste regiment, wat ook gebreek en gehardloop het, paniekerig gemaak. Die res van die 39ste, die 27ste Maryland -regiment en die 5de Baltimore -regiment het egter byna nog 'n uur gehou, maar sy manne was nou in die getal onder die vyand en sy lyn was aan die buitekant, en beveel generaal Stricker om terug te trek. Die Amerikaanse milisie het kort ná 4 uur die middag in goeie orde teruggetrek na die buitewyke van Baltimore. Die Britte kamp oornag op die slagveld, rus en berei hulle voor om die opmars in die oggend voort te sit.

Uitslae van die Slag van North Point

Die Britte het ongeveer 46 gedood en 295 gewondes gely. Amerikaanse slagoffers is 24 dood, 139 gewond en 50 gevang.

Hierdie openingsbetrokkenheid van die Slag van Baltimore was 'n taktiese oorwinning vir die Britse leër omdat hulle die slagveld gehou het nadat die Amerikaners hulle teruggetrek het. Die Slag van North Point was egter 'n strategiese oorwinning vir die Maryland -burgermag. Hulle het een van Groot -Brittanje se bekwaamste leiers, generaal Ross, doodgemaak. Belangriker nog, hulle het die pad lank genoeg versper om te keer dat die Britse infanterie aan die aanval op Fort McHenry deelneem.


Na die Slag van die Noord -Kaap

Die verlies van die Slag om die Noord -Kaap het die Duitse vloot geruk. Dönitz het gesukkel om te verstaan ​​waarom Bey die eerste geveg van die dag onderbreek het toe hy, volgens sy oordeel, in staat was om Burnett en sy kruisers te oorweldig. 'Die regte ding om te doen. . . sou gewees het om die stryd voort te sit en die swakker Britse magte af te handel, veral omdat dit duidelik was dat hulle reeds swaar getref is, ”skryf hy. 'As dit gedoen is, sou 'n uitstekende geleentheid dit wees. . . is geskep vir 'n suksesvolle aanval op die konvooi. ” Waarom, toe hy vlug na die tweede botsing, het hy nie sy voordeel van spoed en gewig gebruik om 'n westelike koers in die wind en swaar see te stuur nie, wat dit vir die lig geboude Britse kruisers en verwoesters baie moeilik sou gemaak het om in aanraking te bly ? Die antwoord sou nooit bekend wees nie. Bey en Hintze is deur die Barentssee ingesluk.

U kan die boek ook koop deur op die knoppies aan die linkerkant te klik.

Hierdie artikel is deel van ons groter bron oor die oorlogvoering van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Klik hier vir ons uitgebreide artikel oor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog.


Die roete

In Boston, Massachusetts, word die opposisie teen die hof wat deur die hof beveel word#8220busing ” gewelddadig op die openingsdag van klasse. Skoolbusse met Afro -Amerikaanse kinders is bestook met eiers, bakstene en bottels, en die polisie in gevegsuitrusting het geveg om woedende wit betogers wat die skole beleër, te beheer.

Die Amerikaanse distriksregter Arthur Garrity het beveel dat Afro -Amerikaanse studente na oorwegend wit skole en wit studente na swart skole vervoer moet word in 'n poging om Boston se geografies gesegregeerde openbare skole te integreer. In sy uitspraak van Junie 1974 in Morgan teen Hennigan, Garrity het gesê dat Boston se feitlike skoolsegregasie teen swart kinders gediskrimineer het. Die begin van gedwonge busse op 12 September het massiewe protesoptredes ondergaan, veral in Suid-Boston, die stad se grootste Iersk-Katolieke woonbuurt. Betogings het maande lank onverpoos voortgegaan, en baie ouers, wit en swart, het hul kinders tuis gehou. In Oktober is die National Guard gemobiliseer om die federale desegregasiebevel af te dwing.

1609 – Engelse ontdekkingsreisiger Henry Hudson het afgevaar wat nou bekend staan ​​as die Hudsonrivier.

1814 – Tydens die oorlog van 1812 is die Slag van North Point in Maryland geveg.

1916 – Adelina en August Van Buren het die eerste suksesvolle transkontinentale motorfietsreis voltooi wat deur twee vroue probeer is. Hulle het op 5 Julie 1916 in New York begin.

1918 – Gedurende die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, tydens die Slag van St. Mihiel, werk die Amerikaanse weermagpersoneel vir die eerste keer tenks. Die tenks is in Frans gebou.

1938 – In 'n toespraak eis Adolf Hitler selfbeskikking vir die Sudeten-Duitsers in Tsjeggo-Slowakye.

1943 – Tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog is Benito Mussolini deur Duitse valskermsoldate geneem van die Italiaanse regering wat hom vasgehou het.

1953 – Amerikaanse senator John F. Kennedy trou met Jacqueline Lee Bouvier.

1953 Nikita Krushchev is verkies as die eerste sekretaris van die Kommunistiese Party van die Sowjetunie.

Keiser Haile Selassie uit 1974 is deur die weermag van Ethiopië uit die bewind geneem nadat hy 58 jaar lank regeer het.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 1980 noem vier voorwaardes vir die vrylating van Amerikaanse gyselaars wat op 4 November 1979 geneem is. Die voorwaardes was die ontvriesing van Iraanse bates, die terugkeer van die rykdom van die shah na Iran, die kansellasie van Amerikaanse eise teen Iran 'n Amerikaanse belofte van nie -inmenging in Iran se binnelandse sake.

1992 – Dr. Mae Carol Jemison het die eerste Afro-Amerikaanse vrou in die ruimte geword. Sy was die vragspesialis aan boord van die ruimtetuig Doen moeite. Aan boord was ook die missiespesialis N. Jan Davis en die lugmag -luitenant -kolonel Mark C. Lee. Hulle was die eerste egpaar wat saam in die ruimte vlieg. En Mamoru Mohri het die eerste Japannese persoon geword wat die ruimte in gevlieg het.


Slagoffers [wysig | wysig bron]

Die amptelike verslag van die Britse leër oor ongevalle, onderteken deur majoor Henry Debbeig, gee 39 dood en 251 gewondes. Hiervan behoort 28 gedood en 217 gewondes aan die Britse leër 6 gedood en 20 gewondes behoort aan die 2de en 3de bataljon van die Royal Marines 4 gedood en 11 gewondes behoort aan die kontingente van Royal Marines losgemaak van Cockburn se vloot en 1 gedood (Elias Taylor) en 3 gewondes behoort aan die Royal Marine Artillery. Β ] Soos normaal was, het die Royal Navy 'n aparte ongevalle-opgawe ingedien vir die verlowing, onderteken deur agter-admiraal Cockburn, wat 4 matrose doodmaak en 28 gewondes gee, maar weerspreek die Britse leër se ongevalleverslag deur 3 dood te maak (1 en 2 van HMS Madagaskar en HMS Ramillies onderskeidelik) en 15 gewondes vir die Royal Marines losgemaak van die skepe van die vloot. ⎙ ] 'n Volgende ongevalle -terugkeer van Cochrane na die Admiraliteit, gedateer 22 September 1814, gee 6 matrose dood, 1 vermis en 32 gewond, met Royal Marines -slagoffers van 1 gedood en 16 gewond. ⎚ ] Die totale Britse verliese, soos amptelik gerapporteer, was óf 43 gedood óf 279 gewond óf 42 gedood en 283 gewond, afhangende van watter van die twee ongevalleopgawes akkuraat was. Historikus Franklin R. Mullaly gee nog 'n weergawe van die Britse slagoffers, 46 dood en 295 gewond, ondanks die gebruik van dieselfde bronne. ⎛ ] ⎜ ] ⎝ ] Die Amerikaanse verlies was 24 dood, 139 gewond en 50 gevange geneem. Α ]


Verkenners vir die Amerikaanse Derde Leër te voet en in pantservoertuie het op 15 September 1944 versigtig die stad Luneville aan die oostekant van die Moselrivier in die golwende heuwels van Noordoos-Frankryk genader. , 42ste Kavallerie-eskader bereik die buitewyke van die stad met 'n mistige omhulsel, 'n dop wat van 'n Duitse 88 mm-geweer afgevuur is, het daarin gestamp. Die geskrikte Amerikaners vlug vinnig uit die gebied.

Alhoewel niemand dit destyds geweet het nie, was die skoot die begin van die Slag van Arracourt, 'n gepantserde geveg van 11 dae tussen die Amerikaanse luitenant-generaal George S. Patton se Derde Leër en die Duitse Generaal van Panzer Troops Hasso von Manteuffel se Vyfde Panzerleër .

In die volgende vier dae het die 4de Pantserdivisie van majoor -generaal Manton Eddy se XII Corps geveg teen Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt se 15de Panzergrenadier -afdeling vir beheer oor Luneville. Op 16 September val die Amerikaners die stad uit die suide kragtig aan, sterk teenstaan ​​deur panzergrenadiers wat 'n dag vroeër versterk is deur ses tenks en 'n gelyke aantal antitankgewere. Die Duitsers is uit die stad gedwing, en die Amerikaners het 'n verdedigende kordon rondom die stad gevorm.

Op 17 September het die Duitsers 'n gesamentlike poging aangewend om Luneville terug te kry. Hulle pogings is in die wiele gery deur die kavallerietroepe en tenks en gepantserde infanterie van Combat Command R, Amerikaanse 4de pantserdivisie. Die stryd om die stad het op 18 September verhit toe twee gevegsgroepe van kolonel Heinrich von Bronsart-Schellendorf se 111ste Panzer Brigade, ondersteun deur eenhede van Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger se 21ste Panzer Division, Luneville vanuit die suidooste aangeval het. Terselfdertyd het kolonel Erich von Seckendorf se 113de Panzer Brigade die Amerikaners uit die noordooste getref. Teen 12 uur het versterkings van Combat Command A, 4th Armoured Division in die vorm van Task Force Hunter, wat bestaan ​​uit 'n groep tenks, infanterie en tenksvernietigers, aangekom en die Duitsers van Luneville en die omliggende gebied verdryf. Die geveg vir die stad duur egter voort op 19 September toe die 15de Panzergrenadier -afdeling terugkeer om die terugtrekking van Duitse magte uit die stad te dek.

'N Assistent -kanonnier vul tenkdoppe aan.

In die stryd om die beheer van Luneville is 1 070 Duitsers óf doodgemaak óf gevang en 13 gepantserde vegvoertuie is vernietig. Amerikaanse verliese beloop etlike honderde GI's dood en gewond, en die verlies van ongeveer 10 gepantserde vegvoertuie. Met Luneville beveilig, was Patton se Derde Leër van plan om die hele 4de Pantserdivisie as speerpunt te gebruik in 'n vinnige opmars na die Duitse grens.

By die Amerikaanse derde leër se hoofkwartier was die Amerikaanse reaksie op die Duitse aanval middel September in Luneville kommerwekkend. Die vyandelike poging was so swak en uiteenlopend dat die Amerikaners geglo het dat dit bloot 'n swak gekoördineerde plaaslike teenaanval was. Alhoewel intelligensie van die Derde Weermag geweet het van die teenwoordigheid van die 111ste Panzer Brigade in die gebied, het dit nie geweet van die 113th Panzer Brigade se plek nie, en het dit ook geen bewyse gehad dat 'n groot vyandelike gepantserde aanval vir die onmiddellike toekoms beplan word nie.

Die 4de Pantser wat in April 1941 geaktiveer is, word in Julie 1944 na Frankryk ontplooi en word beveel deur genl.maj. John S. Wood. Die hoofgevegseenhede van die afdeling was drie brigadeformasies wat bekend staan ​​as Combat Command A, B en R (wat staan ​​vir reserwe). Elkeen is georganiseer rondom 'n enkele tenkbataljon wat bestaan ​​uit 53 Sherman M4 medium tenks en 17 Stuart M5A1 ligte tenks, 'n gepantserde infanteriebataljon van drie kompagnies van in totaal 1000 man wat op M2 en M3 gepantserde halfspore vervoer is, en 'n gepantserde veldartillerie bataljon met 18 selfaangedrewe 105 mm-gewere. Die 4de Pantserdivisie is aangevul deur die onafhanklike 704ste Tank Destroyer Bataljon. Hierdie eenheid het drie maatskappye beheer met 'n totaal van 36 M18 Hellcat tenkvernietigers. 'N Afdelingsverkenningskader wat uit vier troepe in 48 M8 pantservoertuie bestaan, het die Amerikaanse pantserdivisies 'n stewige verkenningsbate gegee, wat teen 1944 beter was as die verlaagde verkenningsbataljons wat aan die Duitse panzer- en panzergrenadierafdelings verbonde was.

Alhoewel die Amerikaners nie daarvan bewus was nie, sou die beoogde opmars van die 4de Pantserdivisie gedurende die volgende 11 dae ontwrig en geblokkeer word deur 'n Duitse gepantserde teenaanval wat slegs die tweede was na die Slag van die Bulge in Desember 1944 as die grootste gepantserde wedstryd tussen die VSA en Duitse leërs in die Europese operasieteater. Die gepantserde gevegte van Lorraine was klassieke vergaderings, waar beide kante gelyktydig aanstootlike maneuvers uitgevoer het sonder dat enige van die partye 'n beduidende numeriese of duidelike verdedigingsvoordeel gehad het. Die Amerikaanse bevelvoerders van die Derde Weermag het nie met die aanvang van die derde week van September besef dat die stryd om Luneville deur die Duitsers plaasgevind het nie, want dit was waar die Duitse offensief in die Lorraine moes begin.

Die langdurige gepantserde geveg in Lorraine het gevolg op die ineenstorting van die Wehrmacht -weerstand in Frankryk en België en die gevolglike vinnige opmars van die Westerse koalisiemagte oor die wydte van Frankryk na Patton se uitbreek van die Normandië -brughoof op 30 Julie. Die leër na die westelike kant van die Ryk was die indrukwekkendste, die hoogste opperbevel van die Duitse weermag (Oberkommando des Heeres, of OKH) was die meeste bekommerd oor die ligspoed van die derde leër van Patton.

Ten spyte van 'n verlammende brandstoftekort wat sy vordering periodiek vertraag het, het die Derde Weermag daarin geslaag om 400 myl van Normandië na die westelike oewer van die Moselrivier te ry. Die vyandelike magte wat Lorraine langs die Mosellyn verdedig het, het behoort tot generaal van die Panzer Troops Otto von Knobelsdorff se Eerste Leër, wat uit ses infanterie en drie panzergrenadier -afdelings bestaan ​​het. Hierdie afdelings is meestal aangevul met onbevoegde en swak opgeleide plaasvervangers. Eerste weermag besit minder as 200 gepantserde vegvoertuie van alle soorte. Die Luftwaffe -eenhede wat die Eerste Weermag ondersteun, het slegs 110 vliegtuie gehad.

Terwyl hy in Lorraine werk, bestaan ​​Patton's Third Arm uit Eddy's XII Corps, genl. Walton Walker se XX Corps en genl. Wade Haislip se XV Corps. Die Derde Weermag het agt goed toegeruste afdelings na die Arracourt-geveg gebring, waaronder drie gepantserde en vier aangehegte tenkbataljons. Die Derde Leër het 933 tenks gehad, waarvan 672 M4 Sherman medium tenks en 261 M5A1 Stuart ligte tenks was. Boonop het die Amerikaanse weermag se lugkorps die derde leër ondersteun met 400 vegters en vegvliegtuie van sy XIX Tactical Air Command.

Kaptein J.F. Brady, bevelvoerder van Kompanjie A, 35ste tenkbataljon het die Silver Star tydens sy dapperheid tydens Arracourt ontvang. Anders as die Duitsers in Arracourt, is hy en sy medetanker goed ondersteun deur organiese artillerie-, logistieke en ingenieursweseenhede.

In ooreenstemming met die wense van die opperste geallieerde bevelvoerder -generaal Dwight D. Eisenhower, is Patton beveel om Lorraine te bevry en dan die verdediging van die Siegfried Line te oortree wat die westelike grens van Duitsland bewaak. Sodra die skrikwekkende doelwitte bereik is, sou die derde leër die Rynrivier oorsteek en die stede Frankfurt en Mannheim verower. Hierdie noodlottige steek in Duitsland sou verseker dat die Geallieerdes die Saarstreek verower, wat steenkool en staal vir die Hitler se oorlogsmasjien voorsien het.

Patton beveel sy 4de pantserdivisie na die Duitse grens op 19 September
in ooreenstemming met die plan, sou die CCB van die afdeling voortgaan van die Delme-Chateau-Salins-gebied, 26 myl noord van Luneville, na die stad Saabrucken, terwyl CCA sou vorder van sy plek in Arracourt, wat 10 myl noord van Luneville, en verower die Duitse stad Saareguemines.

Om die bedreiging wat die derde leër van Patton inhou, te hanteer, het Hitler Manteuffel beveel om 'n gewaagde teenaanval te begin. Manteuffel het sy vaardigheid bewys om panzerkragte aan die Oosfront te hanteer, waar hy bevel gegee het oor die 7de Panzer Division of Army Group Center tydens sy opmars na Moskou in 1941. Die aanval van Manteuffel, wat 'n voorlopige begindatum van 5 September gehad het, sou begin wes van die Vosges -berge en ry oor die Langres -plato na die Moselrivier. Dit was egter onmoontlik, aangesien die hoofkwartier van die Vyfde Panzer -leër nie tot 9 September vanaf die noordelike deel van die front in Nederland na Straatsburg kon herontplooi nie.

Boonop het Manteuffel die enorme taak gehad om sy drie panzer- en drie panzer -grenadierbrigades uit 'n verskeidenheid verskillende streke saam te stel. Dit was 'n ingewikkelde taak, aangesien sommige van hulle op die voorste linies ontplooi is. Vanweë Patton se vinnige opmars is die Duitse aanval uiteindelik teruggeskuif na 15 September.

Gefrustreerd deur die reeks vertragings, beveel Hitler die offensief om te begin, ongeag of al die toegewese magte by die verhooggebied aangekom het. Ten volle besef van die onrealistiese rooster vir die aanval en die onvoldoende kragte om daartoe verbind te word, was Manteuffel diep skepties dat sy aanval sou slaag. Met so min strydwaardige panserdivisies in die Lorraine-sektor van die Westelike Front, sou die Duitse aanval op die Amerikaanse Derde Leër afhang van die nuwe panzerbrigades wat in die laat somer van 1944 gestig is. Byna al die derde Reich se tenkproduksie gedurende hierdie tyd is herlei om die nuwe gepantserde formasies toe te rus. Baie van die nuwe panzerbrigades was bedoel vir diens aan die Oosfront. Indeed, Hitler had established the panzer brigade program in an effort to keep pace with the Soviet Union’s robust tank pro- duction. However, the concept of these new panzer formations on which Hitler placed such great hope was deeply flawed.

Rather than a balanced combined arms unit, such as that fielded by the German Army’s panzer divisions deployed at the outset of World War II, the new panzer brigades contained mostly tanks and panzergrenadiers. They sorely lacked sufficient artillery, engineer, and logistical assets. Designed for quick counterattacks, they were ill suited for sustained periods of frontline combat.

The first of these brigades were numbered 101 to 110. They actually were similar to a reg- iment in strength and had only one tank bat- talion. Their armor included 36 PzKpfw Panther medium tanks and 11 Pz IV/70 tank destroyers. These brigades’ infantry component consisted of 2,100 panzergrenadiers in six companies transported in SdKfz 251 half-tracks that mounted 20mm cannons.

In response to the shortcomings of the first series of panzer brigades, a second series desig- nated 111 to 119 was fielded in August 1944. These contained two battalions of tanks, one of which had 36 Pz.Kpfw V Panthers and the other of which had 36 Pz.Kpfw IVs. The infantry complement was expanded to a regi- ment of two panzergrenadier battalions of three companies each, as well as a heavy weapons company. In addition, each brigade had one armored reconnaissance company, assault gun company, and engineer company. Due to the shortage of SdKfz half-tracks, most of the 4,800 troops in these brigades had to travel in trucks, which severely limited the cross-country capability of the brigade.

Manteuffel, tasked with using Panzer Brigades 106, 111, 112, and 113 in the attack against
Patton’s forces in Lorraine, was particularly concerned about the combat reliability of these units. He had little confidence in their fighting ability due to the absence of any artillery in the brigades, a lack of radio equipment for communications, and insufficient armored recovery and maintenance services. He also pointed out that the men in the new panzer brigades had not been trained in combined- arms tactics.

Lieutenant General Walter Kruger, who led LVIII Panzer Corps, was deeply critical of the battle worthiness of the new panzer brigades. “Panzer Brigades 111 and 113 … were makeshift organizations,” he wrote. “Their combat value was slight. Their training was just as incomplete as their equipment. They had been given no training as a unit and they had not become accustomed to coordinating their subunits.” His disgust for the caliber of troops sent to the front from rear-echelon formations was evident in his description of them as “barrel-scrapings.” The concerns of the senior panzer leaders involved in the forthcoming mission about the usefulness of the panzer brigades to be employed did not bode well for its success.

Knobelsdorff was so alarmed in early September by the approach of Patton’s Third Army to the Moselle River that he wanted to launch an immediate spoiling attack against Walker’s XX Corps before it could cross the river. Knobelsdorff intended to send Colonel Franz Bake’s 106th Panzer Brigade against Maj. Gen. Raymond McClain’s 90th Division on the extreme left flank of Third Army. But before he could send the 106th Panzer Brigade into action, Knobelsdorff had to promise Hitler that he would return it to First Army’s reserve within 48 hours.

The 106th Panzer Brigade, which was organized in two groups, moved under cover of dark- ness on the night of Sept. 7-8 toward the American flank. With the arrival of darkness, the attack groups split up at Audun-le-Roman. The first attack group drove northeast toward Landres, and the second attack group turned southeast toward Trieux.

Having failed to reconnoiter the enemy’s position, at 2 AM the first attack group rumbled past McClain’s headquarters, which was situated on a wooded hill south of Landres. Curious as to the nature of the traffic, a member of the crew of a Sherman tank guarding the headquarters realized after an hour that it was a German column. He alerted nearby artillery crews. The Americans knocked out a half-track, but one of the German Panthers blew up the Sherman. A number of American artillerymen were killed in the sharp firefight. The first attack group disengaged and continued south.

McClain immediately issued orders to his infantry battalions to engage the Germans. The U.S. 712th Tank Battalion started up its Shermans and they caught up with the back of the first attack group column and fired on it. Meanwhile, U.S. bazooka teams from a tank destroyer platoon prepared to engage the Germans at first light.

Much to the consternation of the Germans, the Americans stood their ground rather than retreating. A battle unfolded at dawn when the first attack group split up to attack the town of Mairy from two directions. The town was vigorously defended by the 1st Battalion, 58th Infantry, which had 3-inch antitank guns. Additionally, the Americans were supported by 105mm howitzers. The panzer grenadiers attacked into the town on halftracks, but they could not dislodge the Americans.

After nearly three hours of hard fighting, the Germans began to disengage. One half of the attack group was able to retire, but the other half was targeted by the U.S. artillery where it was positioned in a sunken road west of Mairy and completely destroyed.

A German Panther carries panzer grenadiers into action at Bures south of Arracourt. Newly established panzer brigades were committed piecemeal in Lorraine against General George Patton’s Third Army only to be mauled by the Americans.

The second attack group pushed west from Trieux toward Avril, but the Americans were at Avril in force. They used their antitank guns to repulse a half-hearted attack by the Germans probing their positions. The defeat of the 106th Panzer Brigade in the Battle of Mairy left it badly crippled and of limited use during the forthcoming Battle of Arracourt.

Four days later, elements of Brig. Gen. Holmes E. Dager’s CCB, 4th Armored Division and infantry from the 35th Infantry Division crossed the Moselle south of the railroad hub of Nancy. The following day, September 13, Combat Command Langlade, named after its commander French Colonel Paul Girot de Langlade, part of Haislip’s XV Corps, foiled a spoiling attack at Dompaire by Panzer Brigade 112.

After its defeat at Dompaire, the 112th Panzer Brigade was in no shape to engage in combat for the time being. In addition, the 107th and 108th Panzer Brigades were withdrawn from Lorraine and placed in reserve to help defend the German city of Aachen against an imminent attack by the U.S. First Army. These events would seriously weaken the offensive Hitler had envisioned to serve as a hammer blow to Patton’s Third Army.

Not only were the forces marked to participate in Manteuffel’s main attack altered, but the scheme itself was changed just before it was to be launched. With Patton’s tanks in control of Luneville and the German forces assembled northeast of the town, Manteuffel aimed his assault against the American southern flank toward the town of Arracourt, which lay 10 miles north of Luneville. Hitler’s ambitious panzer attack of mid-September had devolved from its ambitious objectives of striking Patton in the flank, cutting his lines of communication, and destroying him to the much lesser goal of eliminating the spearhead of the U.S. Third Army.

On September 14, the foot soldiers of the 80th Infantry Division of the XII Corps spilled over the river to the north of the city. That same day, 4th Armored Division’s CCA, led by Colonel Bruce Clarke, reached the east bank of the Moselle just below Nancy. Eddy asked Clarke if he felt it was safe to cross his CCA to the east bank. Clarke passed along the query to Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams, who commanded the 37th Tank Battalion attached to CCA. “That is the shortest way home,” said Abrams, pointing to the east bank.

Clarke approved the order and Abrams’ tank battalion crossed the river. Once across it continued its lightning advance and by nightfall had driven 20 miles into the German rear. The American advance beyond the Moselle threatened to create a breach between the German First Army and General of Infantry Friedrich Wiese’s Nineteenth Army to its south. This would enable Patton’s tanks to race across the German border and into the Saar Basin. OKH realized that the unrelenting pressure from Patton would require an immediate and vigorous counterstrike against his army.

By mid-September 1944, Wood’s 4th Armored Division had a complement of 163 tanks supporting its 15,000 troops. The well-trained division, which had only been in combat since late July, had been fortunate not to have sustained heavy casualties. The 4th Armored Division had encountered few German tanks since it broke out of Normandy and sped across France. This was because it had not faced determined German panzer units until it reached Lorraine. As a result, the 4th Armored’s troops had no real experience facing German tanks.

On September 19, Manteuffel finally unleashed the armored offensive in Lorraine that Hitler had been demanding since late August. The morning of the attack dawned as it had the last several days with intermittent rain and thick fog in the low-lying areas. The terrain around Arracourt was agricultural, with gently rolling hills and tracts of woods. While the hills were not particularly high, some of them offered good vantage points for surveying the surrounding farmland. These vantage points would play an important role in the coming fight.

Fifth Panzer Army’s strike on September 19 took the form of two simultaneous thrusts. One thrust consisted of the 113rd Panzer Brigade advancing northwest from the town of Bourdonnay along the Metz-Strasbourg road toward Lezey-Moyenvic. The other thrust involved the 111th Panzer Brigade striking the Third Army’s center by way of the Parroy-Arracourt axis.

The objective of the operation was to link-up with Colonel Enrich von Loesch’s 553rd Volks- grenadier Infantry Division north of Nancy at Chateau-Salins, thus closing the breach the Americans had previously opened between the German First Army and the Nineteenth Army to its south. Barring the Germans’ way was Clarke’s CCA, which had deployed in 4th Armor’s southern sector around Arracourt. The division’s northern zone near Chateau-Salins was covered by CCB.

When the German tanks began to roll on the morning of September 19, CCA’s main components were the 25th Cavalry Squadron, 37th Tank Battalion, and the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion. CCA was understrength since Task Force Hunter, amounting to one third of the combat command’s strength, had been detailed the day before to aid the fight for Luneville. Clarke’s command post was at the Riouville farm a half mile east of Arracourt. Guarding the command post was a platoon of Hellcats, two battalions of M7 105mm self-propelled howitzers, and a battalion of tractor-drawn 155mm artillery pieces.

CCA’s left flank was shielded by B Company, 37th Tank Battalion and C Company, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion. This small task force linked CCA with CCB to its west. CCA’s center consisted of the balance of the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, which was deployed on the southeast ridge of the Bezange Forest overlooking Moyenvic. The right margin of the combat command consisted of the unit’s headquarters company and C Company, 37th Tank Battalion, which held the village of Lezey. At the village of Moncourt, on the eastern por- tion of CCA’s zone, stood a platoon of Stuart tanks belonging to D Company, 37th Tank Battalion. Screening CCA’s front was a line of out- posts manned by the troopers of the 25th Cavalry Squadron. Near the center of CCA’s position was the 166th Engineer Battalion.

The first contact CCA had with the enemy near Arracourt occurred at 7 AM when fire from a Stuart light tank destroyed a German half- track near Moncourt. Shortly afterward, five Panther tanks emerged from the fog and forced D Company to retreat to the main 37th Tank Battalion assembly area near the hamlet of Bezange-la-Petite. The Americans spotted another column of German armor moving along the Metz-Strasbourg road.

Notified of the enemy’s advance, Colonel Clarke ordered Captain William Dwight, 37th Tank Battalion’s liaison officer, to take a platoon of tank destroyers and establish a blocking position on Hill 246 approximately 800 yards from the village of Rechicourt-la-Petite. It was 7:45 AM when Dwight, with four M18 Tank destroyers under Lieutenant Edwin Leiper, reached the summit of Hill 246. No sooner had the crews assumed firing positions than they saw a single Ger- man tank emerge from the woods at the base of the hill.

The lead tank destroyer, commanded by Sergeant Stacey, opened fire, striking the enemy tank with its first shot. More German tanks were seen, and Stacey destroyed a second target in quick succession. A third German tank hit Stacey’s Hellcat, which caused injuries to the crew, but it was able to move under its own power back to Arracourt. Another Hellcat destroyed the Pz IV that had disabled Stacey’s gun. Two more German tanks were knocked out as they tried to reverse into the wood.

As the German armor withdrew, so did Leiper’s three remaining M18s, which rumbled onto a neighboring height. Leiper noticed a string of German tanks on a road running along the hills between Rechicourt and Bezange-la-Petite. The Americans unleashed a fusillade of armor-piercing shells at the new target. To make sure the tanks were completely destroyed, they called in an artillery strike from nearby M7 105mm guns. The torrent of American artillery shells destroyed five Pz IV tanks.

The fog and occasional rain had thus far prevented American airpower from coming into play however, some help from the sky was forthcoming. Major Charles “Bazooka Charlie” Carpen- ter, the head of the 4th Armored Division’s reconnaissance aircraft detachment, was flying in the area. He dove in his L-4H single-engine reconnaissance airplane on German tanks trying to work their way around Leiper’s position. Although he was unable to hit the tanks with his 2.36-inch rockets, he alerted Leiper to the threat to his rear.

The German Panther outclassed the American Sherman tank in nearly every respect except speed. Introduced in 1943, the Panther boasted a high-velocity 75mm gun and its thick, sloped frontal armor stopped rounds from Shermans and M18 Hellcat tank destroyers.

Reacting to the German threat, Leiper pulled one of his vehicles around and hit two German tanks. But a third German tank destroyed two Hellcats in quick succession. Leiper withdrew toward Arracourt with his remaining Hellcat. As he did, he was joined by three Sherman tanks sent by Abrams. While mopping up an enemy infantry platoon, one was hit by a panzergrenadier armed with a panzerfaust.

As Leiper battled south of Arracourt that morn- ing, farther north C Company, 37th Tank Battalion, commanded by Captain Kenneth Lamison, engaged German armor along the Metz-Strasbourg road. In the initial contact, Lamison and his fellow tankers disabled three Panthers that emerged from the thick fog. Recoiling from that loss, the Germans withdrew south of the highway.

Lamison hurriedly sent a platoon of Shermans to a commanding ridge near Bezange-la-Petite to trap the retreating foe. The American tankers sprung the ambush. From a flanking position, they knocked out four enemy tanks. Then, the Shermans hid on a reverse slope before their opponent could return fire. Due to the fog, the Germans could not pinpoint the origin of the fire. As they looked around anxiously, the Shermans popped up over the crest of the ridge and finished off the four remaining Panthers. As the action on the ground escalated, Bazooka Charlie again entered the fray, this time successfully striking two German tanks with his rockets from an altitude of 1,500 feet.

At 9:30 AM another German tank column approached CCA’s command post. CCA’s command center had ordered B Company, 37th Tank Battalion to shift to CCA’s command center. B Company arrived at its destination 45 minutes later. To deal with the developing threat, C Company, 37th Tank Battalion deployed on a ridge 500 yards from the command post. Sending salvos of 75mm armor-piercing shells at their antagonists, the Shermans knocked out several enemy tanks.

A German force of 14 tanks neared CCA’s headquarters at 12 PM. This was the southernmost assault of the day. Although it is not known exactly which German unit made the assault, it likely was the 111th Panzer Brigade. In a series of quick engagements, the platoon of Hellcats assigned to shelter the headquarters knocked out eight Panther tanks. The remaining Panthers withdrew rapidly.

At mid-afternoon, A Company, 37th Tank Battalion, which was part of Task Force Hunter sent to Luneville the day before, returned to Arracourt. Clarke and Abrams immediately paired A Company with B Company. “Dust off the sights, wipe off the shot, and breeze right through,” they instructed the company leaders. The two tank units then swept across the zone east of Arracourt. Leaving a single tank platoon from A Company to guard CCA’s command post, Hunter formed up southwest of Rechicourt with 24 Shermans and Dwight’s Hellcats.

Within minutes, the American tankers were hitting the remaining enemy armor in the area from front and flank, resulting in eight German tanks knocked out and approximately 100 German infantry casualties. The Americans lost three tanks. This was the last major engagement of the day. The U.S. forces engaged reported losing a total of five Shermans, three Hellcats, and six killed and three wounded.

As night fell, the 113th Panzer Brigade withdrew to Moncourt having suffered the loss of 43 tanks, mostly Panthers, and approximately 200 infantry. Due to its late disengagement at Luneville on September 18, coupled with its late arrival at its staging point for the attack on Arracourt on the following day, the 111th Panzer Brigade played virtually no part in the battle on September 19. As a result, the 113th Panzer Brigade attacked alone and unsupported. Nevertheless, OKH ordered Manteuffel to continue the attack the next day.

Although outnumbered 130 tanks to 45, Manteuffel instructed Kruger’s 58th Panzer Corps to attack from Arracourt toward Moyenvic on September 20 using the 111th Panzer Brigade. If repulsed, the Germans were to draw the Americans back to the Marne-Rhine Canal where flak guns and tanks from Panzer Brigade 113 awaited them.

American opposition on that day included not only the 37th Tank Battalion and some tank destroyers, but also the 35th Tank Battal- ion, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion, 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, and three field artillery battalions.

On the morning of September 20, in accordance with Patton’s orders of the previous day, 4th Armored Division advanced toward the German border. The Americans advanced in the early morning in two columns. Abrams led the 37th Battalion and Lt. Col. Charles Odems led the 35th Tank Battalion.

Trailing the American columns was Clarke’s command post, which was attacked by the lead elements of the 111th Panzer Brigade. The threat was relieved by the lively fire from the towed guns of the 191st Field Artillery Battalion, which fired its 155mm howitzers at a range of only 200 yards. After two tanks were hit, the rest of the German force withdrew. U.S. forces sent to assist the headquarters destroyed five Panther tanks that day.

By late morning, the two U.S. task forces had traveled six miles from their start line. Fearful that more German forces were in the Parroy Forest sector and might attack the division’s rear, Wood returned both task forces to Arracourt to clear that region of the enemy.

After returning to his launch point, Abrams sent a team composed of tanks and armored infantry to the north of the Parroy Forest. When C Company, 37th Tank Battalion crested a rise near the town of Ley, it was met by a German ambush containing tanks and 75mm Pak 40 antitank guns. The first German volleys destroyed six Shermans. In return, the Americans knocked out seven German tanks and three enemy antitank guns.

Later in the day, A Company, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion and A Company, 37th Tank Battalion took Moncourt. They did this by ini- tiating the assault with tanks and following up the armored attack with an infantry assault. By day’s end, the Germans had lost 16 tanks, 257 dead, and 80 captured. The 111th and 113th Panzer Brigades had only 54 tanks left from the 180 with which they started the offensive. The U.S. 4th Armored Division lost 18 Shermans.

Under continued pressure from his superiors to halt Third Army’s advance, German Fifth Panzer Army commander Hasso von Manteuffel ordered Panzer Brigades 111 and 113 to launch a two-pronged attack toward the town of Arracourt on September 19. Poor reconnaissance and map reading by the Germans contributed heavily to the failure of the attack.

The 4th Armored Division rested on September 21, and the Germans reinforced their strike force at Arracourt with elements of Generalleutnant Wend von Wietersheim’s 11th Panzer Division from the Alsace area. Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht, the 11th Panzer Division, to which the 111th Panzer Brigade was attached, had a tank strength of just 40 Panthers and Panzer IVs.

In the predawn hours of September 22, the 11th Panzer began its mission to seal off the 4th Armor’s penetration by gaining control as far west as the Bezange Forest-Arracourt Blois de Benamont area. The attack was redirected to seize the village of Juvelize and then push north through Lezey. A supporting thrust was to be made by the 113th Panzer Brigade toward Ley.

The first encounters of the day occurred around 9:15 AM in thick fog between light Stu- art tanks of the screening D Troop, 25th Cavalry Squadron and German panzergrenadiers aided by 12 tanks, which quickly destroyed four American Stuarts. Hellcats from B Com- pany, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, responded to the German assault and knocked out three Panthers before withdrawing. In response, B and C Companies of the 37th Tank Battalion deployed between Juvelize and Lezey and beyond the latter town.

By noon, elements of 111th Panzer Brigade had occupied Juvelize, while the 113th reached Lezey. During their advance, American ground attack aircraft struck both panzer brigades. To block the enemy’s move any farther south, Abrams established a defensive line consisting of tanks from two of his companies, supported by infantry, on Hill 257 just northwest of Juvelize. As German armor continued to advance, American tanks on Hill 257 fired on them at ranges from 400 yards to 2,000 yards, destroying 14 tanks and effectively stopping the enemy’s attempt to reinforce the town. Abrams then ordered his B Company, together with A Company, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion, to take the town. They successfully achieved their objective. The 111th Panzer Brigade subsequently withdrew from the area.

German casualties at Juvelize amounted to 16 tanks, 250 men killed, and 185 captured. The U.S. forces engaged lost seven killed and 13 wounded. As for equipment, the Americans lost seven Stuarts and one Sherman tank.

On September 23, the Germans licked their wounds and waited for the remainder of the 11th Panzer Division. As for the Americans, Patton’s desire to continue his advance toward Germany was frustrated by a lack of supplies, which were being funneled to the Allied forces engaged in Operation Market Garden in Holland. As a result, Eisenhower ordered Patton to switch to the defensive.

On September 24, the 11th Panzer Division advanced on the lightly defended town of Moyen- vic. Over the next few hours the Germans conducted small battalion-sized probes supported by a few tanks against the Americans, but each probe was repulsed. The Germans lost 10 tanks and 300 troops.

The following day, the 11th Panzer Division made a minor attack from Moyenvic. Larger assaults were made at Juvelize, Lezey, and Ley. By this time, the 4th Armored was in the process of shortening its defensive line by pulling back to Rechicourt-Arracourt. That day, CCA and CCB reported destroying 10 enemy tanks and killing 300 enemy soldiers, while suffering 212 casual- ties. The fighting on September 26 was limited due to bad weather. However, the two sides exchanged artillery fire.

The tempo picked up on September 27 when Manteuffel sought to secure Hills 318, 265, and 293 on the southern flank of 4th Armored guarded by CCB. These hills overlooked the German positions in the Parroy Forest and placed any German movement there under the threat of American artillery and tank fire.

The 224 men of A Company, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion, who were deployed between Hills 265 and 318, put up a spirited defense of their position that day. They held their ground in the face of repeated assaults by tanks and infantry from the 11th Panzer Division throughout the long day.

U.S. infantryman fires a machine gun at Germans on a rural French farm. The tenacious resistance of the U.S. infantry stunned panzer troops, who believed they could easily overrun U.S. infantry lacking close armor support.

Meanwhile, the 110th Panzergrenadier Regiment supported by tanks from the 11th Panzer Division attacked C Company and a platoon of tank destroyers holding Hill 265. A German battle group took Hill 318 from elements of the U.S. 51st Armored Infantry Battalion in heavy fighting, which sparked continuous fighting over the next 24 hours. The struggle for neighboring Hill 265 was almost as intense with the Americans barely holding the high ground. They were able to hold on primarily because of strong artillery support.

In preparation for a last-ditch effort to capture Hills 265 and 318, Wietersheim sent reinforcements to the German units deployed opposite CCB’s positions on the two strategic hills. On September 29, the 111th and 113th Panzer Brigades, as well as portions of the 110th Panzergrenadier Regiment, made a coordinated assault on the objectives. The early morning attack, in dense fog that limited observation to a few dozen yards, pushed the 51st Armored Infantry back 500 yards. This gave the Germans control of the forward crest of Hill 318 by late morning.

In the final days of Arracourt, American armored crews received assistance from P-47 D-25 Thunderbolts proficient in tank hunting. The Germans called them Jabos for jager-bomber, which means fighter-bomber.

In response, Clarke sent a company of Sherman tanks from the 8th Tank Battalion to retake the hill, and the fighting reached a new level of intensity. The fog lifted just in time for P-47 Thunderbolts of the U.S. 405th Fighter Group to foil the next German attack. The air strikes forced the German tanks into the clear where they were systematically picked off by American artillery and tank fire.

In the afternoon, the Germans were forced to retreat from Hill 318 after a loss of 23 tanks. At Hill 265, the Germans pushed the Americans back to the reverse slope, but the Americans held on. With no reinforcements expected, the Germans abandoned the height.

The fighting on September 29 marked the last major attempt by the Fifth Panzer Army to cut Third Army’s armored spearhead near Arracourt. The failed effort of the previous four days cost the Germans 36 tanks, 700 killed, and 300 wounded.

The end of September 1944 found the fighting in Lorraine at a stalemate. Deprived of supplies, Patton could not switch to the offensive. As for the German Army, its panzer force had been so badly mauled that it was incapable of further offensive action against Patton’s Third Army.

Patton’s next challenge was to capture fortress Metz on Third Army’s left flank. After Metz fell to the Americans on December 13, Third Army advanced toward the Siegfried Line. Before Decem- ber was over, Patton’s Third Army would be engaged in another great armored clash, known as the Battle of the Bulge.


Battle of Guilford Courthouse

On March 15, 1781, American and British forces clashed for several hours near Guilford Courthouse. The battle was the culmination of several months of hard campaigning by the armies of Nathanael Greene and Lord Charles Cornwallis. British strategy centered on conquering the South by destroying Greene’s army. Aware of this plan, Greene and other American leaders refused to give Cornwallis a traditional fight, and instead engaged the British in several skirmishes and strategic retreats. Prior to Guilford Courthouse, the American strategy had resulted in the defeat of two detachments of Cornwallis’s main army: one led by Patrick Ferguson at King’s Mountain in October 1780 and the other led by Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens in January 1781.

After Cowpens, Greene withdrew to Virginia in what became known as the “Race to the Dan.” Cornwallis burned his baggage at Ramseur’s Mill in the interest of speed but unsuccessfully pursued Greene to the Dan. His men fought several skirmishes with Greene’s men at Torrence's Tavern and Cowan’s Ford, where Patriot leader William Lee Davidson was killed. The British crossed the Catawba at Beattie’s and Cowan’s Fords, and the Yadkin River at Shallow Ford. Greene’s forces crossed the Dan River shortly before Cornwallis’s men arrived, taking with them all of the boats along the south bank. Recent rains had flooded the river making the local fords unusable, saving Greene’s army from destruction. The “race” cost Cornwallis irreplaceable numbers of men to desertion and small skirmishes, and left his 2,000-man army completely destitute of supplies. One British officer late described his men, many of whom were barefoot, as living off of “green corn and carrion.”

Unable to wait for the rivers to recede without supplies Cornwallis fell back from the Virginia border while Greene’s army replenished itself with food and ammunition, and received reinforcements. On February 22, Greene’s 4,400 men recrossed the Dan River and began pursuing the British southward. The two armies fought several skirmishes within the area including engagements at Weitzell's Mill and Clapp's Mill. Headquartered at High Rock Ford Greene, with replenished supplies and holding a two-to-one advantage in men, decided to offer the open battle that Cornwallis had pursued for nearly three months. By March 14, the armies were within ten miles of each other near Guilford Courthouse, a heavily wooded area consisting of a few small houses, the county courthouse, and several small plowed fields.

On the morning of March 15, Greene deployed his army in three lines, each spaced approximately 400 yards apart. The first consisted of nearly 800 North Carolina militia arranged on the edge of a field with “their arms resting on a rail fence.” The North Carolina militiamen included William R. Davie, Benjamin Williams, Nathaniel Macon, James Turner, and David Caldwell. Nearly 850 Virginia militiamen stood as a second line within dense woods to the rear of the North Carolinians. The third line consisted of Greene’s regulars, the Continental soldiers from Maryland and Virginia. In addition, on the right and left flanks of the first line, Greene posted veteran Virginia and North Carolina riflemen, as well as Continental dragoons and infantry led by William Washington and Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee. Among the riflemen stood Joseph Winston, Jesse Franklin, and Richard Allen. Marquis De Bretigny lead a small detachment of North Carolina militia dragoons attached to Washington’s force. Greene posted artillery at both the first and third lines, with those along the first having orders to fall back after the fighting began. Greene, following the example of Daniel Morgan at Cowpens earlier that year, ordered the North Carolina militia to fire two volleys and then fall back behind the Virginians.

Taking Greene’s bait, Cornwallis's army marched out from its camp at Deep River Meeting House in the early morning hours. Several clashes erupted between British and American advance parties led by Banastre Tarleton and Light Horse Harry Lee at the New Garden Meeting House several miles south of Greene’s main army. At one point, Tarleton’s dragoons withdrew across the grounds of present-day Guilford College. British forces drove back the Americans, and by noon, Cornwallis was in striking distance of Greene’s army.

Cornwallis’s men advanced on Greene’s first line after a thirty-minute artillery barrage by both sides. The British broke through the first and second lines relatively quickly, but suffered severe casualties in the advance, particularly along the Virginia militia line. One American noted that, after his regiment fired a volley, the British “appeared like the stalks of wheat after the harvest man passed over them with his cradle.” Despite their losses, Cornwallis’s army pushed on to the American third line, where they engaged the Continental regulars in both small arms fire and hand-to-hand combat. After the war, a story developed which had it that Cornwallis ordered his own artillery to fire into the melee, despite being warned he would kill some of his own men. Recent research has proven this story completely apocryphal. The artillery did fire into the group, but only after American cavalry had entered the fray and threatened the British guns.

Unwilling to the risk the destruction of his army, and realizing that he had inflicted massive casualties on the British, Greene withdrew his army to Troublesome Ironworks nearly fifteen miles away. The battered British army did not pursue. Although Cornwallis’s army held the field, the Americans had punished them severely. Twenty-seven percent of Cornwallis’s army lay dead or wounded on the field. The Foot Guards battalions, considered the finest troops in the entire British army, suffered fifty-six percent casualties, including nearly all of their officers. By comparison, Greene lost only six percent of his force, the majority of whom were North Carolina and Virginia militiamen who had fled shortly after the battle began and been counted as missing in action. In a letter to Samuel Huntington, the president of Congress, Greene described the engagement as “long, obstinate and bloody.”

After the battle, Cornwallis withdrew his army first to Ramsey's Mill and then through southeastern North Carolina to the British base at Wilmington, where he resupplied his army. British Parliamentarian Charles James Fox told the House of Commons, “Another such victory would ruin the British army.” Fox’s assertion would be borne out in the following months. In late April 1781, Cornwallis marched north from Wilmington, focusing his strategy on Virginia instead of the entire South. Despite skirmishes at Swift Creek, Peacock Bridge, and Halifax, he and his men crossed into Virginia in mid-May. Five months later, Cornwallis surrendered his army to George Washington at the little seaside village of Yorktown, effectively ending major fighting in the southern colonies, and speeding along American victory in the war.

References and additional resources:

Babits, Lawrence Edward, and Joshua B. Howard. 2009. Long, obstinate, and bloody: the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Rankin, Hugh F. 1976. Greene and Cornwallis: the campaign in the Carolinas. North Carolina bicentennial pamphlet series, 10. Raleigh: Dept. of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History.

Beeldkrediete:

"Photograph [of an engraving of a portrait of General Nathaniel Greene], ca. 1910-1930, Accession #: H.19XX.331.94." 1910-1930. North Carolina Museum of History. (accessed June 6, 2014).


Battle of North Point - History

When Griffin’s Division reached Jericho Ford on the North Anna River the afternoon of 23 May 1864, the troops found the crossing undefended so Griffin immediately ordered Sweitzer and Ayres to cross their brigades. After a brief skirmish with a South Carolina brigade picketed there, both brigades advanced into the woods to their front. Moving to positions well into the stand of timber, the two brigades halted and immediately began chopping trees and digging entrenchments and were soon followed by the rest of the V Corps.

About 5:30 p.m., Union pickets reported heavy dust being kicked up on the road to Hanover Junction. Suddenly, a great rebel yell pierced the evening air and gunfire exploded to the Regulars’ front. Peering to the far side of the wood, they could see a huge gray line heading right for them. The troops of Sweitzer’s and Ayres’ brigades, unstacked their weapons, leapt to their works, and commenced a heavy fire against Brown’s South Carolinians, and Brig. Gen. James H. Lane’s North Carolinians. To the rear, Cutler’s 4th Division scrambled to grab their rifles and set out to reach the high ground on the corps’ right where it should have been all along. But as the division deployed to advance, the two brigades forming Wilcox’s left wing crashed into the Pennsylvania Bucktails, and the “Iron Brigade,” driving them back toward the river. On the Federal right, only one brigade held. Sweitzer’s brigade also fell back, though in good order. Only Ayres now held in the center.

The attack had interrupted the men’s evening meal, which upset them in no small way. According to one account, the Regulars, angry over their lost suppers, “waited until the Confederate line came within point-blank range and then opened fire with a vengeance.” Back on the Union right, three batteries pulled into position amidst the shaken 4th Division. The presence of the artillery heartened the men and soon, many stragglers who had fled to the bluffs gathered their courage and returned to the fight. Having sustained heavy casualties in their own assaults at Saunder’s Field and Laurel Hill, the Regulars now had the grim satisfaction of dishing out the punishment for once. As the rebels retreated to Noel’s Station, Federal officers led a rousing cheer which echoed through the woods “in a tremendous roar of victory.” The steadfast performance of the regiment earned the men of the 11th Infantry a note of congratulations in Gen. Meade’s order of the day.


After a $50 million grant landed at City of Hope in January, experts there pledged to find a cure for type 1 diabetes by 2023. That’s ambitious, Roep acknowledges, “but these advances could change the lives of people who were told they had an incurable disease.”…

The short answer. Diabetes mellitus is not curable: There is no treatment that will eliminate the disease completely. That being said, we’ve come a long way since the days before insulin, when diabetes was often a fatal disease….


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