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Duitsland verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State

Duitsland verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State



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Adolf Hitler verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State en bring Amerika, wat neutraal was, in die Europese konflik.

Die bombardement op Pearl Harbor het selfs Duitsland verras. Hoewel Hitler 'n mondelinge ooreenkoms met sy As -vennoot Japan aangegaan het dat Duitsland by 'n oorlog teen die Verenigde State sou aansluit, was hy onseker oor hoe die oorlog gevoer sou word. Die aanval van Japan op Pearl Harbor het die vraag beantwoord. Op 8 Desember het die Japannese ambassadeur Oshima na die Duitse minister van buitelandse sake, von Ribbentrop, gegaan om die Duitsers op 'n formele oorlogsverklaring teen Amerika vas te trek. Von Ribbentrop staan ​​stil vir tyd; hy het geweet dat Duitsland nie verplig was om dit te doen kragtens die voorwaardes van die drieparty -verdrag, wat hulp beloof het as Japan aangeval word, maar nie as Japan die aanvaller was nie. Von Ribbentrop was bang dat die toevoeging van 'n ander antagonis, die Verenigde State, die Duitse oorlogspoging sou oorweldig.

LEES MEER: Die geheime Britse veldtog om die VSA te oorreed om die Tweede Wêreldoorlog te betree

Maar Hitler het anders gedink. Hy was oortuig dat die Verenigde State hom binnekort op die spel sou slaan en oorlog teen Duitsland sou verklaar. Die Amerikaanse vloot val reeds Duitse U-bote aan, en Hitler verag Roosevelt vir sy herhaaldelike verbale aanvalle op sy Nazi-ideologie. Hy het ook geglo dat Japan baie sterker was as wat dit was, dat sodra dit die Verenigde State verslaan het, dit sou draai en Duitsland sou help om Rusland te verslaan. So om 15:30. (Berlynse tyd) op 11 Desember het die Duitse afgevaardigde in Washington die Amerikaanse minister van buitelandse sake, Cordell Hull, 'n afskrif van die oorlogsverklaring oorhandig.

Op dieselfde dag het Hitler die Reichstag toegespreek om die verklaring te verdedig. Die mislukking van die New Deal, het Hitler aangevoer, was die werklike oorsaak van die oorlog, aangesien president Roosevelt, ondersteun deur plutokrate en Jode, probeer toesmeer het vir die ineenstorting van sy ekonomiese agenda. 'Eers prikkel hy oorlog, vervals dan die oorsake, wikkel hom dan in 'n mantel van Christelike skynheiligheid en lei die mensdom stadig maar seker na 'n oorlog,' verklaar Hitler - en die Riksdag spring op hul voete in donderende toejuiging.


Duitse oorlogsverklaring teen die Verenigde State

Op 11 Desember 1941, vier dae na die Japannese aanval op Pearl Harbor en die Amerikaanse oorlogsverklaring teen die Japanse Ryk, Nazi -Duitsland verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State, in reaksie op wat beweer word dat dit 'n reeks uitlokkings deur die Amerikaanse regering was toe die VSA nog amptelik neutraal was tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Die besluit om oorlog te verklaar, is byna sonder konsultasie deur Adolf Hitler geneem. Dit word na verwys as Hitler se "mees raaiselagtige" besluit van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. [1] In die openbaar is die formele verklaring aan American afgelê Chargé d'Affaires Leland B. Morris deur die Duitse minister van buitelandse sake, Joachim von Ribbentrop, in laasgenoemde se kantoor. Later die dag verklaar die VSA oorlog teen Duitsland, met die optrede van Duitsland wat die oorblywende betekenisvolle binnelandse isolationistiese opposisie teen die VSA by die Europese oorlog uitgeskakel het.


Hayworth: ‘In My History ’ VSA het nie formeel oorlog verklaar teen Nazi -Duitsland nie (VIDEO)

Die voormalige rep. JD Hayworth (R-AZ), wat senator John McCain in die Republikeinse voorverkiesing uitdaag, het gesê dat die Verenigde State ten minste in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog nie amptelik oorlog verklaar het nie, en dat dit hoe dit was het in sy geskiedenis gegaan.

Terwyl hy verlede week met 'n plaaslike GOP -organisasie in Phoenix gepraat het, is Hayworth deur 'n deelnemer gevra oor die versuim van Amerika om formeel oorlog te verklaar in ons moderne konflikte. Hayworth verdedig die hedendaagse magtigings vir die gebruik van militêre geweld. Maar ek wil ook daarop wys dat die oorlog wat Dwight Eisenhower in Europa teen die Derde Ryk in Europa gelei het, as ons wil wees. nooit verklaar nie deur die Amerikaanse kongres, ” gesê Hayworth. Onthou, die kongres het 'n oorlogsresolusie teen Japan aangeneem. Duitsland twee dae later oorlog teen ons verklaar. Ons het nooit formeel oorlog verklaar teen Hitler en Duitsland nie, en tog het ons die oorlog gevoer. ”

Die vraesteller het toe geantwoord dat hy gedink het dat die Verenigde State wel oor Duitsland verklaar het, en dat hy dit sou nagaan. Hayworth het geantwoord: 'Ek dink ons ​​moet dit nagaan. Miskien het ons die rasionalisering gemaak, want daar was 'n as -alliansie dat die aanval van Japan gelykstaande was aan die aanval van die Derde Ryk. Maar soos ek onthou my geskiedenis, Duitsland verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State, nie omgekeerd nie. ”

Trouens, die Verenigde State het gedoen oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar. Die tydlyn lui soos volg: Japan val op 7 Desember 1941 die Amerikaanse vlootbasis by Pearl Harbor aan. Die Verenigde State verklaar oorlog teen Japan die volgende dag, 8 Desember 1941. Toe op 11 Desember 1941 verklaar Duitsland oorlog teen die Verenigde State State — waaraan die Verenigde State onmiddellik teruggegee het deur dieselfde dag oorlog teen Duitsland te verklaar.

Die video van Hayworth is regstreeks gestroom deur die plaaslike GOP-organisasie. Dit is daarna vasgelê en aanlyn geplaas deur 'n spoorsnyer teen Hayworth. Ons kon nie dadelik die veldtog van Hayworth ’s bereik vir kommentaar nie.

Laat opdatering: Mark Sanders, kommunikasie -direkteur van Hayworth, gee ons hierdie opmerking:

In 'n gee -en -neem -sessie met lede van 'n gehoor, is kongreslid Hayworth uitgevra oor die huidige konflikte waarin die VSA besig is. Hy het gesê dat die Verenigde State tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog nie oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar het nie, en was dit eens met die heer stel die vraag dat addisionele navorsing nodig mag wees. Hayworth het sy navorser opdrag gegee om dit te ondersoek en ons het gevind dat Duitsland op 11 Desember 1941 oorlog teen die Verenigde State verklaar het en dat president Roosevelt geskryf het dat ek die kongres versoek om 'n oorlogstoestand tussen die Verenigde State en Duitsland te erken tussen die Verenigde State en Italië. '”

Die kongres het ingestem om die oorlogstoestand tussen die Verenigde State en die Duitse regering wat op die Verenigde State neergelê is, hiermee formeel te verklaar.


Blykbaar, op daardie stadium in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, moes die as -moondes (Duitsland, Italië en nou Japan) gedink het dat dinge goed genoeg gaan om die direkte betrokkenheid van die Verenigde State, 'n industriële kraghuis, waarvan die bevolking groter was as die van Duitsland en Italië saam. In hul beraadslagings het die Axis -krygsheren ook blykbaar die feit dat die Amerikaanse nywerheidsaanlegte op daardie stadium nie direk deur grond, see of selfs lug aangeval kon word nie, versaak omdat tegnologie nog nie gevorderd genoeg was om hulle maklik te bereik sonder om te ondervang nie.

Aangesien Groot -Brittanje nog steeds nie verower is nie en die Sowjetunie net besig was om sy enjins aan die gang te kry, moes versigtigheid 'n bietjie meer versigtigheid van Hitler en Mussolini voorskryf, maar dit was natuurlik nie hul sterkpunt nie.

Soos dit blyk, het die VSA 'n maksimum militêre sterkte van ongeveer 10 miljoen man aan die geallieerde poging gelewer, sowel as 'n ongelooflike hoeveelheid wapens en voorrade. Die bydrae van Amerikaanse vindingrykheid tot die mengsel was ook nie afslag nie, veral in die wedloop om die eerste atoombomme te skep. As Duitsland nie vroeg in 1945 verslaan is nie, het die Duitsers heel moontlik die verontwaardiging gely as die eerste nuk.

Die lesse wat u hier moet leer, is om u hoenders nie te tel voordat hulle uitgebroei word nie, en om nooit te dink dat 'n vyand verslaan is voordat hulle werklik is nie. Hierdie besef moes nog duidelik blyk uit die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, toe die bydraes van die Verenigde State die balans stewig in die geallieerdes se guns gestoot het. Miskien is nog 'n les wat ons kan leer, om nie toe te laat dat megalomane diktators u land bestuur nie!

Vraag aan studente (en intekenare): Waarom het ons selfs in die een-en-twintigste eeu nog diktators? Laat weet ons asseblief in die kommentaarafdeling onder hierdie artikel.

As u van hierdie artikel gehou het en kennisgewings van nuwe artikels wil ontvang, is u welkom om in te teken Geskiedenis en opskrifte deur van ons te hou Facebook en word een van ons beskermhere!


Waarom Hitler die oorlog teen die Verenigde State verklaar het

TOE NUUS VAN DIE JAPANSE AANVAL OP PEARL HAVEN Duitsland bereik het, is sy leierskap geabsorbeer deur die krisis in sy oorlog met die Sowjetunie. Op 1 Desember 1941, na die ernstige nederlaag wat die Rooi Leër aan die Duitse magte aan die suidpunt van die Oosfront toegedien het, het Adolf Hitler veldmaarskalk Gerd von Rundstedt, die bevelvoerder van die weermaggroep wat die volgende dag daar geveg het, verlig Hitler het na die weermaggroep se hoofkwartier in die suide van die Oekraïne gevlieg. Laat op 3 Desember vlieg hy terug na sy hoofkwartier in Oos -Pruise, net om nog slegter nuus te ontvang: die Duitse weermaggroep aan die noordelike punt van die Russiese front word ook deur die Rooi Leër se teenaanvalle teruggedruk. Die onheilspellendste van alles was dat die Duitse offensief in die middel, teenoor Moskou, nie net uitgeput was nie, maar ook die gevaar loop om deur 'n Sowjet -teenoffensief oorweldig te word. Hitler en sy generaals het nog nie die omvang van die nederlaag langs die front erken nie, maar het hul terugslae bloot gesien as 'n tydelike halt in die Duitse offensiewe operasies.

Die werklikheid het net begin insink toe die Duitse leiers nuus ontvang van Japan se aanval op Pearl Harbor. Op die aand van 8 Desember, binne enkele ure nadat ons gehoor het van die vorige dag se aanval, het Hitler beveel dat die Duitse vloot te alle tye Amerikaanse skepe en dié van Sentraal- en Suid -Amerikaanse lande wat hul solidariteit met die Verenigde State verklaar het, moet laat sink. Die aand vertrek hy ook uit Oos -Pruise per trein na Berlyn, maar nie voordat hy 'n dagvaarding aan die lede van die Duitse parlement, die Reichstag, stuur om op 11 Desember te vergader nie en tydens 'n formele sitting wat aan die hele land, verklaar oorlog teen die Verenigde State.

Waarom hierdie gretigheid om met nog 'n groot mag oorlog toe te gaan, en in 'n tyd toe Duitsland reeds 'n ernstige situasie op die Oosfront beleef het? Sommige het aangevoer dat dit 'n irrasionele reaksie van Hitler was op sy versuim om Moskou in te neem, en sommige het die vertraging van 'n paar dae toegeskryf aan onwilligheid van Hitler se kant toe dit meer te doen gehad het met die inisiatief van Japan die Duitsers verras nog steeds dat ander hulle verbeel dat Duitsland uiteindelik gereageer het op Amerika se beleid om Brittanje te help, alhoewel Hitler in al sy vorige oorlogsverklarings maar min ag geslaan het op die beleid, vir of teen Duitsland, van die binnegevalde lande. Ideologiese oorwegings en strategiese prioriteite soos Duitsland dit gesien het, was altyd belangriker. Die mees onlangse geval was die van die Sowjetunie, wat kritieke voorrade aan Duitsland gelewer het tot enkele minute voor die Duitse aanval op 22 Junie 1941.

Die realiteit is dat oorlog met die Verenigde State al jare op Hitler se agenda was, dat hy vyandelikhede uitgestel het slegs omdat hy dit op 'n tyd en onder omstandighede van eie keuse wou begin, en dat die Japannese aanval pas presies aan sy vereistes. Dit was 'n veronderstelling van Hitler sedert die 1920's dat Duitsland op 'n stadium teen die Verenigde State sou veg. Reeds in die somer van 1928 beweer hy in sy tweede boek (eers gepubliseer totdat ek dit in 1961 vir hom gedoen het, soos Hitlers zweites Buch) dat die versterking en voorbereiding van Duitsland op oorlog met die Verenigde State een van die take van die Nasionaal -Sosialistiese beweging was. Omdat sy doelwitte vir die toekoms van Duitsland 'n onbeperkte uitbreiding meebring en omdat hy gedink het dat die Verenigde State 'n uitdaging sou wees vir die Duitse oorheersing van die wêreld, was 'n oorlog met die Verenigde State lankal 'n deel van die toekoms wat hy hom voorgestel het. Dit sou kom tydens sy eie bewind of tydens die van sy opvolgers.

Gedurende die jare van sy kansellerskap voor 1939, was die Duitse beleid wat bedoel was om die projek van 'n oorlog met die Verenigde State te implementeer deur twee faktore gekondisioneer: geloof in die waarheid van die steek-in-die-rug legende enersyds praktiese probleme om Amerikaanse militêre mag aan die ander kant te betrek. Eersgenoemde, die wydverspreide oortuiging dat Duitsland die Eerste Wêreldoorlog verloor het weens die ineenstorting in die huis eerder as 'n nederlaag aan die voorkant, het outomaties 'n gesprek van enorme betekenis meegebring, en dit word algemeen geïgnoreer. Hoe meer geloof 'n mens aan die steek in die rug gegee het, hoe minder verwaarloos was die militêre rol van die Verenigde State in die konflik. Vir Hitler en vir vele ander in Duitsland was die idee dat Amerikaanse deelname die Westerse moondhede in 1918 kon laat vashou en dan na die oorwinning beweeg, nie 'n redelike verklaring van die gebeure van daardie jaar nie, maar 'n legende.

Slegs die Duitsers wat nie deur die nasionalistiese euforie verlig was nie, kon glo dat Amerikaanse magte in die verlede 'n belangrike rol gespeel het of in die toekoms sou doen. 'N Soliede Duitse tuisfront, wat die Nasionaal -Sosialisme sou verseker, kan die volgende keer 'n nederlaag voorkom. Die probleem met die stryd teen die Verenigde State was nie dat die inherente swak en verdeelde Amerikaners effektiewe strydmagte kon skep, ondersteun en ondersteun nie. Dit was eerder dat die tussenliggende oseaan deur 'n groot Amerikaanse vloot geblokkeer kon word.

Anders as die Duitse vloot van die tydperk voor 1914, waarin besprekings werklik oor die relatiewe verdienste van die landing op Cape Cod teen die landing op Long Island was, het die Duitse regering van die dertigerjare 'n meer praktiese benadering gevolg. In ooreenstemming met die klem op die opbou van die lugmag, is in 1937 en 1938 spesifikasies uitgereik vir wat die Me 264 geword het en binnekort in die regering na verwys as die “America bomwerper ” of die “New York bomwerper. & #8221 Die “America-bomwerper ” sou in staat wees om 'n vrag van vyf ton bomme na New York of 'n kleiner vrag na die Midde-Weste te vervoer, of om verkenningsopdragte oor die Weskus te vlieg en dan na Duitsland terug te keer sonder om by te vul. basisse. Daar is met verskillende tipes en modelle geëksperimenteer, die eerste prototipe wat in Desember 1940 vlieg, maar nie een van hulle het verder gegaan as die voorlopige modelle nie.

In plaas daarvan konsentreer Hitler en sy adviseurs steeds meer op die konsep van die verkryging van basisse vir die Duitse lugmag aan die kus van Noordwes -Afrika, sowel as op die Spaanse en Portugese eilande aan die Afrika -kus, om die afstand na die westelike kus te verkort halfrond. Hitler het ook gesprekke gevoer met sy vlootadviseurs en met Japannese diplomate oor die bombardering van die Verenigde State vanaf die Azore, maar die konsultasies het eers in 1940 en 1941 plaasgevind.

Net soos die Japannese, het die Duitsers in die dertigerjare die vraag gekonfronteer hoe om die Amerikaanse vloot te hanteer in die bevordering van hul ekspansionistiese ambisies sonder die minste konsultasie, en in volledige en doelbewuste onkunde van mekaar se projekte, het die twee regerings tot presies dieselfde gevolgtrekking. In beide lande was die besluit om die Amerikaanse hoeveelheid met kwaliteit te troef, om supergevegskepe te bou, wat met hul aansienlik groter omvang baie swaarder wapens kan dra wat oor groter afstande kan skiet en sodoende die Amerikaanse slagskepe kan vernietig op afstande wat die vyand en #8217s gewere kon nie ooreenstem nie.

Die Japanners het in groot geheim begin om vier sulke supergevegskepe te bou. Die Duitsers het gehoop om ses supergevegskepe te bou; hulle planne is vroeg in 1939 uitgewerk en die kielies is in April en Mei gelê. Hierdie monsters van 56 200 ton sou nie net die nuwe Amerikaanse gevegskepe van die Noord-Carolina-klas uitklas nie, maar selfs die opvolger-Iowa-klas.

Die presiese besonderhede van hoe 'n oorlog met die Verenigde State eintlik sou plaasvind, was nie 'n onderwerp waaraan Hitler of sy medewerkers baie aandag geskenk het nie. Toe die tyd aanbreek, kon iets altyd uitgewerk word; dit was belangriker om die voorvereistes vir sukses voor te berei.

Toe die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in September 1939 begin, het die werk opgehou met die gedeeltes van die blou-water-vloot wat nog nie voltooi was nie, insluitend die supergevegskepe. Die onmiddellike noodsaaklikheid van die oorlog het voorrang geniet op projekte wat nie in die nabye toekoms voltooi kon word nie. Byna onmiddellik het die Duitse vloot egter stappe gedoen om die Verenigde State in die oorlog te bring. Admiraal Erich Raeder, die opperbevelhebber van die vloot, kon skaars wag om met die Verenigde State oorlog te voer. Hy het gehoop dat die toename in insinkings van handelsvaart, insluitend Amerikaanse, wat sou voortspruit uit 'n heeltemal onbeperkte duikbootveldtog 'n groot impak sou hê op Brittanje, wie se oppervlakte -vloot Duitsland nog nie kon verslaan nie. Maar Hitler het teruggehou. Soos hy dit sien, wat was die punt daarvan om die sinkings van U-bootjies marginaal te verhoog toe Duitsland nog nie 'n groot vloot gehad het nie en ook nie 'n basis daarvoor het nie?

Die lente van 1940 het die geleentheid gebied om beide tekortkominge reg te stel. Die verowering van Noorweë in April het onmiddellik twee relevante besluite opgelewer: Eerstens sou Noorweë in die Derde Ryk opgeneem word, en tweedens sou 'n belangrike permanente basis vir die Duitse vloot aan die Noorse - nou Duitse kus by Trondheim gebou word. Boonop sou daar 'n groot, heeltemal Duitse stad gebou word, met die hele kompleks wat direk met die vasteland van Duitsland verbind sou word met spesiale paaie, brûe en spoorweë. Die werk aan hierdie kolossale projek het tot die lente van 1943 voortgeduur.

Die verowering van die Lae Lande en Frankryk, kort daarna dié van Noorweë, het verdere vooruitsigte gebied. In die oë van Hitler en sy medewerkers was die oorlog in die Weste verby, sodat hulle hul volgende doelwitte kon bereik. Op land wat 'n inval in die Sowjetunie beteken het, 'n eenvoudige taak wat Hitler oorspronklik in die herfs van 1940 wou voltooi. Op see het dit beteken dat die probleem van oorlogvoering teen die Verenigde State aangepak kon word.

Op 11 Julie 1940 beveel Hitler die hervatting van die vlootbouprogram. Die supergevegskepe, tesame met honderde ander oorlogskepe, kan nou gebou word. Terwyl die program voortduur, sou die Duitsers nie net die vlootbasis in Trondheim bou en die Franse vlootbasisse aan die Atlantiese kus oorneem nie, maar sou hulle 'n landverbinding na die Straat van Gibraltar dryf - as Duitsland Spanje kon beheer soos Frankryk. . Dit sou dan maklik wees om lug- en seebase in Franse en Spaanse noordwestelike Afrika sowel as op die Spaanse en Portugese eilande in die Atlantiese Oseaan aan te skaf en te ontwikkel. In 'n oorlog met die Verenigde State sou dit die perfekte basis wees vir die nuwe vloot en vir vliegtuie wat nog nie aan die vroeëre buitensporige spesifikasies vir langafstandvlugte voldoen nie.

Hierdie rooskleurige vooruitsigte het nie uitgewerk nie. Wat ook al die entoesiasme van Francisco Franco om aan die oorlog aan die kant van Duitsland deel te neem en wat ook al sy bereidheid was om sy vriend in Berlyn by te staan, die Spaanse diktator was 'n nasionalis wat nie op die punt was om Spaanse soewereiniteit aan iemand anders te gee nie - ook nie op gebied wat tans gehou word nie deur Spanje en ook nie in die Franse en Britse besittings wat hy verwag het as beloning om by die Axis aan te sluit nie. Die feit dat die Duitse leierskap in 1940 bereid was om die deelname van Spanje as 'n gelyke vegparty op te offer eerder as om hul hoop op Duits-beheerde basisse op en voor die kus van Noordwes-Afrika op te gee, is 'n uitstekende aanduiding van die prioriteit dat hulle toegewys aan hul konsep van oorlog met die Verenigde State. Die aanbod van Franco vir die gebruik van Spaanse basisse was vir hulle nie genoeg nie: Duitse soewereiniteit was wat hulle geglo het hul plan sou vereis. Toe die Spaanse minister van buitelandse sake in September 1940 na Berlyn gaan en Hitler en Franco in Oktober op die Frans-Spaanse grens vergader, was dit die soewereiniteitskwessie wat 'n fundamentele skeuring tussen die voornemende oorlogsvennote veroorsaak het.

Maar dit was nie net die basisse wat ontwykend geblyk het nie. Aangesien die voorbereidings vir die oorlog met die Sowjetunie nog 'n herverdeling van wapenshulpbronne in die laat herfs van 1940 nodig gemaak het, is die bou van die blou watervloot weer gestaak. Weer moes Hitler die geesdrif van die Duitse vloot vir oorlog met die Verenigde State in bedwang bring. Die vloot het geglo dat die manier om Groot -Brittanje in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, net soos in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, in onbeperkte duikbootoorlog te lê, selfs al beteken dit dat die Verenigde State in die konflik gebring moet word. Maar Hitler was te betwyfel of dit wat die laaste keer misluk het, sou werk, want hy het ander idees om met Brittanje om te gaan, soos bombardement en moontlik inval. Toe hy die Verenigde State aangeneem het, het hy besef dat hy dit nie sou kon doen sonder 'n groot vloot nie. Op hierdie stadium het Japan in die prentjie gekom.

Aangesien die Duitsers lankal 'n oorlog met die Westerse moondhede as die belangrikste en moeilikste voorvereiste vir 'n maklike verowering van die Sowjetunie beskou het, en aangesien dit aan hulle blyk dat Japan se ambisies in Oos -Asië bots met Britte, Franse en Amerikaanse belange, het Berlyn jare lank probeer om Japanse deelname aan 'n alliansie teen die Weste te bereik. Die owerhede in Tokio was in die algemeen bly om met Duitsland saam te werk, maar belangrike elemente in die Japannese regering was huiwerig om Brittanje en Frankryk te beveg. Sommige het verkies om 'n oorlog met die Sowjet -Unie, ander was bekommerd oor 'n oorlog met die Verenigde State, wat hulle as 'n waarskynlike gevolg van oorlog met Brittanje en Frankryk beskou het, terwyl ander gedink het dat dit die beste sou wees om die oorlog met China eers af te handel, en sommige het 'n kombinasie van hierdie sienings.

In elk geval het alle Duitse pogings om Japan tot 'n alliansie wat die Weste teenstaan, misluk. Die Duitse reaksie op hierdie mislukking - hul ondertekening van 'n nie -aggressie -ooreenkoms met die Sowjetunie in 1939 - het slegs 'n paar van hul beste vriende vervreem in 'n Japan wat toe met die Sowjetunie op die grens tussen hulle Oos -Asiatiese marionetstate Manchukuo en Mongolië.

Volgens Tokio blyk dit dat die nederlaag van Nederland en Frankryk die volgende jaar, en die behoefte van die Britte om op die verdediging van die tuiseilande te konsentreer, die koloniale ryke van Suidoos -Asië oopmaak vir maklike verowering. Vanuit die perspektief van Berlyn lê dieselfde wonderlike vooruitsigte voor die Japannese - maar daar was geen rede om dit alles te laat kry sonder 'n militêre bydrae tot die algemene oorsaak van maksimum plundering nie. Hierdie bydrae sou lê in die aanval op die Britse Ryk in Suidoos -Asië, veral Singapoer, voordat Brittanje Frankryk en Holland in 'n nederlaag gevolg het, nie daarna nie. Boonop sou dit die probleem van die hantering van die Verenigde State in een slag oplos.

Op kort termyn sou die Japanse deelname aan die oorlog Amerikaanse aandag en hulpbronne van die Atlantiese Oseaan na die Stille Oseaan aflei. Op die lange duur, en nog belangriker, sou die as 'n groot en doeltreffende vloot kry. In 'n tyd toe die Verenigde State 'n vloot gehad het wat skaars genoeg was vir een oseaan, het die Panamakanaal dit moontlik gemaak om die vloot van die Stille Oseaan na die Atlantiese Oseaan te vervoer en terug. Dit was die basiese kommer agter die Amerikaanse begeerte na 'n vloot met twee oseane, wat deur die kongres in Julie 1940 goedgekeur is. Konflik in die Stille Oseaan sou groot steun aan Brittanje in die Atlantiese Oseaan onmoontlik maak. Verder het dit duidelik geen verskil gemaak in watter oseaanse Amerikaanse oorlogskepe gesink is nie.

Vir Duitsland was die voor die hand liggende alternatief vir die bou van sy eie vloot 'n bondgenoot wat reeds een gehad het. Die Duitsers het geglo dat die Japanse vloot in 1940-41 die sterkste en beste ter wêreld was (en dit is heel moontlik dat hierdie beoordeling korrek was). Dit is in hierdie raamwerk van verwagtinge dat 'n mens miskien makliker die nuuskierige, skynbaar self-teenstrydige beleid teenoor die Verenigde State wat die Duitsers in 1941 gevolg het, makliker kan verstaan.

Aan die een kant het Hitler herhaaldelik beveel dat die Duitse vloot beperk moet word om voorvalle in die Atlantiese Oseaan te vermy wat die Verenigde State voortydig in die oorlog teen Duitsland kan bring. Wat ook al die stappe wat die Amerikaners mag neem in hul beleid om Groot-Brittanje te help, Hitler sou dit nie as 'n voorwendsel neem om met die Verenigde State oorlog te voer nie, totdat hy die regte tyd gedink het: Amerikaanse wetgewing oor huurverhuring het sy beleid teenoor die Verenigde State nie meer beïnvloed nie State as die gelyktydige toename in Sowjet -hulp aan Duitsland het sy besluit om met die land oorlog te voer beïnvloed.

Aan die ander kant het hy herhaaldelik die Japannese belowe dat as hulle van mening is dat oorlog met die Verenigde State 'n noodsaaklike deel van 'n oorlog teen Brittanje is, Duitsland in so 'n konflik sal aansluit. Hitler het persoonlik hierdie belofte aan die minister van buitelandse sake, Matsuoka Yosuke, afgelê toe laasgenoemde Duitsland vroeg in April 1941 besoek het. Dit is herhaaldelik daarna herhaal. Die oënskynlike teenstrydigheid word maklik opgelos as 'n mens in gedagte hou wat sentraal was in die denke van die Duitse leier en gou in die Duitse regering algemeen verstaan ​​word: solank Duitsland die Verenigde State alleen moes hanteer, het dit tyd nodig om sy eie blou-water-vloot was dit dus sinvol om vyandelikhede met die Amerikaners uit te stel. As Japan egter aan die kant van Duitsland in die oorlog sou kom, sou die probleem outomaties opgelos word.

Hierdie benadering maak dit ook makliker om te verstaan ​​waarom die Duitsers nie spesifiek was oor die volgorde nie: as Japan sou besluit om in die lente of somer van 1941 oorlog te voer, selfs voor die Duitse inval in die Sowjetunie, sou dit goed wees, en Duitsland sou onmiddellik daarby aansluit. Toe dit egter blyk dat Japannese-Amerikaanse onderhandelinge in die lente en somer tot 'n mate van ooreenkoms kan lei, het die Duitsers hard probeer om die gesprekke te torpedo. Een manier was om Japan as't ware deur die agterdeur in die oorlog te trek. In 'n tyd toe die Duitsers nog seker was dat die oostelike veldtog op pad was na 'n vinnige en oorwinnende oplossing, het hulle probeer om die Japanners te oorreed om die Sowjetunie aan te val.

Gedurende die somer van 1941, terwyl die Japannese vir die Duitsers gelyk het om te huiwer, lyk dit asof die Duitse veldtog in die Sowjetunie perfek verloop. Die eerste en mees onmiddellike Duitse reaksie was 'n terugkeer na sy program vir vlootbou. In die wapentegnologie van die dertiger- en veertigerjare was groot oorlogskepe die stelsel met die langste tydsduur van bestellings tot voltooiing. Die Duitse leiers was heeltemal hiervan bewus en baie sensitief vir die implikasies daarvan. Elke keer as die geleentheid daar blyk te wees, het hulle eers na die vlootbouprogram gegaan. Maar weer, in 1941, net soos in 1940, het die vooruitsig op vinnige oorwinning oor die onmiddellike vyand vervaag, en weer moes die werk aan die groot oorlogskepe gestaak word. (Maar die Duitsers, ten spyte van hul baie gewilde organisasie, kon nie 'n enjinkontrak in Junie 1944 kanselleer nie. Hulle het vier nuttelose slagskip-enjins aangebied.) Die stop van die slagskipkonstruksie beklemtoon net die hoop dat Japan sou beweeg, sowel as die entoesiasme waarmee so 'n aksie sal begroet word.

Net soos die Duitsers nie die Japannese op hoogte gehou het van hul planne om ander lande aan te val nie, so het die Japannese die Duitsers in die duister gehou. Toe Tokio gereed was om te verhuis, moes dit slegs met die Duitsers (en Italianers) gaan om seker te maak dat hulle net so bereid is om oorlog te voer teen die Verenigde State, soos hulle herhaaldelik beweer het. Einde November en weer begin Desember het die Duitsers die Japannese gerusgestel dat hulle niks hoef te bekommer nie. Duitsland, net soos Italië, was gretig om met die Verenigde State oorlog te voer - mits Japan die duik sou neem.

Daar was twee maniere waarop die Duitse oorlogsverklaring teen die Verenigde State sou verskil van haar prosedure om met ander lande oorlog te voer: die tydsberekening en die afwesigheid van interne opposisie. In alle ander gevalle was die tydsberekening van die oorlog in wese in Duitsland se eie hande. Nou sou die datum gekies word deur 'n bondgenoot wat beweeg het toe dit gereed was en sonder om die Duitsers vooraf in kennis te stel. Toe Hitler in April met die Japannese minister van Buitelandse Sake vergader het, het hy nie geweet dat Japan maande lank sou waai wat hy ook nie geweet het nie, die laaste keer dat Tokio met hom gepraat het dat die Japannese van plan was om onmiddellik te verhuis.

As gevolg hiervan is Hitler tydens die Pearl Harbor uit die stad gevang en moes hy terugkeer na Berlyn en die Reichstag ontbied om oorlog te verklaar. Sy groot bekommernis, en dié van sy minister van buitelandse sake, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was dat die Amerikaners hul oorlogsverklaring voor sy eie kan kry. Soos Ribbentrop dit verduidelik het, laat 'n groot mag hom nie oorlog verklaar nie, verklaar dit oorlog aan ander. ”

Net om seker te maak dat die vyandelikhede onmiddellik begin, het Hitler egter reeds sy bevele uitgereik aan sy vloot, sedert Oktober 1939, om onmiddellik Amerikaanse skepe te laat sink, selfs voor die formaliteite van 'n verklaring. Noudat Duitsland 'n groot vloot aan sy kant gehad het, hoef u nie eers 'n uur te wag nie. Die feit dat die Japannese vyandelikhede begin het soos Duitsland vroeër daardie jaar met sy aanval op Joego -Slawië begin het, met 'n Sondagoggend -aanval in vredestyd, het getoon wat 'n heerlike geskikte bondgenoot Japan sou wees. Die Amerikaanse vloot sou nou in die Stille Oseaan verpletter word en dus nie in staat wees om Brittanje te help nie, terwyl Amerikaanse troepe en voorrade ook na die teater oorgedra sou word.

Die tweede manier waarop hierdie Duitse oorlogsverklaring verskil van die meeste wat dit voorafgegaan het, was in die afwesigheid van teenkanting tuis. Die waansinnige toejuiging van die eenparige Reichstag, die Duitse parlement wat laas in 1938 verkies is, weerspieël eensgesind 'n eenparige regering en militêre leierskap. In die Eerste Wêreldoorlog is daar ooreengekom dat Duitsland nie aan die voorkant verslaan is nie, maar het geswig voor die ineenstorting van 'n tuisfront wat deur Woodrow Wilson se sirene van die Atlantiese Oseaan mislei is, en daar is geen gevaar vir 'n nuwe steek nie in die rug. Die opponente van die regime tuis is stilgemaak. Sy verbeelde Joodse vyande word reeds geslag, met honderde duisende wat dood is tydens die toespraak van Hitler op 11 Desember 1941. Noudat Duitsland 'n sterk Japannese vloot aan sy kant gehad het, is die oorwinning as seker beskou.

Vanuit die perspektief van 'n halfeeu kan 'n bykomende onbedoelde gevolg van Pearl Harbor vir die Duitsers gesien word. Dit het nie net beteken dat hulle beslis verslaan sou word nie. It also meant that the active coalition against them would include the United States as well as Great Britain, its dominions, the Free French, various governments-in-exile, and the Soviet Union. Aid without U.S. participation, there could have been no massive invasion of northwest Europe the Red Army eventually might have reached the English Channel and the Atlantic, overrunning all Germany in the process. If the Germans today enjoy both their freedom and their unity in a country aligned and allied with what their leaders of 1941 considered the degenerate Western democracies, they owe it in part to the disastrous cupidity and stupidity of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. MHQ

GERHARD L. WEINBERG is a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His next book is a general history of World War II, to be published by Princeton University Press.

This article originally appeared in the Spring 1992 issue (Vol. 4, No. 3) of MHQ - The Quarterly Journal of Military History with the headline: Why Hitler Declared War on the United States.

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Reviews & endorsements

'Historians have argued for decades over the question of why Hitler chose to declare war on the United States. Klaus Schmider has now written the first full authoritative history of the decision, setting it firmly in the context of German domestic and military policy. This will become the definitive account.' Richard Overy, author of The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945

'Hitler's suicidal declaration of war on the United States in December 1941 has long seemed a quixotic even nihilistic move. In his brilliant new book, which is based on a broad range of records, Klaus Schmider restores a sense of strategy and rationality to the 'Fuehrer's' decision.' Brendan Simms, author of Hitler: Only the World Was Enough

'In a must-read, ground-breaking book, Schmider analyzes the factors that influenced a shift in Hitler's policy from one of restraint to a declaration of war on the United States. Woven into this complicated narrative are Germany's uncertain relationship with Japan, the war with the Soviet Union, synthetic rubber, and the impact of Lend-Lease and the United States' modification of its neutrality on Hitler's decision.' Mary Kathryn Barbier, author of Spies, Lies, and Citizenship: The Hunt for Nazi Criminals

'A masterly reassessment that harnesses the latest scholarship to situate Hitler's fateful choice in a complex of ideological obsessions, economics, strategic ambition, flawed technology and operational overstretch, challenging long-held assumptions of nihilistic or deranged decision-making at the heart of the Third Reich.' Andrew Lambert, author of Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires, and the Conflict That Made the Modern World


Four Days in December: Germany’s Path to War With the U.S.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines, simultaneously invading the Pacific holdings of Great Britain and the Netherlands. Four days later, Germany handed declarations of war to the American chargé d&rsquoaffaires in Berlin and to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington, D.C. The Reich&rsquos partner, Italy, did the same in Rome and the American capital.

Then, as now, these moves might seem an impulsive display of Axis solidarity. The reality is quite different. Hitler had long recognized that his hopes and plans for world domination necessitated war with the United States. As he stated explicitly in a follow-up volume to Mein Kampf written in 1928 (see &ldquo Mein Kampf: The Sequel &rdquo), preparing for war with the United States would be a central responsibility of any National Socialist government. The days after Pearl Harbor brought to a crescendo the dictator&rsquos protracted effort to orchestrate an international conflict to suit his and Germany&rsquos purposes.

The surprise for Hitler was not that Japan attacked the United States, but how and when. He learned of Pearl Harbor the way millions did: from someone who had heard a radio report about the raid. The Japanese had not given their allies any precise information on what they planned, so the bombing and torpedo assault itself startled Germany and Italy&mdashhardly unusual. Neither had ever notified Tokyo in advance of intended attacks, either.

The news flash came soon after the German leader returned to the Wolf&rsquos Lair, his headquarters deep in a forest near Rastenburg. Hitler had traveled to East Prussia from the Eastern Front, where he had gone to address firsthand the crises arising from successful Soviet counterattacks at Rostov.

The setbacks to the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the crumbling of Italian forces amid a British offensive in North Africa had left personnel at the Wolf&rsquos Lair feeling gloomy. Late on December 7, Nazi press chief Otto Dietrich brought Hitler the news about Pearl Harbor. Hitler asked Dietrich to confirm the bulletin, but already word of the Americans&rsquo undoing was enlivening the atmosphere at the Wolfsschanze.

&ldquoA delirium of joy embraced everyone as far as one could see in the headquarters,&rdquo General Walter Warlimont, a deputy chief of operations in the OKW, the High Command of the German Armed Forces, noted in his memoirs.

The exuberance erupted from certainty that the real fight&mdashagainst the mongrel giant of the west&mdashat last had begun. Hitler, who saw his life as a constant war, would not be cheated again, as he had been in 1938 when Allied appeasement over the Sudetenland spoiled his plans to invade Czechoslovakia.

Hitler and other German leaders so thoroughly expected the Reich to fight America that, after the initial delighted outburst, they gave Pearl Harbor scarcely a thought. Army chief of staff General Franz Halder, for example, merely noted in his diary entry for December 8 that &ldquoJapan appears to have opened hostilities against America and England by surprise air attacks and warship attacks on Honolulu and also against Shanghai and against Malaya.&rdquo Halder&rsquos entry devotes more attention to the Eastern Front and to North Africa. On December 9, Halder writes that he conferred with an assistant on a &ldquodirective for conversations with attachés [of other countries] on the entrance of America into the war.&rdquo The next day Halder briefly notes major Japanese successes, and on December 11 records that he heard a naval officer&rsquos report about &ldquobasic factors in the Japanese-American naval war.&rdquo His December 12 entry notes a report on the &ldquoAsian theater of war,&rdquo but Halder does not consider Germany&rsquos declaration of war the day before worthy of note. As his master did, the army commander took for granted the Americans&rsquo inability to mount military operations serious enough to affect the German war effort.

Similarly, for December 7 and 8 the usually voluminous OKW war diary refers to the attack at Honolulu only by summarizing official Japanese announcements and dispatches from the Reuters news agency. The December 8 OKW entry mentions the sinking of the American battleship &ldquoNew Virginia&rdquo evidently no one at German headquarters had a list of American capital ships or knew that no U.S. Navy vessel with that name existed. On December 9 the OKW diary summarizes official announcements from Tokyo. On December 10, however, the diary merely mentions a report, and on December 11 it again distills Japanese headquarters and Reuters reports.

The December 11 entry, made after Hitler declared war, notes that General Alfred Jodl, the OKW chief of operations, called from Berlin to suggest that his deputy consider having the staff examine the question of whether the United States will concentrate its military effort first in Europe or in the Pacific. Thereafter, only minimal references to the Pacific War appear in the OKW war diary through 1945. Entries for December 12 and 13 ignore the fact that Germany has gone to war with another rather large country.

War with the United States had been on Hitler&rsquos wish list for two decades. Upon becoming chancellor in 1933 he began rearming Germany for the first fights he anticipated&mdashagainst Czechoslovakia, France, and Britain. He was confident those weapons would also suffice for his next war, against Russia. In 1937, with a first generation of arms in production, he turned to the special weapons he needed to take on the United States.

A firm believer, like most of his political and military associates, that in World War I Germany had not been defeated at the front but &ldquostabbed in the back&rdquo&mdashthe colloquial term, popularized by General Erich Ludendorff, was Dolchstoss, &ldquodagger&rsquos thrust&rdquo&mdashHitler held that the Americans played no real role in bringing about Germany&rsquos loss. The United States had a tiny, weak army and minimal air force and Hitler had nothing but scorn for aircraft production quotas set by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, even though American factories had been meeting those quotas for two years. (Told days before the war declaration that the United States expected by 1944 to be building 100,000 warplanes a year, Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring sneered that all the Americans could make was refrigerators.)

By Hitler&rsquos lights, so racially mixed a collection of degenerates as the Americans could not possibly mount an effective military effort anyway. But the United States was distant, and had a big navy at a time when Germany did not, so Hitler began developing the Me 264 Amerika Bomber, a four-engine behemoth capable of intercontinental attacks. At the same time, Germany began developing super-battleships whose guns would be large and powerful enough to demolish American dreadnoughts from afar.

But progress on the weapons of the future stalled and then stopped. Only prototypes of the Me 264 got off the ground, never the swarms of enormous aircraft that Hitler envisioned. German shipwrights laid the keel for the aircraft carrier Flugzeugträger A (later renamed Graf Zeppelin) in 1936, and keels for monster 56,000-ton battleships early in 1939, but the outbreak of war on September 1 created demands for materiel and manpower that took precedence over these next-generation warships, which never did sail. (Not every production order was cancelled in June 1944 the German navy took delivery of four huge battleship engines that promptly were melted down for scrap.)

Admiral Erich Raeder, who had assumed the German navy&rsquos helm in 1928, had been pleading for war with the United States since soon after the invasion of Poland. Despite the U-boats&rsquo success, Raeder didn&rsquot have enough submarines to isolate England, and thanks to flawed designs and losses at sea the Kriegsmarine at times had few surface vessels larger than a destroyer. In 1940&ndash41, Hitler and associates realized the foreseeable future would not include a huge German blue-water navy of battleships, aircraft carriers, and cruisers. To compensate, they looked to the obvious alternative: enlisting an ally that already had such a force. The equally obvious candidate: Japan.

Under these circumstances, Hitler adopted two parallel policies. He ordered Raeder to avoid incidents with the United States in the Atlantic, and began chivvying Japan to take Singapore away from Great Britain. With Japan openly joining the Axis side, the alliance would gain a world-class navy, not after years of building but right away, and so remove the main hurdle to Germany&rsquos making war on the United States.

The Japanese had seen Germany&rsquos victories in the west as a signal to move south to expand their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But after joining the Axis, Tokyo authorities demurred, explaining that they were not planning to invade Malaya until 1946, when the United States had announced it would give up its bases in the Philippines. Hitler countered that if concern about the United States was restraining Japan, Germany would immediately join in a war against the U.S. and its allies&mdashprovided Japan struck now, not five years later, when the Americans would be stronger. One way or another, Hitler expected to fight the United States, so it made no difference to him whether an American warship went down in the Atlantic or in the Pacific. The sooner Japan attacked, the better.

Having promised to fight on Japan&rsquos side, specifically at a March 1941 meeting in Berlin with Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, German leaders chafed as Tokyo and Washington conducted seemingly endless negotiations on into that year. Japan&rsquos occupation of southern French Indo-China, coming as it did within a month of Germany&rsquos June 22, 1941, invasion of Russia, clearly pointed in the direction Germany wanted, but still the talks in Washington droned on. The Germans believed their attack on the Soviet Union would allay Japan&rsquos fears of any threat to its home islands from Russia&rsquos Pacific territories, encouraging the empire to strike southward into areas it had long coveted. The Germans also expected such an action to draw American attention and resources into the Pacific and away from the Atlantic, increasing Germany&rsquos advantage there.

Hitler worried that the Soviets&rsquo failure to collapse as quickly as anticipated might deter Japan from going after the United States. (From an opposite viewpoint, President Roosevelt hoped endless talk might lead Tokyo to see that a German victory was not the certainty the Japanese might be imagining.)

To spur Japan on, Hitler turned to propaganda. In an October 3, 1941, speech trumpeting a new offensive against the Russians, he boasted, &ldquoI say today, because I can now say it, that this enemy is already crushed and cannot ever recover.&rdquo Within the week Dietrich was claiming the Reich had crushed the Red Army and won the war in the East. On November 8, Hitler insisted the offensive &ldquohad succeeded beyond all measure.&rdquo

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels thought all three announcements were terrible mistakes. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano also saw the agitprop as wrong-footed. Ciano was Fascist royalty not only was he married to Mussolini&rsquos daughter Edda, but in 1936 he replaced Il Duce as foreign minister. He was present at the 1938 talks in Munich in that capacity. Ciano was also the recipient of phone calls at all hours from German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who was trying to reinforce Italy&rsquos martial resolve. Even so, Ciano was not privy to Hitler&rsquos larger motives. In Ciano&rsquos diary entry for October 18, he wryly suggests, &ldquoIsn&rsquot this a case of their having sung their victory anthem too soon?&rdquo (Hitler did not keep a diary, so his private contemplations are unknown.)

Mistake or no, Hitler clearly meant the propaganda barrage to induce Japan to act. Looking back on events in a 1950 memoir, Bernhard von Lossberg, an assistant to OKW deputy chief Warlimont, concluded, &ldquoDietrich&rsquos statement was probably designed to hasten Japan&rsquos entry into the war.&rdquo Lossberg&rsquos suspicions are confirmed by a document from Hitler&rsquos special military historian that his secretary, Marianne Feuersenger, quoted in her 1982 memoir. Referencing &ldquoDietrich&rsquos speech on his command,&rdquo the historian wrote, &ldquoPropaganda fully under the control of the Führer&hellip. It was decisive that Japan had to be held to the course. F[ührer] had a terrible fear at the beginning of the crisis [before Moscow] that they might be scared off.&rdquo

Events proved Hitler&rsquos anxieties well founded. Only days before the Japanese strike force Kido Butai came within range of Pearl Harbor, Tokyo was checking with Berlin and Rome to make sure that their promise to join Japan in war against the United States still held and asking that both nations agree to a treaty not to enter into a separate peace agreement. The communication brought prompt replies in the affirmative from both Germany and Italy.

Before Hitler could respond in earnest to Pearl Harbor, he had to get to Berlin, assemble the Reichstag, give its members the good news of war with the United States, and hand an American diplomat a formal declaration of hostilities. But he saw no need to keep Raeder and his U-boats on the leash. Late on December 8, 1941, Hitler ordered Raeder to authorize the Kriegsmarine to sink on sight any ship flying the flag of the United States, plus those of Uruguay and eight other Central American nations seen as its allies.

Once he reached Berlin, Hitler phoned and met with Goebbels to review the situation in detail. The propaganda minister documented the exchanges in his diary the following day, as was his custom. Goebbels&rsquos December 8 entry notes that Japan has attacked the United States. &ldquoI was&hellipcalled by the Führer who is extraordinarily happy about this development,&rdquo Goebbels writes. &ldquoHe will summon the Reichstag for Wednesday [December 10] in the afternoon to clarify the German position on this.&rdquo

After enthusing about the Japanese action at Pearl Harbor and the likelihood that it will shrink American deliveries of weapons and transportation equipment to Britain and the Soviet Union, Goebbels adds, &ldquoThe development has produced the greatest joy for the Führer and the whole headquarters.&rdquo Goebbels&rsquos December 9 entry summarizes developments in East Asia and the Pacific, mentions the coming Reichstag session, and repeats his assessment that the United States no longer will be able to aid England and the Soviet Union. &ldquoWe can be extraordinarily satisfied with the way things have developed,&rdquo the Nazi propagandist says in conclusion.

On December 10 Goebbels again predicts the demise of American deliveries of weapons and airplanes, refers to worldwide puzzlement over German policy in the new situation, and reports at length on a December 9 meeting in Berlin and Hitler&rsquos demeanor during it. &ldquoHe is filled with joy over the very fortunate development of the negotiations between the USA and Japan and also over the outbreak of war,&rdquo Goebbels writes. &ldquoHe correctly pointed out that he had always expected this development.&rdquo

Goebbels then summarizes comments by Hitler to the effect that the Japanese initiated war in the Pacific in a manner and at a moment that caught him unaware but which he found entirely correct. Hitler told Goebbels about his sink-on-sight order to the Kriegsmarine&mdashwhich both men celebrated&mdashand said that in his Reichstag speech he would declare war on the United States. Hitler added that he would urge all Axis partners to do the same. (Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria proceeded to do so, although Roosevelt had the State Department attempt for half a year to get the latter three to withdraw their declarations of war.)

In his conversation with Goebbels, Hitler claimed to be blasé about setbacks on the Eastern Front and predicted an end to American provisioning of England and the Soviet Union. Hitler summarized what he expected to say to the Reichstag, telling Goebbels that to give himself time to draft and polish the speech he was postponing it to December 11. &ldquoThe Führer again projects a wave of optimism and confidence in victory,&rdquo Goebbels writes.

On December 11 diarist Goebbels says how good it is to have Japan&rsquos aggressive and successful advances diverting attention at home and abroad from Axis setbacks on the Eastern Front and in North Africa. Japanese pilots have sunk the British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse off Malaya, the propaganda minister notes. He restates his conviction that America will stop being England&rsquos quartermaster. Writing of a noon meeting the day before with Hitler, Goebbels says the Führer is especially pleased about Prince of Wales and Repulse and about the timing of the Japanese successes, given the situation on the Eastern Front. Goebbels notes that although the Japanese wanted the Reichstag to convene earlier, Hitler is to speak at 3 p.m.

After offering considerable detail on matters in the Pacific, Goebbels&rsquos December 12 entry reports on Hitler&rsquos speech the day before. In his address, the dictator told the Reichstag that Germany was at war with the United States and had signed a treaty with Italy and Japan eschewing a separate peace. Goebbels raves about Hitler&rsquos presentation, and about Mussolini&rsquos own December 11 proclamation and speech about war against the United States.

Two days later Goebbels notes that he and Hitler met once again. He describes their shared excitement and pleasure at Japan&rsquos coups in East Asia. He notes that in the afternoon Hitler spoke to the Gauleiter, the district chiefs of the Nazi Party, telling his tribunes all will be well, with no chance that the entry of the United States will prolong the conflict.

In the meantime, Goebbels reports, Ribbentrop has handed Germany&rsquos declaration of war to the American chargé d&rsquoaffaires the German chargé in Washington presented the document to Secretary of State Hull. Ribbentrop and Hitler had worried that the United States might declare war before Germany was able to do so. (&ldquoA great power does not allow itself to be declared war on it declares it on others,&rdquo Ribbentrop once told a deputy.)

At every previous juncture expanding the war, Hitler heard warnings and even argument from his circle of political and military advisors. But prior to the German declaration of war on the United States, the only discouraging words came from Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, the former German ambassador to Washington. For once on a dangerous gambit, the Reichstag exhibited unanimity as enthusiastic as the leadership&rsquos.

Hitler and coterie may have had no second thoughts, but in Rome, Galeazzo Ciano&rsquos experienced eyes suddenly came into sharper focus. He connected the dots backward from Germany and Italy&rsquos twin declarations of war&mdashthe latter of which he personally handed the American chargé the afternoon of December 11&mdashto Pearl Harbor, to Japan&rsquos demand for a treaty abjuring any separate peace, to autumn&rsquos bluster about the Eastern Front.

Although Ciano notes in his diary that Ribbentrop was &ldquojumping with joy about the Japanese attack on the United States,&rdquo he records a very different personal perspective.

Following a meeting on December 13 with the Cuban minister, who had come to declare war on Italy, Ciano mused on the private page about &ldquohaving had the good fortune, or is it the misfortune, to declare war on France, on Great Britain, on Russia and on the United States.&rdquo


At War:

The United States and Germany were at war in all but name well before December 1941. Since early 1941 (at least) the United States had shipped war material and economic goods to the United Kingdom, enabling the British government to carry on with the war. American soldiers, sailors, and airmen served in the British armed forces, albeit not in great numbers. And in the late summer of 1941, the United States effectively found itself at war in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Greer Incident, in which a U.S. destroyer tangled with a German U-boat, served to bring the conflict into sharp focus.

The Fireside Chat delivered by President Roosevelt on September 11, 1941 made clear that the United States was already virtually at war with Germany:

“Upon our naval and air patrol — now operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean — falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas — now. That means, very simply, very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships — not only American ships but ships of any flag — engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines they will protect them from surface raiders.

It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.”

This declaration did not simply apply to U.S. territorial waters. The United States would escort convoys filled with military equipment to Europe with surface ships and anti-submarine craft, firing at will against any German submarines, ships or planes that they encountered.

Moreover, even U.S. ground forces had begun to participate in the war. In early July 1941, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, with Navy support, began deploying to Iceland. The Americans relieved British and Canadian troops who had invaded the island a year earlier.

In the long run, Hitler (and the rest of the German government) believed that confrontation with the United States was virtually inevitable. The U.S. had intervened in 1917 on behalf of Russia, France, and the United Kingdom it was almost certain to do so again. U.S. behavior in 1941 reaffirmed this belief. Starting the war on German terms, before the U.S. was prepared to effectively defend itself, was the consensus position within the German political and military elite.

And so Germany declared war on the United States not out of a fit of pique, but rather because it believed that the United States was already effectively a belligerent, and that wider operations against the U.S. would help win the war. In particular, the Axis declaration of war enabled an operation that the Germans believed was key to driving Britain out of the conflict a concerted submarine attack against U.S. commercial shipping. Although the Kriegsmarine had targeted U.S. vessels in the months and years before Pearl Harbor, it radically stepped up operations in the first months of 1942, launching a major effort just off the U.S. Atlantic seaboard.

The German tactics were devastatingly effective against a U.S. military that lacked good tactics, equipment, and procedures for fighting the U-boats. For their part, British military and political authorities worried that the German offensive might work, destroying enough shipping to cut Britain’s lifeline to North America. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force quickly dispatched advisors to the United States in an effort to staunch the bleeding, but 1942 nevertheless proved the most devastating year of the war for shipping losses. Overall, Operation Drumbeat proved far more successful for the Axis than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.


U.S. Relations With Germany

Following U.S. independence from Great Britain, the United States established the first Consulate on German soil in Hamburg in June 1790, and the second one in Bremen in 1794, both independent German states at the time. The United States established diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Prussia in 1797, then the German Empire in 1871. U.S.-German relations were terminated in 1917 during World War I, and the United States declared war on Germany. Relations were reestablished in 1921 but were severed again in 1941 during World War II when Nazi Germany declared war on the United States. After the war, Germany, and its capital, Berlin, were divided into four zones occupied by Allied powers. In 1955, the United States established diplomatic relations with West Germany, which included the U.S., British, and French zones. The United States established diplomatic relations in 1974 with East Germany, which included the Soviet Union’s zone. West Germany and East Germany were unified in 1990.

Today, Germany is one of the United States’ closest and strongest Allies in Europe. U.S. relations with Germany are based on our mutual and vital relationship as friends, trading partners, and Allies. Our political, economic, cultural, and security relationships, critical to shared prosperity and continued stability, are based on extensive people-to-people ties and close coordination at the most senior levels.

In the political sphere, Germany stands at the center of European affairs and plays a key leadership role as a member of the G-7, G-20, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The United States recognizes that the security and prosperity of the United States and Germany significantly depend on each other. As Allies in NATO, the United States and Germany work side by side to maintain peace, security, and freedom. Germany plays an important role in NATO’s core mission of collective defense, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, regularly contributing to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing, and taking the lead on NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) for the second time in 2019. U.S. and German troops work together effectively in NATO and UN operations worldwide, including in Mali and elsewhere in Africa, as well as on peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. Germany was an integral part of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and is a Framework Nation in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. Since 2015, Germany has been an active contributor to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Germany maintains troops in Iraq as part of the NATO training mission and is a top financial contributor for stabilization in Syria. NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean and the UN Maritime Task Force in support of Lebanon also include German naval assets.

The U.S. and Germany have strong people-to-people relations. More than 40 million Americans of German heritage live in the United States, comprising the largest ethnic ancestry group of the United States. Established in 1952, the U.S.-Germany Fulbright program is one of the oldest, largest, and most innovative Fulbright programs in the world, and the binational German-American Fulbright Commission has created initiatives such as diversity programs and an international higher education administrators seminar, which are emulated by other Fulbright commissions in Europe and around the world. The German government has been consistent in providing exceptionally strong funding for the Fulbright Program, which allows the binational Fulbright Commission to meet our two governments’ priorities. Since 1983, the bilateral Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange program has provided almost 28,000 U.S. and German high school students and young professionals with an academic year exchange experience resulting in thousands of new personal and professional connections between the United States and Germany. Each year approximately 9,000 students and 1,200 teachers participate in three-week exchanges across the United States and Germany through the German-American Partnership Program (GAPP). In addition, Germany annually sends an outstanding high school student to the United States on the Benjamin Franklin Transatlantic Fellowship Program. Notable German alumni of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) include four German presidents and five chancellors.

Bilaterale ekonomiese betrekkinge

EU Member States are collectively the United States’ biggest trading partner, and Germany, as Europe’s largest economy, is at the heart of that relationship. After China and the United States, Germany is the world’s third-largest exporter. Every fourth job in Germany depends on exports, which accounted for 47 percent of Germany’s GDP in 2019 (almost four times the export share of U.S. GDP).

In 2019, bilateral trade in goods and services totaled nearly $260 billion, with U.S. exports of $96.7 billion and imports of $162.9 billion. All of the $66.2 billion trade deficit in 2019 was in goods. Bilateral trade in services ($71.6 billion in 2019) is roughly in balance with a U.S. surplus of $1.7 billion (down from a $3 billion surplus in 2018). Major U.S. goods export categories to Germany in 2019 were aircrafts and parts ($10.1 billion), vehicles ($7 billion), pharmaceuticals (5 billion), medical equipment ($2.7 billion), and industrial machinery ($2.2 billion), optical and medical instruments ($6.7 billion), and electrical machinery ($5.5 billion). Major categories of German exports to the United States in 2019 were vehicles ($17.9 billion), pharmaceuticals ($17.6 billion), industrial machinery ($6.8 billion), medical equipment ($5.8 billion), and returned goods and reimports ($5.6 billion). Many U.S. imports from Germany are investment goods such as capital equipment, enabling U.S. production and exports. German investments in the United States focus largely on manufacturing, wholesale trade, as well as finance and insurance. Altogether, U.S. affiliates of German firms employ more than 861,000 U.S. workers.

While Americans have invested more than $148 billion FDI in Germany, Germans have invested $522 billion FDI in the United States – 29 percent of all FDI from the EU. The U.S.-German Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation affords U.S. investors national treatment and provides for the free movement of capital between the United States and Germany. Taxation of U.S. firms within Germany is governed by a protocol on the avoidance of double taxation.

Germany’s Membership in International Organizations

Germany and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations in addition to those mentioned above, including the United Nations, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Germany also is an observer to the Organization of American States.

Bilaterale verteenwoordiging

Die amptelike amptenare van die ambassade is op die lys van die departement se sleutelbeamptes.

Germany maintains an embassy in the United States at 4645 Reservoir Road NW, Washington, DC 20007 (tel. 202-298-4000).

More information about Germany is available from the Department of State and other sources, some of which are listed here:


Meer kommentaar:

Amelia Kristina Hilborn - 3/27/2010

Quite obvious that its an extreemly vauge source and a lot of speculations. That America would have been ever considered a threat to Germany is more childish and after constructed than what any man living of that age would have ever even speculated about. Germany was by the strongest military power and Hitler developed long range V2 missles to blast America, that was as far he was concerned what level America was, some kind of pathetic enemy that could be sueing for peace when being bombarded by these long distance missles while the americans themselves were unable to return the fire. However Hitler made a smililar scheme on England and failed there so, maybe he was misstakening, but at any rate he never speculated in pre war time about US navy being too big since then why the heck would he challange the British navy which was quite more deadly even if perhaps not more up to date. Last of all speaking of large populations. USA had rougly twice the German population at that time. The Soviet, UK & France had altogether almost 5 times the German population, once again a lame excuse to believe Hitler would have considered America a threat. As also proved in battle the Americans were highly uneffective agienst the germans and most people can agree on that the german mp40 was superior to the American Thompson all from day 1. Since then however Germany had invented many newer and better guns such as STG44 / Mp44 along with highly advanced tanks the Americans were totally unable to break (as of the Tiger) However the Americans won by cheer numbers and by that only. However it's not strange because even if most Americans seems to believe that the WW2 was between US & Nazi Germany and US & Japan the WW2 was actually mainly a war between Japan and England & Soviet and Nazi Germany. I could go on forever, but I doubt anyone will read it so ill just quit.

Randll Reese Besch - 9/4/2009

Hitler wanted war with the USA so soon? I was under the impression that the attack on Pearl Harbor caught him off guard and he was furious that it was done so soon. That he didn't want the USA involved for a long time. The Japanese saw their chance and did it. Too bad their code had been broken and the four most important ships set sail days before their scouts arrived. In the end it cost them the war.


Kyk die video: Dnevnik iz II svetskog rata Jun. Јун 1942. Дневник из II светског рата (Augustus 2022).