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Iranse regering - Geskiedenis

Iranse regering - Geskiedenis


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IRAN

Die Iraanse grondwet van Desember 1979 definieer die politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale orde van die Islamitiese republiek. Dit verklaar dat Shi'a Islam van die Twelver (Jaafari) sekte die amptelike godsdiens van Iran is. Die land word beheer deur sekulêre en godsdienstige leiers en beheerliggame, en pligte oorvleuel dikwels. Die hoofheerser is 'n godsdienstige leier of, by afwesigheid van 'n enkele leier, 'n raad van godsdienstige leiers. die uitvoerende tak. Die president stel en hou toesig oor die Ministerraad (lede van die kabinet), koördineer regeringsbesluite en kies regeringsbeleid wat voor die Nasionale Vergadering geplaas moet word.

Die Nasionale Vergadering bestaan ​​uit 270 lede wat vir 'n termyn van vier jaar verkies is. Die lede word verkies deur 'n direkte en geheime stemming. Alle wetgewing van die vergadering moet deur die Raad van Voogde hersien word. Die ses advokate van die Raad stem slegs oor beperkte vrae oor die grondwetlikheid van wetgewing; die godsdienstige lidmate oorweeg alle wetsontwerpe om te voldoen aan Islamitiese beginsels.

HUIDIGE REGERING
OpperleierKHAMENEI, Ali Hoseini-, Ayatollah
PresidentMahmud AHMADI-NEJAD
Spreker van die Islamitiese Raadplegende Vergadering (Majles)Mahdavi-KARUBI, Mehdi, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Sekretaris van die kabinetRamezanzadeh, Abdollah
Eerste vise -pres.Aref-Yazdi, Mohammad Reza
Visepres. vir AtoomenergieAqazadeh-Khoi, Qolam Reza
Visepres. vir OmgewingsbeskermingEbtekar, Masumeh
Visepres. vir regs- en parlementêre aangeleenthedeAbtahi, Mohammad Ali, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Visepres. vir liggaamsoefeningMehr-Alizadeh, Mohsen
Visepres. vir bestuur en beplanningSatari-Far, Mohammad
Min. van Landbou JihadHojati, Mahmud
Min. van HandelShariat-Madari, Mohammad
Min. van kommunikasie en inligtingstegnologieMotamedi, Ahmad
Min. van koöperasiesSufi, Ali
Min. van Logistiek van die verdediging en gewapende magteShamkhani, Ali, VAdm.
Min. van Ekonomiese Sake en FinansiesMazaheri, Tahmasb
Min. van onderwys en opleidingHaji-Qaem, Morteza
Min. van EnergieBitaraf, Habibollah
Min. van Buitelandse SakeKharazi, (Ali Naqi) Kamal
Min. van gesondheid, behandeling en mediese opvoedingPezeshkian, Masud
Min. van behuising en stedelike ontwikkelingAbdol-Alizadeh, Ali
Min. van nywerhede en myneJahangiri, Eshaq
Min. van intelligensie en sekuriteitYunesi, (Mohammad) Ali, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Min. van BinnelandMusavi-Lari, Abdol Vahed, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Min. van Islamitiese kultuur en leidingMasjed-Jamei, Ahmad
Min. van JustisieShoshtari, Mohammad Esmail, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Min. van Arbeid en Sosiale SakeHoseini, Safdar
Min. van PetroleumNamdar-Zanganeh, Bijan
Min. van Paaie en VervoerKhoram, Ahmad
Min. van wetenskap, navorsing en tegnologieMoin-Najafabadi, Mostafa
Goewerneur, Sentrale BankSheibani, Ebrahim
Hoof van rente -afdeling in die VSAJahansuzan, Fariborz
Permanente verteenwoordiger by die VN, New YorkZarif-Khonsari, Mohammad Javad


Iranse regering - Geskiedenis


In die vroeë 1900's was die enigste manier om die land te red van korrupsie en manipulasie deur buitelandse sake deur 'n geskrewe wetgewing op te stel. Hierdie sentiment het die grondwetlike rewolusie veroorsaak. Daar was 'n reeks deurlopende geheime en openlike aktiwiteite teen die despotiese bewind van Naser o-Din Shah, waarvoor baie hul lewens verloor het. Die pogings van vryheidsvegters het uiteindelik vrugte afgewerp tydens die bewind van Moazaferedin Shah. Mozafaredin shah het op Junie 1896 op die troon gegaan. Na die onophoudelike pogings van vryheidsvegters is Mozafar o-Din Shah van die Qajar-dinastie genoodsaak om die dekreet vir die grondwet en die oprigting van 'n verkose parlement (die Majlis) in Augustus uit te reik 5, 1906. Die koninklike mag beperk en 'n parlementêre stelsel ingestel.

Bakhtiari Revolusionêre in kamp buite Esfahan (Junie 1909)
Voor, in 'n wit jas met 'n swaard, is Mohammad Ebrahim Khan, Zabet van Julfa.

Op 18 Augustus 1906 is die eerste Wetgewende Vergadering (genoem die Opperste Nasionale Vergadering) in die Militêre Akademie gevorm om die voorbereidings te tref vir die opening van die eerste termyn van die Nasionale Raadplegende Vergadering en die opstel van die verkiesingswet daarvan. Tydens hierdie vergadering het premier Moshirul Doleh 'n toespraak gelewer as hoof van die kabinet. Die sessie is afgesluit met die toespraak van Malek Al Motokalemin.

Op 7 Oktober 1906 in 'n toespraak ondanks sy swak gesondheid, het Mozaferedin Shah die eerste sitting van die Nasionale Raadplegende Vergadering ingehuldig. Op hierdie stadium is die sitting gevorm in die afwesigheid van verteenwoordigers uit die provinsies.

Na die dood van Mozafaredin Shah, het sy opvolger, Mohammad Ali Mirza, wat toe as kroonprins regeer is, op 21 Januarie 1907 op die troon gegaan. Maar hy het dit van die begin af oortree, wat konstitusionaliste laat reageer het.

As voordeel uit die interne stryd, het sowel Rusland as Brittanje 'n ooreenkoms aangegaan om hul eie verskille te besleg, wat Iran effektief verdeel in twee invloedsgebiede vir hul gerespekteerde lande. Dit het vroeg in September 1907 opslae gemaak en die verskillende faksies in Iran verenig. Die Iraanse regering is op 7 September 1907 amptelik deur die Russiese en Britse ambassadeurs in kennis gestel van hierdie verdrag.

Die stygende getye van ontevredenheid en ontevredenheid het daartoe gelei dat Mohammad Mirza die kabinetslede op 17 Desember 1907 ontbied onder die valse voorwendsel om advies in te win. Hy beveel onmiddellik hul aanhouding. Slegs Nasserul Molk, wat die premier was, is vrygelaat.

Op 22 Desember 1907 is 'n nuwe kabinet gestig onder leiding van Nezamul Saltaneh Mafi. Op die oppervlak word die lug skoongemaak en die spanning word verlig. Maar op Februarie 1908 word 'n bom na Shah's Coach gegooi, wat hom baie agterdogtig maak. Op 1 Junie 1908 reinig Shah sommige van die hofdienaars. Ambassadeur Zapolski van Rusland en ambassadeur Marling van Brittanje waarsku die Iraanse regering om hulle aan Shah se voornemens te onderwerp.

Vryheidsvegters van Tabriz
Die twee mans in die sentrum is Sattar Khan en Bagher Khan.
Twee dae later nooi Shah die leiers van die konstitusionele beweging na die Imperial Gardens buite Teheran. Daar sit hy alles in die tronk, behalwe vir iemand wat daarin slaag om te ontsnap. Op 24 Junie 1908 plaas Shah Majlis onder beleg en beveel sy bombardement deur artillerievuur.

Gedurende hierdie tye het die Tabriz-opstand 'n hoogtepunt bereik en binne die bestek van vier maande na Rasht, Qazvin, Esfahan, Lar, Shiraz, Hamadan, Mashhad, Astar-Abad, Bandar Abbas en Bushehr versprei. Die Vryheidsvegters het te alle tye die oorhand gekry teen die tirannie. Tog was Tabriz steeds onder ekonomiese en militêre blokke wat deur regeringsmagte opgerig is.

Op 17 Februarie 1909 verower Freedom Forces Rasht. Teen Maart slaag hulle daarin om beheer oor die hoofpaaie van Rasht en Qazvin te neem. Teen 22 April 1909 het Tabriz Freedom Fighters onder leiding van Sattar Khan (Sardar-e Meli) hul aanval gedoen om deur die blokkade te breek. Hulle het 'n groot aantal van hul vegters verloor. 'N Engelse verslaggewer met die naam Moore en 'n Amerikaanse sendeling genaamd Howard Baskerville, wat simpatiek was met die vryheidsvegters, is dood.

Onder bevel van generaal Yeprim en brigadier Mohi het die vryheidsvegters van Rasht Qazvin beset en na Teheran gevorder.

Op 22 Junie 1909 bereik Bakhtiari Chieftains, onder leiding van Samsam-ul-Saltaneh en Haj Aligholi Khan Bakhtiari (Sardar As’ad) die stad Qum, wat hulle op 8 Julie 1909 oorgeneem het. Die intimidasies en ingrypings wat deur Russiese en Britse ambassades gemaak is, kon die vordering van vryheidsvegters nie keer nie. Onvermydelik is 'n aantal Russiese troepe via Badkobeh na Gilan gestuur en Qazvin bereik op 12 Julie 1909. Russe het Gilan Fighters gewaarsku om op te hou om teen Teheran in te trek.

'N Nasionalistiese raad in Rasht
Deur die waarskuwing te ignoreer, het Gilan -vryheidsvegters na Teheran gevorder en met Bakhtiari -magte naby Karaj (60 km wes van Teheran) ontmoet. Deur die verrassingselement te gebruik, het hierdie magte deur die regeringsmagte se lyne beweeg. So het die 3000 sterk, goed toegeruste magte onder leiding van Mohammad Valikhan Tonekaboni en Sardar As’ad die hoofstad binnegekom te midde van verwelkomende gejuig van vryheidsliefde simpatiseerders. Na bloedige gevegte in die strate en die Bazaar -distrik, het die nasionale magte weer geseëvier en die Kosak -brigade, wat teruggetrek het na die paradegronde, is omring en tot oorgawe gedwing.

Op 16 Julie 1909 was die hoofstad onder volledige beheer van vryheidsvegters. Om 8:30, die oggend van 17 Julie 1909, het Mohammad Shah en 'n aantal van sy ondersteuners onder gewapende begeleiding van Russiese soldate asiel geneem by die Russiese ambassade in Zargandeh.

Op hierdie dag het die Nasionale Raadplegende Vergadering (Majlis) 'n noodsessie gehou en Mohammad Ali Shah as 'n monarg afgemaak en sy 13 -jarige seun, Ahmad Mirza, as sy opvolger aangewys. Azadulmolk is aangewys as die vise-regent.

Op 10 September 1909 het Mohammad Ali Shah die Russiese ambassade verlaat en in ballingskap in Rusland gegaan.

Eerste kwartaal (7 Oktober 1906 - 23 Junie 1908)
Die belangrikste taak wat die eerste Majlis aangepak het, was die opstel en bekragtiging van die Grondwet op 30 Desember 1906. Dit bevat ook die interne prosedures. Op 17 Oktober 1907 het dit die grondwetlike wysigings opgestel en bekragtig.

Die eerste Majlis is voor die einde van sy termyn ontbind weens Mohammad Ali Shah se opposisie teen die konstitusionaliste sowel as buitelandse intriges. Kolonel Liakhov, die Russiese bevelvoerder van die Iraanse Kosakbrigade, het saam met verskeie Russiese offisiere artillerie teen Majlis afgevuur. 'N Aantal Majlis -verteenwoordigers en konstitusionaliste is in Bagh Shah aangehou, waarvan 'n aantal dood is. Sommige het gevlug en asiel by buitelandse ambassades gesoek. So is die Eerste Majlis ontbind en 'n krygswet verklaar.

Tweede kwartaal (15 November 1909 - 24 Desember 1911)
Die tweede Majlis kom in werking na 'n periode van Interregnum wat byna 17 maande geduur het. 'N Indirekte plebiscite in twee fases is uitgevoer. Gekonfronteer met ernstige krisisse en dilemmas as gevolg van ingrypings deur buitelandse magte en binnelandse ontberings, het Majlis so ver moontlik hul stand gehou. Uiteindelik is dit onder vreemde druk opgelos. Die verteenwoordigers het óf gevlug óf in ballingskap gegaan.

Tog is belangrike wetsontwerpe gedurende hierdie tyd aangeneem. Dit sluit die Wet op Openbare Belasting, Wet op die Buro vir Oudit, die nuwe verkiesingswet en die onderwyswetsontwerp in.

Derde kwartaal (6 Desember 1914 - 14 Desember 1915)
Die Derde Majlis het nie meer as 'n jaar geduur nie. Gekonfronteer met die Eerste Woordoorlog, het Majlis -verteenwoordigers Iran se neutraliteit verklaar. Tog is Iran se neutraliteit blatant oortree deur buitelandse ekspedisiemagte. Die ekspedisiemag van die tsaristiese Russiese leër het Qazvin na Teheran verlaat en die kwessie van die verskuiwing van die hoofstad na vore gebring. Dit het kommer veroorsaak en tot onluste gelei. 'N Aantal verteenwoordigers verhuis na Qum en vandaar na Kermanshah. Weens 'n gebrek aan kworum kon Majlis -sessie nie gehou word nie. Dit het uiteindelik in 12 November 1915 verdaag.

Gedurende hierdie tydperk het Majlis belangrike wette goedgekeur, soos die Wet op Militêre Diensplig, die grondwetwetsontwerp op die Ministerie van Finansies en belasting op eiendomsbelasting.

Vierde kwartaal (21 Junie 1921 - 20 Junie 1923)
Na 'n lang interregnum, wat vyf jaar en sewe maande geduur het), is die vierde Majlis ingehuldig. Die grootste deel van sy tyd is aan spanning en wrok bestee.

Die waardevolste aksie wat geneem is, was toe dit 'n wetsontwerp opstel en goedkeur wat deur die meerderheidsleier van Majlis, Seyyed Hassan Modaress, voorgelê is. Die wetsontwerp vereis dat die ooreenkoms van 1919 onderteken word tussen die Iraanse premier en die Britse regering sonder dat Majlis dit weet. Die ooreenkoms is in werking getree voordat Majlis kans gehad het om daaroor te debatteer.

Moddares se wetsontwerp, nadat dit goedgekeur is, is in die openbaar bekend gemaak en die Britse regering is formeel in kennis gestel.

Vyfde kwartaal (11 Februarie 1924 - 11 Februarie 1924)
Een van die onstuimige periodes in Majlis, toe 'n kombinasie van generalissimo en buitelandse invloed kragte saamgesnoer het om 'n einde te maak aan die Qajar -dinastie. Onafhanklike Majlis -verteenwoordigers is geteister, geïntimideer en selfs vermoor om die minister van oorlog, Reza Khan, op die troon te laat sit.

Sesde termyn (10 Julie 1926 - 13 Augustus 1928)
Die belangrikste gebeurtenis gedurende hierdie tydperk was die afskaffing van Kapitulasie op 9 Mei 1927.

Sewende kwartaal (6 Oktober 1928 - 5 November 1930)
Majlis verleen die reg om valuta uit te reik aan die Iran National Bank (Bank Melli Iran). Hierdie taak was vroeër uitgevoer deur Iran Royal Bank.

Agt termyn (15 Desember 1930 - 14 Januarie 1933)
Gedurende hierdie tydperk het die minister van tesourie voorgestel dat Darcy License, wat die Iraanse olievelde gemonopoliseer het, gekanselleer word.

Negende kwartaal (15 Maart 1933 - 10 April 1935)
In die tydperk was onderhandelinge met die Britse regering oor petroleum. Dit het gelei tot 'n nuwe ooreenkoms. Die Teheran -universiteit is op 4 Februarie 1936 ingehuldig.

Tiende kwartaal (6 Junie 1935– 12 Junie 1937)
Die belangrikste gebeurtenis gedurende hierdie tydperk was onderhandelinge vir die ondertekening van 'n nie-aggressiewe verdrag tussen Iran, Afghanistan, Turkye en Irak.

Elfde kwartaal (11 September 1937 - 18 September 1939)
Die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het op hierdie tydstip aangebreek. Iran het sy neutraliteit in die konflik verklaar.

Twaalfde kwartaal (25 Oktober 1940 - 30 Oktober 1941)
Talle sosiale en ekonomiese probleme as gevolg van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die land aangegryp. Terwyl Iran sy neutraliteit verklaar het, het die Sowjetunie en Brittanje dit blatant verontagsaam en hul troepe na Iran gestuur onder die voorwendsel van vermeende Rykse invloed in Iran.

Tydens 'n noodsessie op 17 September 1941 het Reza Shah afstand gedoen ten gunste van sy seun, Mohammad Reza, wat die volgende dag as die nuwe monarg ingesweer is. Intussen met die Generalissimo Reza Khan uit die pad, het Majlis 'n wetsontwerp op vergifnis en genade geneem vir 'n aantal politieke en algemene vonnisse.

Dertiende kwartaal (13 November 1941 - 23 November 1943)
Hierdie tydperk val saam met die Teheran -konferensie wat die staatshoof van Brittanje, Sowjetunie en die Verenigde State bygewoon het, waar die territoriale integriteit en politieke onafhanklikheid van Iran gewaarborg is.

Veertiende kwartaal (26 Februarie 1944 - 11 Maart 1946)
Die volksraad is geneem terwyl die geallieerde troepe nog dele van Iran beset het. Die politieke partye en groepe wat gestig is nadat Reza Khan van die bewind geval het, het aktief 'n bod vir Majlis -setels gedoen. Dit het tot onrus gelei in sommige van die kiesdistrikte. Met die staking van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was daar opstande in die buiteland in Azerbeidjan en Koerdistan.

Sestiende kwartaal (9 Februarie 1950 - 18 Februarie 1952)
Majlis het 'n onstuimige tydperk geag dat die kontrakwysigings van Gass-Golshaiyan teen die regering se belang geag word. Die geselekteerde petroleumkomitee het sy voorgestelde wysigings ingedien vir die nasionalisering van die Iraanse oliebedryf. Die Britse regering het 'n klag by die Internasionale Tribunaal in Den Haag ingedien. Die Tribunaal het 'n beperkingsbevel uitgereik wat die Iraanse regering verhinder om maatreëls te tref wat hy reeds getref het vir die oordrag van die oliebedryf aan Iraniërs. Die Iraanse regering het die bevel as ongeldig beskou omdat die tribunaal in hierdie saak nie toeskryfbaar was nie. Die Britte het hul konsulêre kantore in Iran gesluit.

Sewentiende kwartaal (25 April 1952 - 19 Desember 1953)
Hierdie sitting, net soos die voorheen, was geteister deur politieke onrus en onrus. Die verkiesing is moeilik uitgevoer, en sommige sitplekke het gedurende Majlis 'n abnormale kort leeftyd vakant gebly. Slegs 80 verteenwoordigers was teenwoordig uit 135. Die kwessie van olie was die meeste van die besprekings.

Die Britse regering het wel 'n beroep op die Internasionale Tribunaal in Den Haag gedoen, hierdie keer het die Iraanse premier die verhore bygewoon. In 'n stemming het die Internasionale Tribunaal beslis dat dit onbevoeg is om die Britse eis oor die nasionalisering van oliebedrywe te hanteer. Dit is opmerklik dat die Britse arbiter wel sy stem afgestaan ​​het ten gunste van die mosie, wat 9 tot 5. aangeneem is. Dit het daartoe gelei dat die politieke bande met die Britse regering heeltemal verbreek is. Die Majlis het die Iran-Sowjet-ooreenkoms oor die Kaspiese See van 1927 beëindig en die fasiliteite daarvan genasionaliseer.

Shah is in ballingskap geneem, net om aan die bewind te kom tydens 'n staatsgreep wat deur die CIA geborg is. By sy terugkeer het hy beide Majlis en die Huis van die Senaat ontbind.


Inhoud

Hoofamptenare
Kantoor Naam Prent Sedert
Opperleier Ali Khamenei 4 Junie 1989 32 jaar gelede (1989-06-04)
President Hassan Rouhani 3 Augustus 2013 7 jaar gelede (2013-08-03)
Visepresident Eshaq Jahangiri 3 Augustus 2013 7 jaar gelede (2013-08-03)
Speaker van die Parlement Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 28 Mei 2020 12 maande gelede (2020-05-28)
Hoofregter Ebrahim Raisi 7 Maart 2019 2 jaar gelede (2019-03-07)

Die vroeë dae van die revolusionêre regering is gekenmerk deur politieke oproer. In November 1979 is die Amerikaanse ambassade in beslag geneem en die inwoners daarvan gyselaar geneem en 444 dae lank gevange gehou weens die steun van die Amerikaanse regering vir die koning van Iran. Die agt jaar lange oorlog tussen Iran en Irak het honderde duisende gesterf en die land miljarde dollars gekos. Teen die middel van 1982 het magstryd eers die middelpunt van die politieke spektrum uitgeskakel en daarna het die Republikeine [3] [4] [5] die revolusionêre leier Ayatollah Khomeini en sy ondersteuners aan bewind gelaat.

Iran se uitdagings na die rewolusie het onder meer die instelling van ekonomiese sanksies en die opskorting van diplomatieke betrekkinge met Iran deur die Verenigde State ingesluit weens die gyselaarskrisis, politieke steun aan Irak en ander terreurdade wat die Amerikaanse regering en ander beskuldig het dat Iran borg . Emigrasie het Iran miljoene entrepreneurs, professionele persone, tegnici en bekwame vakmanne en hul kapitaal verloor. [6] [7] Om hierdie en ander redes het die ekonomie van Iran nie floreer nie. [ aanhaling nodig ] Armoede het in absolute terme met bykans 45% gestyg gedurende die eerste 6 jaar sedert die Irakse inval in Iran begin [8] en die inkomste per capita het nog nie pre-revolusionêre vlakke bereik toe die Irakse inval in 1988 geëindig het nie. [9] [10]

Die Party van die Islamitiese Republiek was die regerende politieke party van Iran en jare lank die enigste politieke party tot sy ontbinding in 1987. Na die oorlog het nuwe reformistiese/progressiewe partye begin ontstaan. Die land het geen funksionele politieke partye gehad totdat die Executives of Construction Party in 1994 gestig is om vir die vyfde parlementsverkiesing deel te neem, hoofsaaklik uit die uitvoerende liggaam van die regering naby die destydse president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Na die verkiesing van Mohammad Khatami in 1997, het meer partye begin werk, meestal van die hervormingsbeweging en gekant deur hardkoppiges. Dit het gelei tot die inlywing en amptelike aktiwiteit van baie ander groepe, insluitend hard-liners. Nadat die oorlog in 1988 geëindig het, het reformistiese en progressiewe kandidate vier uit ses presidentsverkiesings in Iran gewen en die regse nasionalistiese party van Mahmoud Ahmadinejad twee keer gewen.

Die Iraanse regering word gekant teen verskeie milisies, waaronder die Mojahedin-e-Khalq, die People's Fedayeen en die Koerdiese Demokratiese Party. Sien Lys van politieke partye in Iran vir ander politieke partye.

Opperleier Edit

Die opperhoof van Iran [11] is die staatshoof en die hoogste politieke en godsdienstige gesag (bo die president). Die gewapende magte, die regstelsel, staatstelevisie en ander belangrike regeringsorganisasies, soos die Guardian Council en Expediency Discernment Council, is onder die beheer van die opperhoof. Sedert die stigting van die Islamitiese Republiek was daar slegs twee opperste leiers, en die huidige leier (Ali Khamenei) was sedert 1989 aan die bewind. Sy bevoegdhede strek tot die uitreiking van besluite en die neem van finale besluite oor die ekonomie, omgewing, buitelandse beleid, onderwys, nasionale beplanning van bevolkingsgroei, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] die mate van deursigtigheid by verkiesings in Iran, [20] en wie moet ontslaan word en heringestel in die presidensiële kabinet. [21] [22]

Die opperste leier word aangestel deur die vergadering van deskundiges. Alle kandidate vir die Vergadering van Deskundiges, die President en die Majlis (Parlement), word egter deur die Guardian Council gekies, waarvan die helfte deur die hoogste leier van Iran gekies word. [23] Ook moet alle direk gekose lede na die keuringsproses deur die Voograad steeds deur die Hoogste Leier goedgekeur word. [24] [25]

Voograad Wysig

The Guardian Council is 'n aangestelde en grondwetlik gemanipuleerde raad van 12 lede met aansienlike mag. Dit keur wetsontwerpe van die Islamitiese Raadplegende Vergadering (die Iraanse parlement) goed of veto dit en keur of verbied kandidate wat na die vergadering van deskundiges, die presidensie en die parlement wil gaan, [26] Ses van die twaalf lede is Islamitiese faqihs (deskundige in Islamitiese wet) wat deur die opperste leier van Iran gekies is, en die ander ses is regsgeleerdes wat deur die hoof van die regterlike stelsel benoem is (wat ook deur die opperhoof aangestel is), [27] en goedgekeur is deur die Iraanse parlement. [28]

Dit is die mees onlangse verkiesings wat plaasgevind het.

President Edit

Plaaslike rade Redigeer

Islamitiese konsultatiewe vergadering Vergader

Vergadering van kundiges Redigeer

Politieke drukgroepe en leiers Redigeer

Aktiewe studentegroepe sluit in die pro-hervorming "Office for Strengthing Unity" en "the Union of Islamic Student Societies"

  • Groepe wat die Islamitiese Republiek oor die algemeen ondersteun, sluit in Ansar-e Hizballah, The Iranian Islamic Students Association, Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, Islam's Students, and the Islamic Coalition Association. Daar word gesê dat die konserwatiewe magsbasis bestaan ​​uit 'n 'web van lede van Basiji-milisie, families van oorlogsmartelare, sommige lede van die Revolusionêre Garde, sommige staatsamptenare, sommige lede van die stedelike en landelike armes, en konserwatief-gekoppelde fondamente . " [29]
  • opposisiegroepe sluit die Freedom Movement of Iran en die Nation of Iran party in
  • gewapende politieke groepe wat deur die regering byna heeltemal onderdruk is, sluit in Mojahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK), People's Fedayeen, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan the Society for the Defense of Freedom.

Begroting wysig

Die boekjaar van Iran (FY) strek van 21 tot 20 Maart van die daaropvolgende jaar.

Iran het twee tipes begrotings:

Die begroting van Iran word bepaal deur die Management and Planning Organization van Iran en dan voorgestelde deur die regering aan die parlement/Majlis. Nadat dit deur Majlis goedgekeur is, moet die wetsontwerp nog deur die Guardian Council bekragtig word. Die wetsontwerp sal aan die parlement teruggestuur word vir wysigings as dit deur die Guardian Council gestem word. Die Geskiktheidsraad tree op as finale arbiter in enige geskil. [31]

Na jaarlikse goedkeuring van die regering se begroting deur Majlis, lê die sentrale bank 'n gedetailleerde monetêre en kredietbeleid voor aan die Money and Credit Council (MCC) vir goedkeuring. Daarna word belangrike elemente van hierdie beleide opgeneem in die vyfjaarplan vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling. [32] Die vyfjaarplan is deel van "Vision 2025", 'n strategie vir volhoubare groei op lang termyn. [33]

'N Unieke kenmerk van Iran se ekonomie is die groot omvang van die godsdienstige fondamente (genoem Bonyads) wie se gesamentlike begrotings meer as 30% van die sentrale regering uitmaak. [34] [35] [36]

Setad, 'n ander organisasie ter waarde van meer as $ 95 miljard, word beskryf as 'geheimsinnig' en 'min bekend'. [37] Dit word nie onder toesig van die Iraanse parlement nie, aangesien die liggaam in 2008 gestem het om "hom te verbied om organisasies wat die opperhoof beheer, te monitor, behalwe met sy toestemming". Dit is egter 'n belangrike faktor in die mag van die opperste leier, wat hom finansiële onafhanklikheid van die parlement en die nasionale begroting gee. [37]

Die National Development Fund of Iran (NDFI) is nie afhanklik van Iran se begroting nie. [38] Maar volgens die Santiago-beginsels moet NDFI sy beleggingsbesluite en aksies koördineer met die makro-ekonomiese en monetêre beleid van die regering van Iran.

Inkomste wysig

Amptenare in Iran skat dat Iran se jaarlikse inkomste uit olie en gas teen 2015 $ 250 miljard kan bereik sodra die huidige projekte op dreef kom. [39]

In 2004 kom ongeveer 45 persent van die regering se begroting uit die uitvoer van olie- en aardgasinkomste, hoewel dit wissel met die skommelinge in die wêreld se petroleummarkte en 31 persent as gevolg van belasting en fooie. [30] Oor die algemeen was 'n beraamde 50 persent van die BBP van Iran in belastingjaar 2004 vrygestel van belasting. [40]

Vanaf 2010 is olie -inkomste verantwoordelik vir 80% van die inkomste uit buitelandse valuta uit Iran en 60% van die land se totale begroting. [41] Enige surplus -inkomste uit die verkoop van ru -olie en gas moet in die Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) betaal word. Die goedgekeurde "totale begroting", insluitend kommersiële maatskappye in staatsbesit, was $ 295 miljard vir dieselfde tydperk. [42]

Die regering poog om die deel van belastinginkomste in die begroting te verhoog deur die implementering van die plan vir ekonomiese hervorming deur meer effektiewe belastinginvordering van besighede.

Vanaf 2016 is die wetlike formule dat vir die verkoop van olie teen of onder die begroting se prysveronderstelling 14,5% by die National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) bly, 20% na die National Development Fund (NDF) gaan, 2 % gaan na minderbevoorregte en olieproduserende provinsies, en 63,5% gaan na die staatskas. [43]

Iran het nog nie die tesourie -enkelrekeningstelsel geïmplementeer nie. [44]

Uitgawes Wysig

As gevolg van veranderinge in die indeling van begrotingsyfers, is die vergelyking van kategorieë tussen verskillende jare nie moontlik nie. Sedert die Iranse rewolusie het die regering se algemene begrotingsbetalings egter gemiddeld geraak: [40]

  • 59 persent vir sosiale aangeleenthede,
  • 17 persent vir ekonomiese aangeleenthede,
  • 15 persent vir nasionale verdediging, en
  • 13 persent vir algemene aangeleenthede.

Iran het 22,5% van sy nasionale begroting vir 2003 bestee aan programme vir maatskaplike welsyn, waarvan meer as 50% pensioenkoste gedek het. [45]

Sien die aangehegte grafiek vir 'n uiteensetting van uitgawes vir sosiale en ekonomiese doeleindes.

In die boekjaar 2004 is die uitgawes van die sentrale regering soos volg verdeel: [40]

  • lopende uitgawes, 59 persent, en
  • kapitaaluitgawes, 32 persent.
  • Ander items (geoormerk uitgawes, buitelandse valuta-verliese, dekking van kredietverpligtinge en netto uitleen) was verantwoordelik vir die res.

Onder lopende uitgawes was lone en salarisse 36 persent subsidies en oordragte aan huishoudings 22 persent (nie ingesluit nie indirek subsidies). Uitgawes vir oorheersing was 13 persent van die totale regering. Tussen 2000 en 2004 was die totale uitgawes en netto uitleen ongeveer 26 persent van die BBP. [40] Volgens die vise -president vir parlementêre aangeleenthede sou Iran se subsidiehervormings 20 persent van die land se begroting bespaar. [46]

Volgens die hoof van die Departement van Statistiek van Iran, as die begrotingsreëls in hierdie struktuur nagekom word, kan die regering minstens 30 tot 35 persent op sy uitgawes bespaar. [47]

In teenstelling met die hoofdoelwit en as gevolg van 'n gebrek aan implementering van die hervormingsplan vir subsidies, is die omvang van die Iraanse subsidies aan fossielbrandstof wat sy burgers met 42,2% in 2019 toegeneem het, gelyk aan 15,3% van die BBP van Iran en 16% van die totaal globale energiesubsidies. [48] ​​[49] As gevolg hiervan, loop Iranse belastingbetalers jaarliks ​​'n verlies van $ 3,3 miljard op as gevolg van brandstofsmokkel (en ander olie -afgeleides wat ingesmokkel is), gelykstaande aan die "ontwikkelingsbegroting" van Iran. [50]

Openbare skuld Redigeer

Verspreiding van openbare skuld (boekjaar 2016) [51]

In 2014 beloop die totale eise van Iran op die openbare sektor (regering en regeringsinstellings), Iran se banke en finansiële instellings, 929 triljoen IRR ($ 34,8 miljard), wat volgens die IMF verminder moet word. [52] [53] [54] IMF raam dat openbare skuld tot 40% van die BBP (of meer) kan beloop sodra die agterstallige staat aan die private sektor erken word. [55] Hierdie agterstallige skuld is aan banke (45%), private kontrakteurs (37%) en sosiale sekerheid (18%) (FY 2016) verskuldig. [51]

Eksterne skulde Redigeer

In 2013 was die buitelandse skuld van Iran $ 7,2 miljard, vergeleke met $ 17,3 miljard in 2012. [56] Iran se buitelandse skuld was $ 9,3 miljard in Desember 2020. Dit is een van die laagste getalle wêreldwyd. [57]

Finansiële situasie van die regering Redigeer

Notas:
1) Sedert 2002 word die jongste riglyne van die Internasionale Monetêre Fonds oor finansiële statistieke van die regering as model gebruik om jaarlikse begrotingshandelinge op te stel. Gevolglik word inkomste ingedeel in 'belasting en ander inkomste', en 'olieverkope' wat vroeër as inkomste geklassifiseer is, word nou 'oordrag van kapitaalbates' genoem.
2) In 2007/08 bevat dit 'n begrotingsaanvulling van Rls. 9 500 miljard.
3) Die staatsbegroting sluit nie staatsinkomste en -uitgawes uit kommersiële ondernemings in staatsbesit in nie. [63]
4) Die staatsbegroting maak nie voorsiening vir subsidies wat aan staatsondernemings betaal word nie. Sien ook subsidie ​​hervormingsplan. [63]
5) Sonder spesiale inkomste en uitgawes en die syfer vir deursigtigheid in die prys (subsidie) van energiedraers. [59]
6) Vir "Totale staatsbegroting" (insluitend kommersiële maatskappye in staatsbesit), sien Statistical Center of Iran.
7) Versteek besteding en aanspreeklikheid nie ingesluit nie.

Jaarlikse begrotings Redigeer

2009–10 Wysig

In Iran se staatsbegroting vir die Iraanse kalenderjaar 1388 (2009–2010), van die $ 102 miljard wat vir staatsuitgawes bestem is, [42]

  • 53% word befonds deur inkomste uit die verkoop van ru -olie en gas,
  • 28% kom uit belasting en die oorblywende
  • 19% van ander bronne, soos die privatiseringsprogram. [42]

Olie -inkomste word bereken op grond van die gemiddelde prys van $ 37,50 per vat teen 'n Amerikaanse wisselkoers van 9 500 rial. [64] Iran balanseer sy eksterne rekeninge met ongeveer $ 75 per vat. [65]

2010–11 Wysig

Die begroting vir die Iraanse jaar 1389 (2010–2011), wat op 21 Maart begin, beloop $ 368,4 miljard, wat 'n toename van 31 persent teenoor die vorige jaar verteenwoordig en is gebaseer op 'n geskatte olieprys van $ 60 per vat vergeleke met slegs $ 37,50 laas jaar. [64]

2011–12 Wysig

Die openbare begroting was $ 165 miljard (1,770 triljoen rials) in die Iraanse jaar 2011–2012. Die Iraanse parlement het ook 'n totale begroting van $ 500 miljard (5,170 triljoen rials) goedgekeur, wat $ 54 miljard insluit van prysverhogings en verlagings in subsidies, afgesien van die regering (of openbare begroting), ook uitgawes vir staatsondernemings insluit. [66] [67] Die begroting is gebaseer op 'n olieprys van $ 80 per vat. Die waarde van die Amerikaanse dollar word vir dieselfde tydperk op 10 500 IRR geraam. die totale begroting vir 2011 toon 'n toename van 45 persent in vergelyking met dié van 2011, wat $ 368 miljard beloop. [68]

2012–13 Wysig

Die voorgestelde begroting vir 2011–2012 beloop 5,1 kwadriljoen rial (ongeveer $ 416 miljard). [69] Die befondsing vir die bestuur van die regering is met 5,6 persent verminder en die regering se belastinginkomste sou met 20 persent styg. [69] Die verdedigingsbegroting toon 'n toename van 127 persent. Die regering soek ook hoër bedrae vir ontwikkelings-, navorsings- en gesondheidsprojekte. [70] Goedgekeurde begroting van 5,660 triljoen Rials $ 477 miljard is gebaseer op 'n olieprys van $ 85 per vat en die gemiddelde waarde van die Amerikaanse dollar vir die boekjaar sal na raming 12 260 rial beloop, waardeur die regering $ 53,8 miljard uit subsidie ​​kan verdien sny. [71] The approved total state budget figure shows an 11% increase in Rial terms, in comparison to the previous year's budget. Of this amount, $134 billion relates to the government's general budget and the remaining $343 billion relates to state-owned companies and organizations. Of the $134 billion for the government's general budget, $117 billion relates to operating expenditure and $17 billion is for infrastructure developments. The government's general budget for 2012–13 shows a 3.5% decline in comparison to the previous year, while the budget for state-owned companies and organisations has risen by 18.5%. Revenues from crude oil make up 37% of the state's total revenues in the budget. Revenues from taxes have been projected at 458 trillion Rials ($37 billion), which shows a 10% increase year-on-year. [72] In the first half of 2012, Iran announced in Majlis that it has taken in only 25% of its budgeted annual revenue. [73] According to Apicorp, Iran needs oil to average $127 a barrel in 2012 for its fiscal budget to break even. [74]

2013–14 Edit

In May 2013, the Iranian parliament approved a 7.27-quadrillion-rial (about $593 billion) national budget bill for 2013–14. The new national budget has forecast a 40% drop in oil revenues compared to the previous year's projected figure. The bill has set the price of oil at $95 per barrel, based on the official exchange rate of 12,260 rials for a U.S. dollar, which has been fixed by the Central Bank of Iran. [75] The budget law also includes income of 500 trillion Rials from the subsidies reform plan. Out of this amount, 410 trillion Rials is allocated for direct cash handouts to those eligible who have registered and for social funds. [76]

2014–15 Edit

Iran's earmarked government spending for the year starting in March 2014 at $75 billion, calculated on an open-market exchange rate, with an overall/"total" budget ceiling estimated at about $265 billion. The draft budget estimates oil exports at about 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd). The 2014 budget assumes an average oil price of $100 per barrel, inflation at 21%, GDP growth at 3% and the official USD/IRR exchange rate at 26,000 Iranian rials. [77] [78] [79] [80] The budget bill permits the government to use more than $35 billion in foreign finance. [81] Capital expenditure is set to rise by 9.7%. [82] The administration has set the goal of 519 trillion rials, (about $20.9 billion) government's income from implementation of the subsidy reform plan in budget bill and will be likely forced to double fuel prices. [83] In February 2014, Parliament approved a totaal budget bill worth 7,930 trillion rials ($319 billion at the official exchange rate). [84] The International Monetary Fund has estimated Iran needs an oil price above $130 a barrel to balance its 2015-state budget Brent crude was below $80 a barrel in November 2014. The IMF estimated in October 2014 that Iran would run a general government deficit of $8.6 billion in 2015, at the official exchange rate, to be compensated by drawing on the National Development Fund. [85]

2015–16 Edit

Iran's 2015 proposed budget is nearly $300 billion. The overall/"total" budget shows a 4% growth compared with the 2014 budget. The budget assumes that the country exports 1 million barrels per day of crude oil and 0.3 million barrels per day of gas condensates at an average price of $72 per barrel of crude. [86] The official exchange rate is projected to be on average US$28,500/IRR. [87] Dependency on oil exports in this overall budget bill has dropped to 25% (down from over 30% of government revenues in 2014.) [31] The plan is to increase taxation on large organizations by reducing tax evasion/exemption. The Iranian state is the biggest player in the economy, and the annual budget strongly influences the outlook of local industries and the stock market. The 2015 budget is not expected to bring much growth for many of the domestic industries. [87] [88] An average oil price of $50 for the coming year would result in a deficit of $7.5 billion. The government can lower this deficit by increasing the official exchange rate but this will trigger higher inflation. [89] The proposed expenses are $58 billion including $39 billion is salary and pension payments to government employees. Proposed development expenditure amounts to $17 billion. [89] R&D's share in the GNP is at 0.06% (where it should be 2.5% of GDP) [90] [91] and industry-driven R&D is almost non‑existent. [87]

2016–17 Edit

Proposed government budget is 9.52-quadrillion Iranian rials (about 262 billion US dollars). [92] Assumptions made in the budget are $50 billion in foreign investment and foreign loans, 5-6% GDP growth and 11% inflation. [92] Sixty-five percent of the budget is to be financed through taxation and the remaining 35% from oil sales, based on 2.25 million barrels of oil sales per day, an average oil price of 40 dollars a barrel and US dollar-Iranian rial exchange rate at 29,970. [92]

According to the sixth five-year development plan (2016-2021), the subsidy reform plan is to continue until 2021. [92]

An amendment to the budget was passed in August 2016. This amendment allows the government to issue debt based instruments and the use of forex reserves in an attempt to clear its debt to the private sector, including contractors, banks and insurers. [93]

2021–22 Iranian national budget Edit

According to the constitution, the Guardian Council oversees and approves electoral candidates for elections in Iran. The Guardian Council has 12 members: 6 clerics, appointed by the Supreme Leader and 6 jurists, elected by the Majlis from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial System, who is appointed by the Supreme Leader. According to the current law, the Guardian Council approves the Assembly of Experts candidates, who in turn elect the Supreme Leader.

The reformists say this system creates a closed circle of power. [94] Iranian reformists, such as Mohammad-Ali Abtahi have considered this to be the core legal obstacle for the reform movement in Iran. [95] [96] [97] [98] [99]


Political process

Under the constitution, elections are to be held at least every four years, supervised by the Council of Guardians. Suffrage is universal, and the minimum voting age is 16. All important matters are subject to referenda. At the outset of the revolution, the Islamic Republic Party was the ruling political party in Iran, but it subsequently proved to be too volatile, and Khomeini ordered it disbanded in 1987. The Muslim People’s Republic Party, which once claimed more than three million members, and its leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariat-Madari, opposed many of Khomeini’s reforms and the ruling party’s tactics in the early period of the Islamic republic, but in 1981 it, too, was ordered to dissolve. The government has likewise outlawed several parties—including the Tūdeh (“Masses”) Party, the Mojāhedīn-e Khalq (“Holy Warriors for the People”) Party, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan—although it permits parties that demonstrate what it considers to be a “commitment to the Islamic system.”


Prelude to revolution

The 1979 revolution, which brought together Iranians across many different social groups, has its roots in Iran’s long history. These groups, which included clergy, landowners, intellectuals, and merchants, had previously come together in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. Efforts toward satisfactory reform were continually stifled, however, amid reemerging social tensions as well as foreign intervention from Russia, the United Kingdom, and, later, the United States. The United Kingdom helped Reza Shah Pahlavi establish a monarchy in 1921. Along with Russia, the U.K. then pushed Reza Shah into exile in 1941, and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took the throne. In 1953, amid a power struggle between Mohammed Reza Shah and Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.K. Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) orchestrated a coup against Mosaddegh’s government.

Years later, Mohammad Reza Shah dismissed the parliament and launched the White Revolution—an aggressive modernization program that upended the wealth and influence of landowners and clerics, disrupted rural economies, led to rapid urbanization and Westernization, and prompted concerns over democracy and human rights. The program was economically successful, but the benefits were not distributed evenly, though the transformative effects on social norms and institutions were widely felt. Opposition to the shah’s policies was accentuated in the 1970s, when world monetary instability and fluctuations in Western oil consumption seriously threatened the country’s economy, still directed in large part toward high-cost projects and programs. A decade of extraordinary economic growth, heavy government spending, and a boom in oil prices led to high rates of inflation and the stagnation of Iranians’ buying power and standard of living.

In addition to mounting economic difficulties, sociopolitical repression by the shah’s regime increased in the 1970s. Outlets for political participation were minimal, and opposition parties such as the National Front (a loose coalition of nationalists, clerics, and noncommunist left-wing parties) and the pro-Soviet Tūdeh (“Masses”) Party were marginalized or outlawed. Social and political protest was often met with censorship, surveillance, or harassment, and illegal detention and torture were common.

For the first time in more than half a century, the secular intellectuals—many of whom were fascinated by the populist appeal of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a former professor of philosophy in Qom who had been exiled in 1964 after speaking out harshly against the shah’s recent reform program—abandoned their aim of reducing the authority and power of the Shiʿi ulama (religious scholars) and argued that, with the help of the ulama, the shah could be overthrown.

In this environment, members of the National Front, the Tūdeh Party, and their various splinter groups now joined the ulama in broad opposition to the shah’s regime. Khomeini continued to preach in exile about the evils of the Pahlavi regime, accusing the shah of irreligion and subservience to foreign powers. Thousands of tapes and print copies of Khomeini’s speeches were smuggled back into Iran during the 1970s as an increasing number of unemployed and working-poor Iranians—mostly new migrants from the countryside, who were disenchanted by the cultural vacuum of modern urban Iran—turned to the ulama for guidance. The shah’s dependence on the United States, his close ties with Israel—then engaged in extended hostilities with the overwhelmingly Muslim Arab states—and his regime’s ill-considered economic policies served to fuel the potency of dissident rhetoric with the masses.

Outwardly, with a swiftly expanding economy and a rapidly modernizing infrastructure, everything was going well in Iran. But in little more than a generation, Iran had changed from a traditional, conservative, and rural society to one that was industrial, modern, and urban. The sense that in both agriculture and industry too much had been attempted too soon and that the government, either through corruption or incompetence, had failed to deliver all that was promised was manifested in demonstrations against the regime in 1978.


Ceasefire

1988 July - Iran accepts a ceasefire agreement with Iraq following negotiations in Geneva under the aegis of the UN.

1989 February - Ayatollah Khomeini issues a religious edict (fatwa) ordering Muslims to kill British author, Salman Rushdie, for his novel, 'The Satanic Verses', considered blasphemous to Islam.

1989 3 June - Ayatollah Khomeini dies. On 4 June, President Khamene'i is appointed as new supreme leader.

1989 August - Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is sworn in as the new president.

1989 November - The US releases 567 million dollars of frozen Iranian assets.

Major earthquake kills thousands

1990 June - A major earthquake strikes Iran, killing approximately 40,000 people.

1990 - Iran remains neutral following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

1990 September - Iran and Iraq resume diplomatic ties.


The history of American diplomacy stretches back to Ben Franklin, the country’s first diplomat, who helped the 13 colonies form official ties with France in 1778, during the Revolutionary War. Other nations that were among the earliest to make a formal diplomatic alliance with . lees meer

Faced with an army mutiny and violent demonstrations against his rule, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the leader of Iran since 1941, is forced to flee the country. Fourteen days later, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution, returned after 15 . lees meer


Shah flees Iran

Faced with an army mutiny and violent demonstrations against his rule, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the leader of Iran since 1941, is forced to flee the country. Fourteen days later, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution, returned after 15 years of exile and took control of Iran.

In 1941, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran, and the first Pahlavi shah, who they regarded with suspicion, was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The new shah promised to act as a constitutional monarch but often meddled in the elected government’s affairs. After a Communist plot against him was thwarted in 1949, he took on even more powers. However, in the early 1950s, the shah was eclipsed by Mohammad Mosaddeq, a zealous Iranian nationalist who convinced the Parliament to nationalize Britain’s extensive oil interests in Iran. Mohammad Reza, who maintained close relations with Britain and the United States, opposed the decision. Nevertheless, he was forced in 1951 to appoint Mosaddeq premier, and two years of tension followed.

In August 1953, Mohammad Reza attempted to dismiss Mosaddeq, but the premier’s popular support was so great that the shah himself was forced out of Iran. A few days later, British and U.S. intelligence agents orchestrated a stunning coup d𠆞tat against Mosaddeq, and the shah returned to take power as the sole leader of Iran. He repealed Mosaddeq’s legislation and became a close Cold War ally of the United States in the Middle East.

In 1963, the shah launched his “White Revolution,” a broad government program that included land reform, infrastructure development, voting rights for women, and the reduction of illiteracy. Although these programs were applauded by many in Iran, Islamic leaders were critical of what they saw as the westernization of Iran. Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shiite cleric, was particularly vocal in his criticism and called for the overthrow of the shah and the establishment of an Islamic state. In 1964, Khomeini was exiled and settled across the border in Iraq, where he sent radio messages to incite his supporters.

The shah saw himself foremost as a Persian king and in 1971 held an extravagant celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the pre-Islamic Persian monarchy. In 1976, he formally replaced the Islamic calendar with a Persian calendar. Religious discontent grew, and the shah became more repressive, using his brutal secret police force to suppress opposition. This alienated students and intellectuals in Iran, and support for Khomeini grew. Discontent was also rampant in the poor and middle classes, who felt that the economic developments of the White Revolution had only benefited the ruling elite. In 1978, anti-shah demonstrations broke out in Iran’s major cities.

On September 8, 1978, the shah’s security force fired on a large group of demonstrators, killing hundreds and wounding thousands. Two months later, thousands took to the streets of Tehran, rioting and destroying symbols of westernization, such as banks and liquor stores. Khomeini called for the shah’s immediate overthrow, and on December 11 a group of soldiers mutinied and attacked the shah’s security officers. With that, his regime collapsed and the shah fled.


Iran Government - History

Grondwet
Constitution (ICL-English)-Adopted in 1979 and amended in 1989.
Constitution (English)-From Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.
Constitution (Persian)-From Iran's Parliament website.

Official Government Site
Government of Islamic Republic of Iran-News and communications from government.

Official Name of Parliament: Majlis-e-Shuray-e Islami (National Assembly)

Majlis Research Center (Persian)-The official Parliament site provides extensive information on the activities, organisation and members of the legislative body.
Speaker of the Parliament Bio
Majlis Deputies-The 290-members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. Read profiles of all Parliament deputies.
Majlis Research Center
Majlis Research Journal - Majlis va Pajohesh (Persian)
Mellat Electronic Newspaper (Persian/English)-Provides comprehensive news and information on the activities of the legislature. Includes current affairs and economic news.
Parliament Legal Affairs (Persian)
Majlis Library (English/Persian)-Consists of library, museum and historical documents.
The World Directory of Parliamentary Libraries: Iran (Deutscher Bundestag)-Provides information on the Majlis library.
Majlis Monitor-Monitor the performance of Iran s parliament
General Information about the Parliament (IPU)-by Inter-Parliamentary Union
Parliament Primer
Supreme Audit Court-Responsible for auditing and Accountability for the Parliament.
The Guardian Council (Shoraye Negahban)-The twelve appointed members screen all potential candidates for Assembly of Experts, President and Parliament. The conservative council has the authority to veto legislation they judge to be inconsistent with the Constitution or Islamic law. In Persian only.

State Structure
Leadership | Judiciary | Executive | Legislative
Iran: Government (CIA)-Provides an overview of government and politics in Iran.
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments (CIA)-Updated monthly.
Iran Government And Society (Britannica)
Official Profile (UN)-A comprehensive country profile that focuses on Iran's history, culture, economy, society and government.
The Islamic Republic s Power Centers (CFR)
Who's Who (BBC)-A collection of Profiles of notable contemporary Iranians. Includes profiles of government officials.
Iran: Who Holds the Power (BBC)-Learn about how Iran's complex political system works and who really wields the power.
The Structure Of Power In Iran (PBS)
Iran's Constitution & Structure of governance (Video/Persian)
The Assembly of Experts-Appoints the Supreme Leader and monitors his performance and can remove him. The 86 members are elected for an eight year term.
Hokoumat-e Eslami (Assembly of Experts journal)
The Expediency Council-An advisory body for the Leader which has the responsibilty of resolving the difference between the jusdiciary and the parliament. All the members are appointed by the Supreme Leader.
The Guardian Council (Shoraye Negahban)-The twelve appointed members screen all potential candidates for Assembly of Experts, President and Parliament. The conservative council has the authority to veto legislation they judge to be inconsistent with the Constitution or Islamic law. In Persian only.

Government Ministries

Commerce
Ministry of Industry, Mine & Trade (Formely Commerce)-Economic news and information (English/Persian)
Chamber of Commerce-Provides trade information and links.
Iran Export Magazine--Bimonthly trade magazine focusing on foreign trade and economic issues.
Iran Trade Point Organization
Meer.

Defence
Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistic
Ministry of Defence Legion Expert
AJA (Army)
Aerospace Industries Organization (A.I.O.)-Engaged in the research, design, development and manufacture of missiles and aerospace projects.
Iran Aircraft Manufacturing-Engaged in the design, development and manufacture of the AN-140, Abadil and Sanjaghak aircrafts.
Defence Industries Organization (D.I.O.)-Established in 1924, D.I.O. produces a wide range of military equipment.
Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG)-Designs, develops and manufactures a full range of ammunition and small arms.
Iran Electronics Industries (IEI Military)-Designs, develops and produces electronics for aerospace and military applications.
Meer.

Science, Research and Technology
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology (MSRT)-Responsible higher education in Iran.
MSRT - IRPHE-Responsible for Research and Planning.
National Research Institute for Science Policy
Technology Cooperation Office-provides scientific and industrial consultations to the president's office.
ISTI

Transportation
Ministry of Road & Urban development (Persian)-Provides news, information, statistics and links to related sites.
IT Committee of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation (Persian)
Brief History of Ministry of Road & Transportation
Civil Aviation Organization-Responsible for civil aviation safety and planning, development and upkeep of aviation infrastructure. Official site includes information about airlines and travel/tour operators.
Iranian Railways (English/Persian)-Provides comprehensive information about the Iranian rail Network.
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The United States Overthrew Iran’s Last Democratic Leader

Mohammad Mosaddeq is a name that evokes strong emotions in the average Iranian. A charismatic French- and Swiss-educated lawyer from an aristocratic family, Mosaddeq served two terms as prime minister of Iran from 1951, when he led the movement to nationalize the British-controlled Iranian oil industry, until August 1953, when his government was toppled by a royalist military coup backed by the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

The nationalization of Iranian oil was not only a blow to Britain’s economic interests in Iran but to the very survival of the British Empire in the Middle East. While U.S. President Harry Truman encouraged British Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill to compromise with Mosaddeq, even hosting the Iranian premier in Washington in October 1951, the United States eventually lost patience as Anglo-Iranian negotiations failed. Fearing that continuing crisis and instability in Iran would lead to a takeover by Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, the newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to topple Mosaddeq in 1953.

Mohammad Mosaddeq is a name that evokes strong emotions in the average Iranian. A charismatic French- and Swiss-educated lawyer from an aristocratic family, Mosaddeq served two terms as prime minister of Iran from 1951, when he led the movement to nationalize the British-controlled Iranian oil industry, until August 1953, when his government was toppled by a royalist military coup backed by the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

The nationalization of Iranian oil was not only a blow to Britain’s economic interests in Iran but to the very survival of the British Empire in the Middle East. While U.S. President Harry Truman encouraged British Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill to compromise with Mosaddeq, even hosting the Iranian premier in Washington in October 1951, the United States eventually lost patience as Anglo-Iranian negotiations failed. Fearing that continuing crisis and instability in Iran would lead to a takeover by Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, the newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to topple Mosaddeq in 1953.

The coup transformed Iran’s constitutional monarchy, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, into a royal dictatorship that was later toppled in a popular revolution in 1979. For most Iranians, Mosaddeq remains an evocative national hero because of his staunch defense of Iran’s sovereignty over its most vital national resource—oil—in the face of the declining British Empire’s stubborn refusal to let go of an extremely valuable overseas asset. For many liberal Iranians who still dream of a democratic Iran, he also remains a symbol of civic nationalism and constitutionalism because of his demand that the shah should reign but not rule.

Taghi Amirani’s film is a powerful riposte to a handful of U.S. and Iranian politicians, academics, think tankers, and pundits who have been using and abusing history to absolve the United States of responsibility for toppling Mosaddeq.

The lingering trauma of 1953 is powerfully evoked in Taghi Amirani’s new documentary film, Coup 53. Amirani’s film builds on the research that went into the 1985 End of Empire documentary series for British television, revealing tantalizing details about the role of the SIS in the coup. In the Paris basement of Mosaddeq’s grandson, Amirani discovered the transcript of an interview with Norman Darbyshire, the SIS officer who helped devise the coup plan, that was mysteriously cut from the 1985 broadcast.

With Darbyshire played by Ralph Fiennes, Amirani reenacts the interview in which the former British spy candidly admits his role in the coup, including the April 1953 murder of Gen. Mahmud Afshartus, the pro-Mosaddeq chief of police. The British played a crucial but supporting role to the Americans in the 1953 coup—and they are not keen to draw attention to their actions. Indeed, they have never officially acknowledged their role, unlike the Americans, and have been quite happy for Washington to take the blame.

The release of Amirani’s film this fall, with its narrative of Anglo-American culpability for the 1953 coup, is a powerful riposte to a handful of U.S. and Iranian politicians, academics, think tankers, and pundits who have recently been using and abusing history to absolve the United States of responsibility for toppling Mosaddeq—a form of official historical revisionism that has reached the highest levels of the U.S. government in the midst of Washington’s current maximum pressure campaign against Iran.

On May 8, the Trump administration’s special representative for Iran, Brian Hook, blamed Mosaddeq’s downfall on domestic Iranian actors at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This was despite the fact that Hook’s own State Department published a long-overdue volume of the “Foreign Relations of the United States” series in 2017 that was full of declassified CIA documents confirming the United States’ covert role in the coup.

Hook claimed that these documents demonstrated that Mosaddeq was overthrown by a coalition of Iranian actors, including Iran’s Shiite Muslim clergy, thereby eliding the CIA’s central role in recruiting, mobilizing, and coordinating these Iranian coup plotters. He pinned the blame for Mosaddeq’s downfall on Iran’s clergy: “The current religious leaders don’t want to remind people that the religious establishment at the time supported his overthrow,” Hook told the audience.

Iranian ex-premier Mohammad Mossadeq, accused of treason, speaks during court proceedings in Tehran’s military tribunal on Nov. 20, 1953. STF/AFP via Getty Images

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif hit back on the 66th anniversary of the coup in August, drawing parallels between the Trump administration’s current maximum pressure sanctions policy against Iran and the Anglo-American efforts in 1953 to overthrow Mosaddeq, despite the Islamic Republic’s discomfort with the memory of Mosaddeq as a symbol of secular Iranian nationalism.

Few professional historians take seriously Hook’s argument that the United States played no role or a marginal one in toppling Mosaddeq. In fact, the CIA’s covert operation to topple Mosaddeq, codenamed TPAJAX, was one of the worst-kept secrets of the Cold War. Just days after the coup, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, Loy Henderson, reported to Washington a “widespread” rumor in Tehran that the United States was behind the fall of Mosaddeq. Associates of Iran’s new post-coup prime minister, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, had reportedly been saying that Iran was “deeply indebted to [the] Americans” for the success of their efforts.

For decades, both Britain and the United States publicly denied their roles in the 1953 coup so as not to embarrass the shah or endanger their close political and economic ties with Iran. With the overthrow of the shah in 1979, U.S. and British intelligence officers published memoirs, as detailed by the historian Shiva Balaghi, boasting of their roles in toppling Mosaddeq.

Nonetheless, it was not until March 2000, in the midst of a brief detente between Iran and the United States, that then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright officially acknowledged that the “United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq.” She described the coup as “a setback for Iran’s political development” and empathized with Iranians who “continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.”

Coincidentally, a few weeks later, the New York Times published a classified CIA history of the coup that provided extensive details on TPAJAX. This history leaves no doubt that the CIA played a key role in the coup—planning, financing, and orchestrating the various Iranians who carried it out. The U.S. government has never officially acknowledged the validity of this history. But in August 2013, the CIA officially declassified a document acknowledging its own role in the coup.

While the CIA documents that have been declassified in the last few years held few surprises for professional historians, the historical reality of the U.S. role in the coup is an inconvenient truth for opponents of the Islamic Republic in the United States who advocate regime change in Tehran.

Iranian monarchists who support the exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, worry that these documents refute the monarchist narrative that the 1953 coup was a popular so-called national uprising in support of the shah and expose the crisis of legitimacy that engulfed the monarchy after the foreign-backed coup.

The historical reality of the U.S. role in the coup is an inconvenient truth for opponents of the Islamic Republic in the United States who advocate regime change in Tehran.

Meanwhile, current U.S. advocates of regime change in Iran fear that these documents support Iran’s legitimate grievance that the United States violated Iran’s national sovereignty during the Cold War. These opponents of the Islamic Republic, both American and Iranian, worry that if the U.S. public is made to feel guilty about the CIA intervention in Iran in 1953, they may be less likely to support another U.S. intervention in Iran today.

These opponents of Iran’s current government have responded with a revisionist history—put forward by writers such as the retired Pahlavi-era Iranian diplomat, Darioush Bayandor, and the former U.S. State Department official and current Council on Foreign Relations fellow, Ray Takeyh—that largely absolves the United States of responsibility for the coup and instead blames the downfall of Mosaddeq on Iran’s Shiite clergy, thereby weaponizing the history of 1953 against the clerical rulers of today’s Islamic Republic.

Takeyh rejects the notion that the United States bears primary responsibility for Mossadeq’s downfall. He describes this as a “mythology” that has been “promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.”

Instead, Takeyh argues that “the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant” and that “Mosaddeq was bound to fall” because he had “turned into a populist demagogue” who alienated his allies and refused to compromise with the British because of his “intransigence.”


Kyk die video: منابع خبری تایید کردند سردشت بهم ریخته (Julie 2022).


Kommentaar:

  1. Sarn

    Die hele nag het jy nie jou bene toegemaak nie .. Jy hoef nie vriende te hê nie - jy moet vriende wees met vriende. - Lente sal wys wie kak waar! Vodka "Buratino" ... Voel soos vuurmaakhout ... Eensaamheid is wanneer jy 'n e-pos het, en briewe word slegs deur die posbediener gestuur! Babu met 'n kar! 'n Merrie - in 'n pose! Die inskripsie op die vodka-etiket: "Verkoel voor misbruik"

  2. Markus

    Dit sal interessant wees om meer te weet

  3. Durwin

    Jy stem saam, jou denke is eenvoudig uitstekend

  4. Azizi

    Bravo, you just had a great thought

  5. Nels

    Dit is nie 'n grap nie!

  6. Maolmuire

    Ek lees op die webwerf (rekenaarprobleme) Positiewe resensies oor u hulpbron. Ek het dit nie eens geglo nie, maar nou was ek persoonlik oortuig. Dit blyk dat ek nie mislei is nie.

  7. Mikale

    Dankie vir die verligting, en die belangrikste, net betyds. Dink net, vyf jaar al op die internet, maar dit is die eerste keer dat ek daarvan gehoor het.



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