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Hoe het skepe teikens verwerf buite die horison in WWI?

Hoe het skepe teikens verwerf buite die horison in WWI?



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Uit "The World Crisis, 1911-1928" (Winston Churchill):

... die 5de Slag eskader het op 'n lang afstand van 17.000 meter begin skiet op die laaste twee skepe van admiraal von Hipper.

As die horison ongeveer 4,7 km ver is vir 'n waarnemer wat 1,70 m hoog is, hoe kan 'n skip dan 'n teiken van ongeveer 17,500 meter ver slaan?


Slagskepe is gebou om op afstand deel te neem. Selfs op daardie tydstip was die afstandsmeter redelik uitgebreid. Oor die HMS Barham, een van die skepe in die verlowing:

Barham is voltooi met twee brandbestrydingsdirekteure met afstandafstandmeters van 15 voet (4,6 m). Die een was bo die koninklike toring gemonteer, beskerm deur 'n gepantserde kappie, en die ander een was bo -op die driepootvoorpos bo -op die kolom. Elke rewolwer was ook toegerus met 'n afstandmeter van 15 voet.

En op die foto kan u 'n goeie idee kry van die hoogte van die toring bo dekke:

Let op die skaal op die dek vir skaal. Vanuit die afstandsmeterposisie bo -op die toring is die sigbare horison baie verder weg. Die skaal van die diagram wat op die Wikipedia -bladsy gevind word, gee 'n rowwe skatting van 120 voet bo die waterlyn. Met behulp van die formule hier (as my wiskunde uitwerk), kry ek 'n reikafstand van 21,6 km, of meer as 23,000 yds vir 'n minimum omvang. Soos in die kommentaar aangedui, sal die ander skepe se bo -konstruksies ook ver bo die waterlyn uitsteek, dus die werklike maksimum omvang u kan visueel opspoor dat 'n ander skip wissel, afhangende van die omstandighede, insluitend die toestande en die hoogte van die strukture op die teenstanders ...


Skepe het maste. Die 5de Slag -eskader bestaan ​​uit skepe wat uitkykposisies ('gunnery spot') hoog genoeg gehad het om voorsiening te maak vir die gewere.


Die afstand tot die horison is ongeveer 3,6 vierkante meter (h) waar h die hoogte van die waarnemer in meter is en die afstand in kilometer. Jou 4,7 km is dus die afstand na die horison vir 'n persoon wat op seevlak staan. En vanaf 'n toring van 30 m is die afstand 20 km.


Hier is 'n skaaldiagram van Warspite in 1918 van hierdie pos op World of Warships (slegs klein modifikasies is sedert Jutland opgeneem, dus dit is verteenwoordigend in die afstandsmeterhoogtes). Uit hierdie tekening kan ons metings neem, wat die hoogte van die afstandsmeter bo die vuurhoutoppervlak op die voormast gee, ongeveer 28 m bo die boonste rand van die bagasieruim (die swart band om die romp ongeveer waar die waterlyn sou wees). Die hoogte bo die waterlyn in die geveg moes dus binne 'n meter of so van 28m gewees het.

Dit sou die geometriese horison ongeveer 19+ km (~ 21 kyd) stel. Die maksimum reikafstand waarteen 'n teenstander deur die afstandsmeter gesien kan word, is miskien ongeveer 35 km (~ 38 kyd).

Maar dit is akademies vir Jutland, aangesien die sigbaarheid beperk is deur die weerstoestande en die rook nie deur die geometriese horison nie.

(let ook op dat die breking tot gevolg het dat die horison oor die algemeen verder weg is as die meetkundige horison)

Ter inligting bygevoeg, die langste reikafstand wat die een op die oorlogskip op 'n ander getref het, is 'n opskudding tussen Warspite se treffer op Guilio Cesare tydens die aksie by Calabria (die slag van Punta Stilo) Julie 1940 om ~ 26 kyds, en Scharnhorst op Glorious in Junie 1940 op ongeveer 26,2-26,5 kyds. Die onsekerhede in die syfers maak dit moeilik om te sê dat laasgenoemde beslis langer was as eersgenoemde.


'N Paar maniere:

  1. Soos verskeie ander gesê het: die horison word al hoe verder, hoe hoër jy is, sodat hulle verder uitkyk op die maste. Dit werk ook omgekeerd, dus is dit moontlik om lang dinge (soos die maste van ander skepe) van verder af te sien.
  2. Spotters. Soos enige ander artillerie, kan hulle van voorste spotters gebruik maak om die vyand op te spoor en verslag te doen oor die akkuraatheid van die afgevuurde skote. Op die see kan hierdie spotters klein bootjies of vliegtuie wees wat via die radio kan rapporteer.

Sien hierdie prentjie? Fantasties, dus hou op om hierdie Stealth Destroyer 'n slagskip te noem

In hierdie opsig is dit regverdig om te sê dat die DDG-1000 dieselfde probleem ondervind as die res van die Amerikaanse vloot. Gestel die gevorderde geweerstelsel spog uiteindelik met dieselfde afstand teen oorlogskepe as teen landteikens, drie en tagtig seemyl. Gewere kan 'n groot hoeveelheid vuur in die omtrek van honderde rondes afskud, vergeleke met die raketmagasyn van die skip van tagtig ronde. Dis goed.

In die loop van die jare het dit algemeen geword dat skrywers hul beskrywings van geleide-missielvernietiger (DDG) uitleef. Zumwalt, die nuutste oppervlakvegter van die Amerikaanse vloot. Kommentators van sulke neigings beeld die ultra-hoë-tegnologie DDG-1000 uit as 'n slagskip. Beter nog, dit is 'n 'stealth battleship'-'n geskikte onderwerp vir wetenskapfiksie!

Nie so nie. En om die nomenklatuur reg te kry, maak saak: om 'n oorlogsman 'n slagskip te noem, roep beelde op in die gewilde gedagtes van dik gepantserde dreadnoughts wat met groot gewere op mekaar oopvlieg, opdringende teikens in Normandië of Koeweit, of rook en vuur vlam nadat Nagumo se oorlogsvliegtuie by Pearl Harbor toegeslaan het.

(Dit het die eerste keer laat in 2015 verskyn.)

Sulke beelde mislei. Slagskepe was oorlogsskepe met verskeie missies wat in staat was om vyandelike vloot te betrek, swerms propellervliegtuie af te weer of vyandige strande met geweervuur ​​te bestry. Die DDG-1000 is 'n geesdriftige, maar beskeie gewapende oppervlakte-vegter wat geoptimaliseer is vir een missie: oewerbombardeer. Die skoen pas net nie.

Daar is geen probleem om die etiket aan te heg nie stealth aan Zumwalt, wat tans sy eerste ronde seeproewe aan die kus van New England ondergaan. Skeepsbouers het moeite gedoen om die skip te vermy teen radaropsporing. Radar gee elektromagnetiese energie uit om skepe en vliegtuie te soek, op te spoor en te rig. Dit skree, en luister dan na 'n eggo van romp of vliegtuie - net soos kykers skree en luister wanneer hulle die Grand Canyon besoek.

Die eggo is die truuk. Hierdie moeras van 15 000 ton verplaas half keer soveel as 'n Ticonderoga-klas-kruiser het na berig word nog net 'n vyftigste van die radarsnit van die vloot se werkperd Arleigh Burke-klas DDG's. Alhoewel dit nie heeltemal onopspoorbaar is nie, sal DDG-1000 op vyandelike radar-omvang soos 'n vissersvaartuig of 'n ander klein vaartuig lyk-as dit enigsins opgetel word. Om in 'n oppervlakteverkeer in te skakel, is geen geringe prestasie vir 'n groot vernietiger nie.

Hoe het skeepsbewaarders dit opgelos? Eerstens, die meetkunde van die DDG-1000 se romp, bo-opbou en bewapening buig eerder af as weerspieël elektromagnetiese energie. Regte hoeke en oppervlaktes loodreg op die as van EM -straling weerkaats energie - wat die radarhandtekening van 'n voorwerp verhoog. Gevolglik bevat die DDG-1000-ontwerp min regte hoeke. Alles hang. Terwyl radarantennas, rookstakke en ander toebehore die dekke van konvensionele oorlogskepe deurmekaar maak, word sulke items meestal in ZumwaltSe romp of dekhuis. Dit is verantwoordelik vir die skoon, buitenaardse voorkoms van die vaartuig.

Vir 'n ander demp radar-absorberende bedekkings wat op die buitekant van die skip vasgemaak is, radaropbrengste wat voorkom. Alhoewel dit amper nie met die blote oog sigbaar is nie, sal hierdie groot skip moeilik wees om op te spoor - wat nog te sê spoor of teiken - terwyl hy oor die horison vaar.

As stealth is egter 'n akkurate byvoeglike naamwoord, dubbing Zumwalt 'n slagskip dra valse indrukke oor. Eerstens is daar sprake van taalhigiëne. Dit is te algemeen onder leke om dit te gebruik slagskip as 'n algemene term vir enige oorlogskip. In 2000 het ek inderdaad as rubriekskrywer begin, juis omdat verslaggewers die vernietiger USS benoem het Cole 'n slagskip. 'N Klein vaartuig vol plofstof het daardie ongelukkige vaartuig in Aden getref en 'n massiewe gat in haar sy geblaas. Hoe kan dit gebeur as Cole was 'n slagskip? Slagwaens is robuust gebou, met kwesbare ruimtes omhul in 'n voet of meer pantser. Hulle is gebou op die veronderstelling dat hulle 'n slag in 'n slakfees met vyandelike slagskepe sou slaan.

Vernietigers is nie op hierdie aanname gebou nie. Beskryf Cole as 'n slagskip 'n basiese feit oor moderne oorlogskepe verduister. Amerikaanse seelui probeer om die 'boogskutter', naamlik 'n vyandige skip of oorlogvoël, neer te sit voordat hy sy 'pyl', 'n torpedo of 'n raket teen 'n skip laat vlieg. Dit is omdat min skepe gebou is om strydskade te weerstaan. Bemanningslede noem hulle 'blikkies' vir 'n rede: dit is maklik om 'n Amerikaanse skip se kante deur te steek as 'n vyand die skip se verdediging ontduik. Dit moes dus geen verrassing gewees het dat 'n klein vaartuig propvol plofstof met 'n lading 'n verpletterende slag teen een van die voorste vegters van die Amerikaanse vloot kan kry nie. Weereens: om dinge op hul regte name te noem, is die begin van wysheid.

Tweedens, diegene wat uitbeeld Zumwalt soos 'n dreadnought skynbaar nie aan dreadnoughts dink nie, maar in hul ouderdom. Ook dit vervaag belangrike feite. Vliegtuigvervoerders het tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog slagskepe as kapitaalskepe - die vloot se swaarste en duurste slagoffers - vervang. Dreadnoughts het nuwe lewe gevind as hulpplatforms. Hulle het vyandelike strande platgetrek tydens amfibiese operasies. Hulle het hul diensplig verrig en hul sekondêre batterye gebruik om die taakmag van die draer teen lugaanvalle te skerm.

Die DDG-1000 is geoptimaliseer vir die soort hulpverlening. Die vaartuig dra veral 'n paar langafstand-gewere wat geoptimaliseer is om buitelandse oewers te bombardeer, tesame met tagtig vertikale lanseerders wat landvliegtuie rakette rakende honderde kilometers in die binneland kan opsteek. Die vaartuig voorsien dus in die behoefte van die vloot om buitelandse vuurondersteuning te bied aan troepe wat in kusgebiede veg. Ondersteuning vir geweervuur ​​is 'n vermoë wat verval het toe die laaste slagskip in 1992 uittree. In 'n eng sin is dit dus gepas om die Zumwalts na gevegswaens.

Maar slagskepe het nooit hul multimissie -karakter heeltemal prysgegee nie. In hul dae van nautiese oppergesag het hulle vyandige gevegsvlote geveg om te bepaal wie die see sou beveel. Daarna beskerm hulle kruisers, vernietigers en amfibiese vaartuie wat in groot getalle uitgebrei het om maritieme bevele te ontgin. Dreadnoughts het die voorrang behou totdat die flattop en sy lugvleuel tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog tot hul reg gekom het.

Maar hulle het steeds die hardste oppervlakoppervlakte-platforms gebly, selfs nadat hulle verduister is. Vervoervaart het hulle nie verouderd gemaak nie. Byvoorbeeld, die slagskepe Washington en Suid -Dakota het 'n deurslaggewende rol gespeel in die vlootgevegte by Guadalcanal in 1942. Die Pearl Harbor -vloot het wraak geneem in 'n oppervlakgeweergeveg in die Surigao -straat in 1944. Die Surigao -seestraat het deel uitgemaak van die Slag van Leyte Gulf, die geskiedenis se laaste groot vlootaksie. Iowa-gevegwaens van die klas hervat hul funksie vir oppervlak-oorlogvoering tydens 'n kortstondige herlewing gedurende die 1980's en 1990's. Uitgerus met Harpoon- en Tomahawk-anti-skeepsraketten om hul nege 16- en twaalf 5-duim-gewere aan te vul, vorm hulle die kern van oppervlakte-aksiegroepe, terwyl hulle ook missies vir die bombardement van die see verlaat.

Kortom, slagskepe het gedurende hul lewensduur multimissie -vaartuie gebly - selfs nadat tegnologiese vooruitgang hulle na sekondêre status verplaas het. Die Zumwalt is eendimensioneel daarteenoor. Elke skip is gewapen met twee "gevorderde geweerstelsels" wat presiese vuur kan reën- alhoewel met liggewig-projektiele in vergelyking met slagskepe se 1,900- en 2,700-lb. rondtes - op land teikens ongeveer 83 seemyl ver. Marines sal die rugsteun verwelkom.

Dit is egter nog onduidelik hoe goed die gevorderde geweer teen die vyandelike vloot kan bewys. Byvoorbeeld, 'n onlangse verslag van die Congressional Research Service bring hulde aan die geweer se langafstand-landaanval-projektiele, maar maak maar min melding van hoe die DDG-1000 in oppervlakoorlog sou vaar. Die vervaardiger van die geweer spog met die wapen se "hoogs gevorderde geweervuurvermoë vir oorlogsvoering teen die oppervlak", maar beklemtoon-net soos die ander versterkers van die skip-die oorkoepelende missie oorweldigend. Tot dusver blyk oppervlakte-aksie 'n nagedagte vir die DDG-1000's te wees-anders as hul voorvaders met vrees. Dit is nog 'n nuanse wat deur die naam gemasker word stealth slagskip.

In hierdie opsig is dit regverdig om te sê dat die DDG-1000 dieselfde probleem ondervind as die res van die Amerikaanse vloot se vloot. Gestel die gevorderde geweerstelsel spog uiteindelik met dieselfde afstand teen oorlogskepe as teen landteikens, drie en tagtig seemyl. Gewere kan 'n groot hoeveelheid vuur in die omtrek van honderde rondes afskud, vergeleke met die raketmagasyn van die skip van tagtig ronde. Dis goed.

Maar dit maak min saak as die skip nooit binne bereik is om sy gewere af te vuur nie. Hoe indrukwekkend dit ook is vir 'n geweer, drie-en-tagtig seemyl is slegs 'n fraksie van, byvoorbeeld, die reikafstand van die Chinese YJ-18-vaartuig teen skipke. Die YJ-18, wat tans aan boord van die People's Liberation Army Navy-skepe en -bote is, kan op teikens 290 seemyl ver slaan. Dit blyk ook dat die Zumwalts het Harpoons, waarvan die reikafstand in elk geval onder die gevorderde geweerstelsel val.


Billy Mitchell en die slagskepe

Slagskepe-groot, swaar gepantserde oorlogskepe met gewere van groot kaliber-het in die 1890's in hul moderne vorm na vore gekom en in die eerste dekades van die 20ste eeu simbole geword van nasionale mag.

Hulle was algemeen bekend as “dreadnoughts, ” na HMS Dreadnought, wat in 1906 diens gedoen het by die Britse vloot. Dreadnought het 10 12-duim-gewere in die hoofbattery en 27 minder gewere. Dit was die eerste groot oorlogskip wat deur turbines aangedryf is, wat dit die vinnigste slagskip ter wêreld gemaak het. VreeslikDit was ver bo enigiets anders wat dryf, en dit het 'n wapenwedloop onder die wêreld se vloot geloods.

HMS Dreadnought is spoedig in vermoë oortref deur nuwer slagskepe soos USS Arizona, in 1916 in gebruik geneem. Arizona was amper dubbel so groot as Dreadnought en het meer en groter gewere gehad.

Mitchell voor 'n Vought VE-7 Bluebird, 1920.

Die enigste groot botsing van die slagskipvlote in die geskiedenis was tydens die Slag van Jutland in 1916, toe die Royal Navy en die Duitse keiserlike vloot mekaar aan die kus van Denemarke geslaan het. Onder die Duitse slagskepe wat op Jutland verloof was, was SMS Ostfriesland.

Toe die Eerste Wêreldoorlog in 1918 geëindig het, het die Verenigde State 39 slagskepe gehad. Sommige van hulle was verouderd, nadat hulle uit die motbolle gehaal is vir die oorlog en binnekort weer uitgetree het, maar die meeste was nog steeds strydwaardig. Die vermindering van die Amerikaanse magte het binne enkele ure na die wapenstilstand begin, maar die Kongres het 'n vlootuitbreiding van 10 ekstra slagskepe goedgekeur.

In die tussenoorlogse tydperk het die Amerikaanse strategie groot vertroue in seemag geplaas. Die vloot was die land se eerste verdedigingslinie, en die slagskip was die ruggraat van die vloot. Hierdie reëling was op die punt om ernstig uitgedaag te word deur Army Air Service Brig. Genl Billy Mitchell, wat van die oorlog af op pad huis toe was.

Billy Mitchell het bekendheid verwerf as Amerikaanse luggevegbevelvoerder in Frankryk. Hy het in 1918 byna 1500 Amerikaanse en geallieerde vliegtuie gelei in die St. Mihiel -offensief, wat hom die eerste gesamentlike bevelvoerder van die lugmagkomponent gemaak het.

Hy was reeds 'n bekende persoon. Koerante het gevolg wat hy gesê en gedoen het. Hy is bekroon met die Croix de Guerre deur die Franse. In Engeland het Mitchell 'n gehoor gehad met koning George V, en hy het die prins van Wallis vir 'n vliegtuigrit geneem.

Mitchell het geglo dat die wêreld op die drumpel staan ​​van 'n “lugvaarttydperk ” en dat militêre lugmag onafhanklik van grond- en seemagte moet wees. Hy is geïnspireer deur die voorbeeld van die Royal Air Force, wat in 1918 as 'n aparte diens gestig is, wat die lugwapens van die weermag en vloot kombineer.

Die onherstelbare Mitchell werp voortdurend aspersies op na sy meerdere, wie se entoesiasme vir lugmag (en vir Mitchell) streng beperk was. Op pad huis toe, het Mitchell aan sy medepassasiers op die Cunard -voering gesê Aquitanië dat die Algemene Staf net soveel van die lug weet as wat 'n vark van skaatsery weet.

Ostfriesland net voor die bombardement.

Hy het gehoop om weermagdirekteur van militêre lugvaart te wees, maar die posisie is uitgeskakel tydens 'n naoorlogse herorganisasie en genl.maj Charles T. Menoher is in Januarie 1919 as direkteur van die lugdiens gekies. Rainbow Division in Frankryk tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Sy klasgenoot van West Point, genl. John J. Pershing, het seker gemaak dat Menoher sy oorlogstyd behou en het gereël dat hy aan die hoof staan ​​van die lugdiens, al was Menoher nog nooit in 'n vliegtuig nie. Mitchell het teruggekeer tot die graad van kolonel as hoof van opleiding en operasies, maar het sy ster teruggekry toe hy assistent van Menoher geword het, wie se posisie opgegradeer is na die lugdienshoof.

Menoher was 'n goeie weermagoffisier, maar hy het niks van lugmag geweet nie en hy kon nie Billy Mitchell beheer nie. Hy ondersteun Pershing se siening dat lugmag ondergeskik moet wees aan infanterie.

Dit was nie volgens Mitchell se gesindheid of temperament om respekvol te wees of beleid te ondersteun waarmee hy nie saamgestem het nie. Hy het van die begin af rondom Menoher gewerk, in die openbaar gepraat soos hy goeddink en gedra asof hy die lugdienshoof is. Menoher, wat nie by Mitchell se gewildheid of steun in die kongres pas nie, kners op sy tande.

Na die mening van Mitchell vind veranderinge in militêre stelsels slegs plaas deur die druk van die openbare mening of 'n ramp in die oorlog. die ministerie van lugdienste in Brittanje, en Mitchell het geglo dat die openbare mening die dag in die Verenigde State sou wees.

Mitchell se geloof in lugmag was breed, en strategiese bombardement was veral belangrik. Die doelwit vir sy bekendste uitdaging sou egter die slagskip wees, en die aangeleentheid ter sprake sou die kusverdediging wees.

Dit was nog altyd die vloot se taak om dreigemente te ontmoet wat die Verenigde State vanuit die see nader. Weermagverantwoordelikheid vir die verdediging van die nasie eindig aan die waterrand. In die 1920's was kusverdediging 'n baie gewilde missie omdat 'n groot deel van die krimpende verdedigingsbegroting daarmee gepaard gegaan het.

Mitchell het aangevoer dat die lugdiens dit moet oorneem. Vliegtuie kan die indringers ver van die kus onderskep en stop en dit vinniger en teen laer koste doen as wat die vloot kon doen. Om sy standpunt te bewys, moes hy 'n slagskip sink en al in die somer van 1919 het hy begin dink oor hoe om dit te doen.

Hy het ook geglo dat vliegtuie wat deur katapulte van kapitaalskepe gelanseer word, nuttig sou wees in die kusverdediging en het voorgestel dat die lugdiens twee vliegdekskepe aanskaf. Dit was 'n verleentheid vir die vloot, wat in 1918 die bou van sy eerste vervoerder uitgestel het.

Sommige vlootbeamptes het in lugmag geglo, maar adm. William S. Benson, die hoof van vlootoperasies, was nie onder hulle nie. Hy het gesê dat ek geen idee kan hê dat die vloot ooit vir vliegtuie sal hê nie, en dat die vloot nie vliegtuie nodig het nie. Lugvaart is net baie geraas. ”

In Augustus 1919 ontbind Benson die Navy Aviation Division en herverdeel lugvaartaktiwiteite. ” Hy het nie die assistent -sekretaris van die vloot Franklin D. Roosevelt in kennis gestel nie, wat voor die kongres ontken het dat die afdeling ontbind is. Hy was verplig om terug te keer toe Billy Mitchell 'n afskrif van die opdrag van Benson vervaardig.

Die lug sal seëvier

Mitchell het die hitte versterk met 'n verklaring aan die New York Herald in Desember 1919. “ Die lugdiens moet georganiseer word as van koördinaat belang vir die weermag self, en nie net van gelyke nie, maar van groter belang as die vlootorganisasie, ” het hy gesê. Die lug sal binne 'n baie kort tyd oor die water heers. In 1920 het Mitchell aan die kongres gesê dat die lugdiens enige bestaande slagskip of wat gebou kan word, kan laat sink. Hy het 'n demonstrasie gevra waarin vliegtuie skepe sou bombardeer.

Die vloot, in die hoop om Billy Mitchell vooruit te loop, het einde 1920 sy eie toetse uitgevoer. Die doelwit was USS Indiana, 'n oorskot slagskip wat in die Spaans-Amerikaanse oorlog diens gevind het, maar afgegradeer het tot die status van 'n#8220coast slagskip ” sodat die naam aan 'n nuwe skip toegeken kon word. Die ou skip het gesink na herhaalde treffers, maar daar is niks aangekondig nie en niks verskyn in die Amerikaanse koerante nie.

Op 11 Desember is twee dramatiese foto's van massiewe bomskade deur die toetse gepubliseer deur Londen Illustrated News. Toe verskyn nog sewe foto's Die New York Tribune. Die pers en die kongres roep om meer inligting. Sekretaris van die vloot Josephus Daniels maak 'n verslag bekend van kapt WD Leahy, direkteur van vlootskutters vir die toetse, wat lui: 'Die hele eksperiment wys op die onwaarskynlikheid dat 'n moderne slagskip vernietig word of heeltemal buite werking gestel word deur lugbomme. ”

Kort daarna het meer besonderhede na vore gekom tot nadeel van die vloot se aansprake. Geen lewendige bomme is laat val nie, slegs dummybomme wat met sand gelaai is om die plek van treffers te bepaal. Plofstof is toe op die punte waar sandbomme getref het, neergesit. Die vloot het 'n akkuraatheidssyfer van 11 persent aan die bomme toegeken, wat die ontploffings wat begin het, beperk het. Verdere bewyse dui op 'n akkuraatheid van ongeveer 40 persent.

Ons kan óf enige skip wat vandag bestaan, vernietig óf laat sink, ” het Mitchell in Januarie aan die Huis -toewysingskomitee gesê. Al wat ons wil doen, is om te sien dat julle, heren, kyk hoe ons 'n slagskip aanval. … Gee ons die oorlogskepe om aan te val, en kom kyk daarna. ”

Daniels, wat sy toer as sekretaris van die vloot beëindig het, het ontstel dat ek met blydskap kaalkop op die dek of aan die stuur van 'n slagskip sou staan ​​terwyl Mitchell my uit die lug wou slaan. As hy ooit probeer om bomme op die dekke van vlootvaartuie te rig, sal hy na atome geblaas word lank voordat hy naby genoeg kom om sout op die stert van die vloot te laat val. ”

Binne enkele dae is twee resolusies in die kongres ingedien waarin die vloot aangemoedig word om teikenskepe vir die weermag te voorsien. Voordat die voorstelle tot stemming gekom het, het die vloot ingestem om eksperimente op vlootvaartuie te bombardeer, en saam met die weermag.

Mitchell het die nuwe tweemotorige Martin MB-2-tweedekker, wat hier in formasie gewys word, gekies vir sy historiese demonstrasie.

Volgens Mitchell was die doel van die toetse om te bepaal of 'n slagskip deur bombardemente gesink kan word. Dit was ook die vraag wat die kongres wou beantwoord. Die vloot het egter die standpunt ingeneem dat die doel was om te bepaal hoeveel bomskade skepe kan weerstaan.

Die reëls en voorwaardes vir die toetse is deur die vloot gestel, wat dit vir Mitchell so moeilik moontlik gemaak het om te slaag. Die skepe moes in diep water gesink word, 100 vaam of meer. Die vloot het twee plekke met voldoende diepte naby die kus verwerp en 'n teikengebied ongeveer 50 myl uit die see uit die mond van die Chesapeakebaai gekies. Langley Field, die basis vir Mitchell se bomwerpers, was 25 myl verder wes. Dit het dit vir die bomwerpers 'n terugreis van twee uur gemaak, wat die tyd beperk het wat hulle in die doelgebied kon bly.

Die vliegtuie is nie toegelaat om lugtorpedo's te gebruik nie. Die lugdiens sou slegs twee treffers met sy swaarste bomme toegelaat word. 'N Inspeksieparty sou na elke treffer aan boord van die teikenskepe gaan om die skade noukeurig te ondersoek.

Mitchell het die eerste voorlopige lugbrigade in Langley gestig en sy vliegtuie en bemannings daar bymekaargemaak vir die missie. Die grootste beskikbare bom het 1,100 pond geweeg, wat nie voldoende was om 'n slagskip te laat sink nie. Kapt. C. H. M. Roberts van die afdeling vir vliegtuigbewapening het betyds 'n spesiale hoeveelheid bomme van 2.000 pond vervaardig vir die toetse.

Die groot bomme sou deur twee soorte vliegtuie afgelewer word. 'N Aantal Handley Page O/400's, variante van 'n Britse bomwerper uit die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, was in die vloot en kon groot vragte dra. Die beste vliegtuig sou egter die nuwe tweemotorige Martin MB-2-tweedekker wees, wat dan van die produksielyne af kom. Dit het 'n vaart van 558 myl en kon 'n vrag van 3000 pond dra.

Mitchell het besluit dat sy vlieëniers nie probeer om direkte treffers op die skepe te tref nie. Die mees effektiewe tegniek sou 'n byna mis wees, met die bomme wat onder water ontplof en 'n watergat geskep het om die romp van die skepe maksimum skade aan te rig.

Die Harding -administrasie het sy amp aangeneem en die nuwe oorlogsekretaris was John W. Weeks. Die vloot het by hom gekla oor Mitchell se openbare verklarings en kritiek. Menoher was toenemend kwaad. 'N Week voordat die toetse sou begin, het hy gevra dat Mitchell ontslaan word.

Mitchell, met sy DH-4 in die rigting van sy ontmoeting Ostfriesland, persoonlik die bombardement uitgevoer.

Weke was aanvanklik geneig om saam te stem. Die New York Wêreld het hom aangehaal dat Mitchell die vloot, ” en die New York Sun berig dat Mitchell waarskynlik verwyder sal word. Daar was 'n sterk pro-Mitchell-reaksie in die pers, en Weeks, wat kennis geneem het van Mitchell se gewildheid onder die publiek en die kongres, het teruggetrek en Mitchell in plaas daarvan 'n berisping gegee. Menoher gaan terug om sy tande te kners.

Die toetse is die oggend van 21 Junie geopen, met pers en waarnemers teenwoordig op die USS Henderson. Die lugoperasies sou gelei word deur die marine -kaptein Alfred W. Johnson, bevelvoerder van die lugmag van die Atlantiese Vloot, wat nie 'n vlieënier was nie.

Die doelwitte sou 'n verouderde en oortollige Amerikaanse slagskip wees en vier voormalige Duitse vlootvaartuie, insluitend die slagskip Ostfriesland, verkry na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog in die vredesooreenkoms en beplan om gesloop te word. Die aanvalle op die eerste vier skepe was streng voorlopige gebeure.

21. Junie Vlootvliegtuie het die voormalige Duitse duikboot U-117 met 12 bomme laat sink.

29 Junie. Vlootvliegtuie het die ou Amerikaanse slagskip aangeval Iowa met dummy bomme. Van die 80 bomme wat neergegooi is, is slegs twee as direkte treffers aangeteken. Voorstanders van slagskip het vertroosting gevind uit hierdie toetsronde.

13. Julie. Die weermagvliegtuie het hul eerste verskyning gemaak. Die Martin-bomwerpers (volgens die reëls beperk tot bomme van 300 pond) het die voormalige Duitse vernietiger G-102 in 19 minute laat sink.

18. Julie Vloot- en weermagvliegtuie het om die beurt die voormalige Duitse ligkruiser aangeval Frankfurt. Geen bom swaarder as 600 pond is toegelaat nie. Daar was gereeld onderbrekings terwyl inspekteurs hul inspeksies aan boord gesleep het. Die lugdiens is uiteindelik toegelaat om te slaan en het die vaartuig met bomme van 600 pond laat sink. Die vloot, wat besluit het om skote te gebruik om af te werk Frankfurt, was verbaas.

Genl.maj Charles T. Menoher, hoof van lugdiens.

Die belangrikste gebeurtenis was Ostfriesland, wat 18 treffers van die groot gewere van Britse slagskepe op Jutland geneem het, 'n myn op pad huis toe getref het en twee maande later weer gereed was vir aksie. Ostfriesland is gebou om so na as moontlik oninkbaar te wees. Dit het vier velle vir beskerming teen myne en torpedo's. Die skip is in aparte waterdigte kompartemente verdeel, sodat dit nie deur 'n enkele gat in die romp gesink kon word nie.

Die New York Times, die aand voor die eerste aanval op die vergaderplek by Old Point Comfort gerapporteer Ostfriesland gesê, “Naval -beamptes dring daarop aan dat die flyers nooit die Ostfriesland hoegenaamd. ”

Bombardement van Ostfriesland was in verskillende fases beplan, versprei oor twee dae, 20 en 21 Julie. Henderson. Onder hulle was Pershing (wat op 1 Julie stafchef geword het), sekretaris van oorlogsweke, sekretaris van die vloot Edwin Denby, 18 kongreslede, 50 nuusverslaggewers en verskillende admirale en generaals.

Billy Mitchell, wat al die bombardemente in sy persoonlike vliegtuig vergesel het, vlieg bo die lug, Visarend, 'n tweesitplek de Havilland DH-4B. 'N Lang blou wimpel stroom uit die stert vir identifikasie. Mitchell is vergesel deur kapt. St. Clair Streett, wat op die agterste sitplek as navigator vlieg.

Vliegtuie van die Marine en die Marine Corps het gegaan Ostfriesland Eerstens, spandeer 'n uur en 17 minute om klein bomme te gooi en minimale skade aan te rig. Toe die lugdiensvliegtuie nader kom, is hulle beveel om nie aan te val nie, aangesien waarnemers aan boord was. Toe Mitchell kla oor die vertraging, het Johnson gesê dit is die vlieëniers se skuld dat hulle vroeg opgestyg het. Hulle het inderdaad vroeg opgestyg — met nege minute. Johnson en die inspekteurs het hulle 47 minute lank laat rondloop, en daarna die toetse beëindig nadat die lugdiens slegs die helfte van sy bomme laat val het.

Josephus Daniels, sekretaris van die vloot, 'n aartsvyand van Mitchell's.

Die slagskip was nog steeds aan die gang en die vloot was bly. Clinton Gilbert van Die Washington Post gerapporteer, “Op die goeie skip Henderson, Sekretaris Denby het ons vertel hoe min indruk die bomme gemaak het. Hoë vlootbeamptes snak vrolik. ” Sen. Wesley L. Jones van die staat Washington het gesê dat 'n vlootbeampte vir hom gesê het dat dit 'n duisend -op -een is dat die skip nie deur die bombardement laat sak word nie. ”

Op die oggend van die tweede dag het luitenant Clayton L. Bissell 'n vlug van Martins gelei wat met 1 000 pond bomme aangeval het. Een van die bomme was 'n direkte treffer, en die vloot het die toets gestop vir inspeksie. Die Martins keer terug na die basis met nege bomme oor. Op die kontroleskip het Johnson, vermoedelik 'n objektiewe direkteur van die toetsing, sy emosies laat blyk. “ Deur Jove, ” het hy gesê, “ ons gaan hierdie skip nie sink nie! ”

Die laaste skoot op Ostfriesland was vasgestel op die middag 21 Julie. Kaptein W. R. Lawson sou dit lei, 'n vlug van ses Martins en twee Handley Pages, elk met 'n bom van 2.000 pond. Terwyl die vlieëniers wag om op te styg, bel Johnson met 'n verandering in die reëls. Die bomwerpers kon nie meer as drie van hul grootste bomme na die doelgebied bring nie. Die skriftelike ooreenkoms was dat die lugdiens twee direkte treffers met hul grootste bomme toegelaat sou word.

Mitchell, walglik, het al agt vliegtuie beveel om voort te gaan. Hy het 'n boodskap aan die vloot afgestuur en gesê dat sy bomwerpers 2.000 pond dra en dat hy sal aanhou aanval totdat ons die twee regstreekse treffers gekry het wat die weermag gemagtig is om te maak. .

Een van die Handley Pages moes uit die formasie val, maar die ander sewe vliegtuie het na die teiken gegaan. Hulle was nie van plan om twee direkte treffers te maak en die toets te stop nie. Hulle bevele was om byna mis te streef om skokgolwe teen 'n romp teen die romp te skep.

Mitchell en Pershing in Frankryk tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog.

Twee en twintig minute en verby

Die eerste bom het om 12:18 uur geval. Dit was 'n byna mis, soos beplan. Die ander vliegtuie het met tussenposes ingegee en hul wapens afgelewer. “ Ons kon sien hoe sy 8 tot 10 voet tussen die geweldige houe onder water styg, het Mitchell gesê. Die sesde bom, om 12:31, is verseël Ostfriesland se ondergang. Twee en twintig minute nadat die eerste bom geval het, sak die ou slagskip om 12:40. Die sewende vliegtuig, 'n Handley Page, het sy onnodige bom laat val as 'n laaste saluut op die punt waar die slagskip afgegaan het.

Mitchell followed the bombers back to Langley, jubilantly waggling the wings of Visarend as he flew by Henderson.

The Navy officers were shocked, but soon recovered their voices. The Navy claimed for years afterward that Mitchell had violated the rules and destroyed the value of the tests for determining the effects of various kinds of bombs on ships.

Johnson, in his reminisces for the Naval Historical Center in 1959 when he was a retired vice admiral, said that Mitchell and his fliers “looked upon bombing largely as one would a sporting event.” (During the course of his career, Johnson had gone on to command the battleship Colorado.)

Mitchell, testifying to Congress, said, “In my opinion, the Navy actually tried to prevent our sinking the Ostfriesland.” Writing years later, Mitchell said, “I believe to this day that the officer controlling the air attacks had orders from the admiral not to let us sink the Ostfriesland.

To the press and the public, the outcome was easy enough to understand. Billy Mitchell had sunk a battleship, just as he said he could. However, both the Army and the Navy sought to minimize Mitchell’s success.

“The battleship is still the backbone of the fleet and the bulwark of the nation’s sea defense, and will so remain so long as the safe navigation of the sea for purposes of trade or transportation is vital to success in war,” said the Joint Army and Navy Board report on bombing tests, made public Aug. 19 and reported in Die New York Times. “The airplane, like the submarine, destroyer, and mine has added to the dangers to which battleships are exposed, but has not made the battleship obsolete.”

General Pershing was the senior member of the board and his signature was the only one on the report. It was a deliberate expression of solidarity with the Navy and intended to diminish the significance of the tests.

Mitchell made his own report to Menoher, and it contradicted the board report signed by Pershing. Menoher filed it away, but it was soon in the hands of the press. “Had the Army Air Service been permitted to attack as it desired, none of the seacraft attacked would have lasted 10 minutes in a serviceable condition,” Mitchell said in a part of the report quoted by Die New York Times on Sept. 14.

A cartoon depicting the sinking of Ostfriesland.

It was too much for good soldier Menoher. He said that either Mitchell went or he did. Secretary Weeks, again consulting the political omens, decided that Menoher would be the one to go. Pershing sent for Mason M. Patrick, a strong officer who had gotten Mitchell under control in France. He promoted Patrick to major general and made him Chief of the Air Service.

Patrick was made of sterner stuff than Menoher. When Mitchell threatened to resign if he didn’t get his way, Patrick invited him to put in his papers and escorted him to office where he could do it. Mitchell backed down and did not challenge Patrick again. Patrick, who learned to fly and won his wings as a junior pilot at age 60, gained both the respect and the affection of the force he led.

The Navy had allocated another vessel, the pre-Dreadnought battleship Alabama, to the Army for bombing tests. Mitchell’s bombers sank it in the Chesapeake Bay Sept. 27, 1921. After that demonstration, the First Provisional Air Brigade was disbanded.

In another series of tests in 1923, Mitchell and the Air Service sank the surplus battleship Virginia and severely damaged the battleship New Jersey in operations off Cape Hatteras.

Pershing again supported the Navy against Mitchell. His statement, which he allowed the Navy to edit, was published by Die New York Times. “These tests against obsolete battleships will not, I hope, be considered as conclusive evidence that similar bombs would sink modern types of battleships,” he said.

A group of Mitchell’s airmen after the sinking of Ostfriesland. They had earned the right to call themselves “battleship bombers.”

On to the Carriers

Navy aviators joined their battleship comrades in heaping invective on Billy Mitchell, but they were ready enough to take advantage of what he had achieved. The Bureau of Aeronautics was created Aug. 10, 1921, the first new bureau in the Navy since the Civil War.

In the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments in 1921, the United States and other nations agreed to ceilings on capital ships. Construction of battleships was curtailed, and the US Navy began its transition from battleships to carriers.

In 1922, the Navy commissioned its first carrier, USS Langley, converted from a collier, USS Jupiter. Two partially completed battle cruisers, Lexington en Saratoga, were converted to aircraft carriers, commissioned in 1927.

In 1924, Mitchell predicted that the next war would begin with an early morning air attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The Army War Plans Division dismissed Mitchell’s forecast as “exaggerated” and “unsound.”

Domination of the Navy by “battleship admirals” continued, and they decreed that the primary task for carriers was protection of battleships. In 1925, the General Board of the Navy declared, “The battleship is the element of ultimate force in the fleet, and all other elements are contributory to the fulfillment of its function as the final arbiter in sea warfare.”

Mitchell’s detractors took great satisfaction when Mitchell was court-martialed in 1925 for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline as a result of his virulent public criticism of Army and Navy leaders. Mitchell was found guilty and subsequently resigned from the Army.

The coastal defense mission remained with the Army ground forces and the Navy through the 1920s, but in the 1930s, the Air Corps took on responsibility for coastal defense and used it to help justify long-range bombers such as the B-17.

The battleship fraternity was not quite finished with its chest thumping. The program for the Army-Navy football game on Nov. 29, 1941 included a picture of the battleship Arizona. “It is significant that despite the claims of air enthusiasts no battleship has yet been sunk by bombs,” the caption said. The program did not say what the Navy thought had happened off the Virginia Capes in 1921.

Eight days later, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank Arizona at its moorings at Pearl Harbor.

John T. Correll was editor in chief of Lugmag Magazine for 18 years and is now a contributing editor. His most recent article, “When the Draft Calls Ended,” appeared in the April issue.


How a Tiny Cape Cod Town Survived World War I’s Only Attack on American Soil

July 21, 1918, dawned hot and hazy in Orleans, Massachusetts. Three miles offshore, the Perth Amboy, a 120-foot steel tugboat, chugged south along the outer arm of Cape Cod en route to the Virginia Capes with four barges in tow: the Lansford, Barge 766, Barge 703 en Barge 740. The five vessels carried a total of 32 people, including four women and five children.

Just before 10:30 a.m., a deckhand on the Perth Amboy was startled by the sight of something white skipping through the water. The mysterious object passed wide of the tug, to the stern. Moments later, that same iets crashed into the beach, sending sand high into the air in every direction. A great thunderous roar ripped through the quiet summer morning in Orleans, but those living along the beach were confused—no one was expecting rain. Though residents did not know it at the time, the town of Orleans was making history: the projectile that landed on the beach was the only fire the American mainland would receive during the First World War.

Die Duitser U-156 emerged from the haze and inched closer to the tug and, for reasons that largely remain speculative, proceeded to send volley after volley in the direction of the five ships.

Die Perth Amboy’s captain, James Tapley, had been asleep. At the sound of the first blast, he staggered out on deck and saw what looked like an enormous submarine.

“This, I was sure, was the source of the trouble,” Tapley quipped in a letter he wrote in 1936.

The tugboat Perth Amboy (From the collection of William P. Quinn)

Tapley braced for impact, but most of the U-boat’s shells missed their target, instead pounding the ocean around the Perth Amboy sending fountains of water up in to the sky.

“I never saw a more glaring example of rotten marksmanship,” Captain Tapley told the Boston Daily Globe. “Shots went wild repeatedly and but few that were fired scored hits.”

However, one of the shells fired from the sub’s dual 5.9-inch deck guns crashed into the tug’s pilothouse. The helmsman steering the ship, John Bogovich, felt the structure partially collapse on top of him. Stunned and shaken, he dragged his broken body out of the debris and looked over his injuries, which included jagged wounds above his elbow.

The captain swallowed hard. He knew it was only a matter of time until the sub scored another hit, possibly a knockout.

“We were powerless against such an enemy,” Tapley said. “All that we could do was to stand there and take what they sent us.”

Ultimately, Captain Tapley ordered his crew to abandon ship.

Die Perth Amboy's lifeboat rows to shore. (Orleans Historical Society)

From 1914 to 1918, Germany constructed nearly 400 submarines, but only seven were long-range cruisers that could sail from one side of the Atlantic to the other, pushing the limits to what submersibles were capable of during the First World War. These specialized ships, the U.S. Navy warned, “May appear in American waters without warning,” and cautioned that the “bombardment of coastal towns may also be done.”

During the last summer of the First World War, Germany finally unleashed her infamous U-boats against the eastern seaboard of the United States. In June 1918, one of these long-range cruisers, the U-151, emerged from the deep in the waters off Virginia and harassed American shipping throughout the mid-Atlantic. In a 24-hour period, the U-151 sank seven merchant schooners, one of the greatest single-day achievements of any U-boat during the entire war. One month later, a second submarine, the U-156, surfaced south of Long Island and sowed the ocean with mines, subsequently sinking the armored cruiser U.S.S. San Diego and killing six American sailors. Converging from air and sea alike, ships and airplanes worked in concert to locate and destroy the U-156, but the submarine had escaped.

Where the raider would appear next was anyone’s guess.

Attack on Orleans: The World War I Submarine Raid on Cape Cod

On the morning of July 21, 1918--in the final year of the First World War--a new prototype of German submarine surfaced three miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The vessel attacked an unarmed tugboat and its four barges.

Back on shore in Orleans, Number One Surfman William Moore was on watch in the tower at U.S. Coast Guard Station Number 40. He scanned the horizon as he always did: constantly looking for ships in peril, but with the ocean so tranquil, it seemed highly unlikely that he and his cohorts would have any missions that day. Suddenly, an explosion ripped through the quiet Sunday morning. According to a 1938 article in the Barnstable Patriot, Moore climbed down the tower and alerted the station’s keeper, Captain Robert Pierce, that there were “heavy guns firing on a tow of barges east, northeast from the station.” Pierce, a seasoned seaman who had worked as a lifesaver for nearly 30 years, had never heard anything like this before in his life. He instinctively ordered a surfboat dragged out of the station, but as evidence of a submarine attack offshore became increasingly clear, the keeper began to contemplate what, exactly, he should do next. There was little in their surf station to combat the arsenal of a German U-boat. “That was quite ridiculous to our minds,” one of the surfmen noted in a 1968 interview recorded by Cape Cod historians. “Few at the station ever imagined a submarine attack.”

Meanwhile, curious townspeople who had heard the commotion going on offshore began to spill out of their homes and descend on the beach. Shells skipped across the water and soared through the sky, terrifying the residents of Orleans.

“All seemed to think that the dreaded, expected…bombardment of the Cape had started,” one local said, according to the 2006 book Massachusetts Disasters: True Stories of Tragedy and Survival, adding, “Cape Cod has met the German submarine menace and is not afraid.”

Whether or not the town was actually equipped to repel an invasion was debatable, but one thing was certain: Orleans was under attack.

Die Perth Amboy's crew arrives on shore. (Orleans Historical Society)

At 10:40 a.m. Captain Pierce called the Chatham Naval Air Station, located seven miles to the south. The station’s new flying boats were equipped with bombs that packed a much bigger punch than anything the lifesavers had in their small surf station. It would take nearly 10 minutes to transmit, so Pierce’s message, recorded in Richard Crisp’s 1922 book A History of the United States Coast Guard in the World War, was simple and to the point:

“Submarine sighted. Tug and three barges being fired on, and one is sinking three miles off Coast Guard Station 40.” [There were, in fact, four barges, not three.]

Pierce slammed the phone back on the receiver and rushed to join Moore and others who were in the process of launching the lifeboat. Pierce boarded last, giving the boat one last heave off the beach, and guided the craft towards the vessels in distress. Pierce recalled the lifesaver’s creed: “You have to go, but you don’t have to come back.”

Although he was ten miles from the commotion off Orleans, Lieutenant (JG) Elijah Williams, the executive officer at the Chatham Naval Air Station, identified the sound coming from the sea as shellfire even before Pierce’s message was received. Still, the station had two big problems. First, most of Chatham’s pilots were searching for a missing blimp. Second, many of the pilots who remained on base were rumored to be off playing baseball against the crew of a minesweeper in Provincetown. It was a Sunday morning, after all.

At 10:49 a.m., Lt. Williams managed to secure a Curtiss HS-1L flying boat and a crew to fly it. One minute later, the air station received the delayed alert from U.S. Coast Guard Station Number 40 confirming what he feared all along: a submarine attack!

Ensign Eric Lingard (Middlesex School)

Moments later, Ensign Eric Lingard and his two-man crew took off from the water runway and soared into the clouds. Flying through the mid-morning haze, Lingard aimed the nose of his plane north, racing as fast as he could to Orleans. If things went as planned, his flying boat would reach the beach in just a few minutes.

By now, Pierce and his surfmen were within earshot of the Perth Amboy’s lifeboat. Worried that the surfmen might stray into the sub’s shellfire, Captain Tapley shouted to Pierce from his lifeboat, “All have left the barges. My crew is here. For Christ’s sake, don’t go out where they are.”

Number One Surfman Moore jumped aboard the Perth Amboy’s lifeboat and began to administer first aid to the wounded sailors, starting with John Bogovich, who by then was a semiconscious, bloody heap in the stern of the boat. Moore dug through his first aid kit and wrapped a tourniquet above Bogovich’s shattered arm to stem the bleeding then began to row furiously for shore with the survivors.

Flying north along Cape Cod’s coast, Lingard and his cohorts were closing in on the U-156. When Lingard got the bulk of his seaplane over the sub, his bombardier at the bow of the plane would release the machine’s sole Mark IV bomb, ideally putting a quick end to the nightmare going on in the ocean below.

The injured helsman John Bogovich is transported from the beach. (Orleans Historical Society)

The bombardier lined his sight “dead on the deck” and pulled the release just 800 feet above the sub, defying instructions to bomb their target at a safe distance. But the Mark IV bomb failed to drop.

Lingard circled around a second time, flying just 400 feet above the U-boat—so close that the bomb’s explosion below would likely blow the men from their aircraft.

Again, the bomb failed to release. It was stuck. Frustrated but not willing to throw in the towel, the bombardier jumped out of the cockpit and onto the plane’s lower wing before the target below their aircraft was out of range. Lingard watched in disbelief as a blast of wind nearly sent their “fearless” mechanic tumbling into the ocean below. Gripping the plane’s strut with one hand and holding the bomb with the other, the bombardier took a deep breath, uncurled his fingers and released the flying boat’s single Mark IV.

Unfortunately, the bomb was a dud, and failed to explode when it hit the sea.

Having literally dodged a bullet, the U-156 aimed her deck guns at the annoying fly buzzing over her head. At least three bursts of fire flew past the aviators, but none hit the plane. Lingard climbed high into the sky to avoid additional fire and planned to track the submerging sub until the air station sent additional planes—preferably planes with working bombs.

Die Lansford after the attack (From the collection of William P. Quinn)

By now, Captain Tapley, Bogovich and other members of the Perth Amboy had reached the beach at Station Number 40. Pierce and his lifesavers arrived on shore around the same time. A local doctor was summoned to help the wounded sailors. Captain Pierce breathed a sigh of relief and then turned his attention back toward the four barges bobbing helplessly out at sea thankfully those sailors had all launched lifeboats and appeared to be en route to Nauset Beach, two miles to the north.

The Chatham Naval Air Station had suffered a number of setbacks since first receiving word of the submarine attack. It seemed everything that could go wrong, did go wrong.

At 11:04 a.m., the station’s commander, Captain Phillip Eaton, touched down at the air station, having ended his search for the missing blimp, and was briefed on the seemingly unbelievable situation going on offshore. Knowing the station was short on pilots, the commander decided to take matters into his own hands. At 11:15 a.m., he took off in an R-9 seaplane in an effort to personally sink the German raider.

Lingard, who had been tracking and circling the sub—all the while evading fire—greeted the arrival of the captain’s seaplane with renewed vigor. “[It was] the prettiest sight I ever hoped to see,” he said, according to A History of the United States Coast Guard in the World War. “Right through the smoke of the wreck, over the lifeboats and all, here came Captain Eaton’s plane, flying straight for the submarine, and flying low. He saw [the submarine’s] high-angle gun flashing, too, but he came ahead.”

Lingard hoped his commanding officer would succeed where he and his colleagues had failed and deliver a decisive blow to the raider below.

“As I bore down upon the submarine, it fired,” said Eaton, as recorded in the same book, “I zigzagged and dove as it fired again.”

Despite the fire, Eaton was determined to position his plane above the submarine in order to hit his target. Glancing below, he seemed to have arrived just in time.

“They were getting under way and scrambling down the hatch when I flew over them and dropped my bomb,” Eaton recalled, according to a historical record at the National Archives.

At 11:22 a.m., Eaton braced for the explosion. Instead, his payload splashed 100 feet from the sub—another dud. “Had the bomb functioned, the submarine would have literally been smashed,” Eaton lamented in Crisp’s book.

Enraged, Eaton reportedly grabbed a monkey wrench from a toolbox inside his cockpit and hurled it at the Germans. Still not content, Eaton then dumped the rest of the plane’s tools—as well as the metal toolbox—over the side with the hope of at least giving one of the German sailors a concussion. Those on the sub, in turn, thumbed their noses at the paper tiger in the sky.

The Boston Post's headline on July 22, 1918 (Orleans Historical Society)

The raider had lucked out so far, but the crew of the U-156 had no idea that the airplanes circling above were out of bombs. The next payload dropped from the sky could destroy the sub, and other planes might soon be on their way. The Germans decided it was finally time to head back out to sea. At approximately 11:25 a.m., the captain ordered his submarine to dive. Like a magician, she disappeared underneath the surface behind a cloud of smoke.

Captain Eaton breathed a sigh of relief. Although the bombs dropped from the sky had failed to detonate, perhaps his planes had at least hastened the sub’s exit.

Finally, after an hour and a half, the Attack on Orleans was over. During that time, nearly 150 rounds had been fired by the U-156—an average of more than one every minute. Miraculously, no one was killed, and John Bogovich—as well as the other sailors injured that day—would make a full recovery.* The attack was like nothing the inhabitants of Orleans had ever experienced before. Residents were soon bounding down the bluffs, eager to meet the heroic sailors who had beaten, or at least survived, the German onslaught. In the days that followed, the sandy roads that snaked their way to this small coastal hamlet of Orleans were crammed with newsmen eager to make sense of the raid and interview survivors and residents who had witnessed the only attack on American soil during the First World War.

*Editor's Note, July 30, 2018: A previous version of this article wrongly stated that no one was injured in the attack on Orleans, when, in fact, there were injuries but no one was killed.


Inhoud

Development Edit

The name "shortwave" originated during the beginning of radio in the early 20th century, when the radio spectrum was divided into long wave (LW), medium wave (MW), and short wave (SW) bands based on the wavelength of the radio waves. Shortwave radio received its name because the wavelengths in this band are shorter than 200 m (1,500 kHz) which marked the original upper limit of the medium frequency band first used for radio communications. The broadcast medium wave band now extends above the 200 m / 1,500 kHz limit.

Early long-distance radio telegraphy used long waves, below 300 kilohertz (kHz). The drawbacks to this system included a very limited spectrum available for long-distance communication, and the very expensive transmitters, receivers, and gigantic antennas that were required. Long waves are also difficult to beam directionally, resulting in a major loss of power over long distances. Prior to the 1920s, the shortwave frequencies above 1.5 MHz were regarded as useless for long-distance communication and were designated in many countries for amateur use. [2]

Guglielmo Marconi, pioneer of radio, commissioned his assistant Charles Samuel Franklin to carry out a large-scale study into the transmission characteristics of short-wavelength waves and to determine their suitability for long-distance transmissions. Franklin rigged up a large antenna at Poldhu Wireless Station, Cornwall, running on 25 kW of power. In June and July 1923, wireless transmissions were completed during nights on 97 meters (about 3 MHz) from Poldhu to Marconi's yacht Elettra in the Cape Verde Islands. [3]

In September 1924, Marconi transmitted day and night on 32 meters (9.4 MHz) from Poldhu to his yacht in Beirut. Franklin went on to refine the directional transmission by inventing the curtain array aerial system. [4] [5] In July 1924, Marconi entered into contracts with the British General Post Office (GPO) to install high-speed shortwave telegraphy circuits from London to Australia, India, South Africa and Canada as the main element of the Imperial Wireless Chain. The UK-to-Canada shortwave "Beam Wireless Service" went into commercial operation on 25 October 1926. Beam Wireless Services from the UK to Australia, South Africa and India went into service in 1927. [3]

Shortwave communications began to grow rapidly in the 1920s. [6] By 1928, more than half of long-distance communications had moved from transoceanic cables and longwave wireless services to shortwave, and the overall volume of transoceanic shortwave communications had vastly increased. Shortwave stations had cost and efficiency advantages over massive longwave wireless installations [7] however, some commercial longwave communications stations remained in use until the 1960s. Long-distance radio circuits also reduced the need for new cables, although the cables maintained their advantages of high security and a much more reliable and better-quality signal than shortwave.

The cable companies began to lose large sums of money in 1927, and a serious financial crisis threatened the viability of cable companies that were vital to strategic British interests. The British government convened the Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference [8] in 1928 "to examine the situation that had arisen as a result of the competition of Beam Wireless with the Cable Services". It recommended and received Government approval for all overseas cable and wireless resources of the Empire to be merged into one system controlled by a newly formed company in 1929, Imperial and International Communications Ltd. The name of the company was changed to Cable and Wireless Ltd. in 1934.

Long-distance cables had a resurgence beginning in 1956 with the laying of TAT-1 across the Atlantic Ocean, the first voice frequency cable on this route. This provided 36 high quality telephone channels and was soon followed by even higher capacity cables all around the world. Competition from these cables soon ended the economic viability of shortwave radio for commercial communication.

Amateur use of shortwave propagation Edit

Amateur radio operators also discovered that long-distance communication was possible on shortwave bands. Early long-distance services used surface wave propagation at very low frequencies, [9] which are attenuated along the path at wavelengths shorter than 1,000 meters. Longer distances and higher frequencies using this method meant more signal loss. This, and the difficulties of generating and detecting higher frequencies, made discovery of shortwave propagation difficult for commercial services.

Radio amateurs may have conducted the first successful transatlantic tests in December 1921, [10] operating in the 200 meter mediumwave band (near 1,500 kHz, inside the modern AM broadcast band), which at that time was the shortest wavelength / highest frequency available to amateur radio. In 1922 hundreds of North American amateurs were heard in Europe on 200 meters and at least 20 North American amateurs heard amateur signals from Europe. The first two-way communications between North American and Hawaiian amateurs began in 1922 at 200 meters. Although operation on wavelengths shorter than 200 meters was technically illegal (but tolerated at the time as the authorities mistakenly believed that such frequencies were useless for commercial or military use), amateurs began to experiment with those wavelengths using newly available vacuum tubes shortly after World War I.

Extreme interference at the longer edge of the 150–200 meter band – the official wavelengths allocated to amateurs by the Second National Radio Conference [11] in 1923 – forced amateurs to shift to shorter and shorter wavelengths however, amateurs were limited by regulation to wavelengths longer than 150 meters (2 MHz). A few fortunate amateurs who obtained special permission for experimental communications at wavelengths shorter than 150 meters completed hundreds of long-distance two-way contacts on 100 meters (3 MHz) in 1923 including the first transatlantic two-way contacts. [12]

By 1924 many additional specially licensed amateurs were routinely making transoceanic contacts at distances of 6,000 miles (9,600 km) and more. On 21 September 1924 several amateurs in California completed two-way contacts with an amateur in New Zealand. On 19 October amateurs in New Zealand and England completed a 90 minute two-way contact nearly halfway around the world. On 10 October the Third National Radio Conference made three shortwave bands available to U.S. amateurs [13] at 80 meters (3.75 MHz), 40 meters (7 MHz) and 20 meters (14 MHz). These were allocated worldwide, while the 10 meter band (28 MHz) was created by the Washington International Radiotelegraph Conference [14] on 25 November 1927. The 15 meter band (21 MHz) was opened to amateurs in the United States on 1 May 1952.

Shortwave radio frequency energy is capable of reaching any location on the Earth as it is influenced by ionospheric reflection back to the earth by the ionosphere, (a phenomenon known as "skywave propagation"). A typical phenomenon of shortwave propagation is the occurrence of a skip zone where reception fails. With a fixed working frequency, large changes in ionospheric conditions may create skip zones at night.

As a result of the multi-layer structure of the ionosphere, propagation often simultaneously occurs on different paths, scattered by the ‘E’ or ‘F’ layer and with different numbers of hops, a phenomenon that may be disturbed for certain techniques. Particularly for lower frequencies of the shortwave band, absorption of radio frequency energy in the lowest ionospheric layer, the ‘D’ layer, may impose a serious limit. This is due to collisions of electrons with neutral molecules, absorbing some of a radio frequency's energy and converting it to heat. [15] Predictions of skywave propagation depend on:


Why Clearfield, Utah was the perfect spot for Naval Supply Depot

Clearfield, Utah was a strategic location in many ways. Its centralized location in the west meant supplies could reach any US ports in one day by rail. Even better, its proximity to two major railways was perfect. Its dry climate was also ideal for storage. Most importantly, the location of Clearfield provided security against enemy attacks thanks to its remoteness and distance from the ocean. Placing a supply depot on the coast would have been a primary target and thus too big of a risk.


According to official figures, the casualty rate of colonial soldiers was around 20 %. But Africans’ real casualty rate was considerably higher. Colonial officer Edouard de Martonne published a figure of 65,000 West Africans killed in action, which would equal a casualty rate of 48% ([5]).

In many sources, it is mentioned that soldiers and workers recruited from Africa were being assigned to dangerous missions and were working in harsh conditions.

Another striking example would be the process of the medical school in Dakar to understand what colonialism is. Senegalese government requested this school to be established as early as 1905. But it was founded by the French in 1918. The school did not open until many years later. At last, Senegalese political activists and war veterans demanded its opening to compensate for more than 30,000 Senegalese who fought and died for France in World War I. By 1934, the medical school had more than 400 graduates and it was seen as a success in terms of many levels. However, by the 1930s, France began to shift resources away from the medical school to low-quality rural primary schools so as to support agricultural production and other exports in the run-up to World War II ([5]).

With the trend of democracy’s rising after the World War II, African countries were given independence one by one. The independence of Cameroon in 1960 ([6]) had a domino effect and led to the independence of other countries.

France, through the lands all over the world, is waving his flag over the oceans and on many continents. France is second in the world with 11 million km² of the exclusive economic zone after the USA and is also an important player on the international stage with its military strength, language, culture, and values. The African adventure of France started in the 17 th century. The need to resources made this relationship indispensable. During the colonial period, she never wanted to lose her superiority in the region.

The colonies made important contributions to France. After all, France lost them but did not want to waive its privileges in the context of political, cultural, economic and military relations. Therefore, France has continued to maintain an exceptional relationship, especially with Sub-Saharan African countries.

[1] Bade, S. (2013). The British Aren’t Coming: Why the French Intervene in their Former African Colonies and the British Do Not, Stanford Digital Repository.

[3] The Scramble of Africa. Map for European territorial claims on the African continent in 1914. Retrieved from http://mycontinent.co/AfricaBorders.php

[4] Koller, C. (2008). The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War, Immigrants & Minorities, 26 (1/2). 111–133. University of Zurich.

[5] Max, R. (2009), The Décalage and Bricolage of Higher Education Policymaking in an Inter/National System The Unintended Consequences of Participation in the 1992 Senegalese CNES Reform, In: Vavrus, Frances and Bartlett, Lesley (Eds.) Critical Approaches to Comparative Education, Vertical Case Studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. 39-56. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


11 best-ever nicknames of military leaders

Posted On December 04, 2020 07:32:35

A lot of people get nicknames in the military, usually something derogatory. But not these guys. These 11 military leaders got awesome nicknames by doing awesome stuff.

Here’s what they are and how they got them:

1. Group Capt. Sir Douglas “Tin Legs” Bader

(Photo: Royal Air Force photographer Devon S A)

Group Capt. Sir Douglas Bader was a Royal Air Force hero of the second World War known for his exploits in the air and frequent escape attempts as a prisoner of war in Nazi Germany. He did all of this despite the fact that he lost his legs in 1931 in an air show accident. He was drummed out of the service due to disability but returned when Britain entered World War II. He wore two prosthetic legs and earned his insensitive but inarguably awesome nickname.

2. Capt. Michael “Black Baron” Wittmann

Capt. Michael Wittman was an evil Nazi with an awesome nickname. (Photo: German military archives)

Michael Wittman was an SS-Hauptsturmführer, the SS equivalent of an army captain, in command of a tank crew in World War II. From his time as a young enlisted man to his death as a captain, he was known for his skill in tanks and scout cars. As the war ground on, Wittman became one of the war’s greatest tank aces, scoring 138 tank kills and 132 anti-tank gun kills.

He was recognized with medals and a message of congratulations from Adolph Hitler. He was giving the nickname “The Black Baron” as an homage to the World War I flying ace, “The Red Baron,” Manfred Von Richtofen.

3. General of the Armies John “Black Jack” Pershing

(Photo: US Army)

General of the Armies John “Black Jack” Pershing led the American Expeditionary Forces through World War I and became one of America’s highest ranked officers in history, second only to President George Washington.

Pershing’s nickname was originally a horrible epithet given to him by students while he instructed at West Point. They angrily called him “[N-word] Jack” in reference to his time commanding a segregated unit. The name was softened to “Black Jack” and has become a part of his legacy.

4. Gen. Norman “The Bear” Schwarzkopf

(Photo: US Army)

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf is probably best known for his leadership of Desert Storm. He sported two colorful nicknames. He didn’t like the most famous one, “Stormin’ Norman,” probably because it alluded to his volatile temper. But he seemed to have a fondness for his second, “The Bear,” an allusion to his 6ft., 4in. height and nearly 240-pound size.

5. Lt. Gen. James “Jumpin’ Jim” Gavin

Lt. Gen. James Gavin is probably best known for the same achievement that gave him his nickname, commanding one of America’s first airborne units and literally writing the book on airborne operations, FM 31-30: Tactics and Technique of the Air-Borne Troops.

Even after he rose to the rank of general officer ranks, he kept conducting combat jumps with his men. He landed in Normandy as a brigadier general and jumped in Operation Market Garden as a major general, earning him another nickname, “The Jumping General.”

6. Gen. Sir Frank “The Bearded Man” Messervy

Gen. Sir Frank Messervy was a successful cavalry officer in the British Indian Army in both World Wars and later served as the first commander of the Pakistan Army. In garrison, he had the appearance of a stereotypical, well-groomed Englishman. But he famously neglected to shave during battles, leading to a thick beard when he was engaged for more than a few days.

7. Lt. Gen. Lewis “Chesty” Puller

One of the greatest heroes of the Korean War, Lt. Gen. Lewis “Chesty” Puller tried to join World War I but the conflict ended just before he could ship out. Instead, he fought in anti-guerilla wars, World War II, and the Korean War. But for all of his battlefield exploits, he received a nickname for his physical appearance. His impeccable posture and large frame made him look “chesty,” so that became his name.

8. Maj. Gen. Smedley “The Fighting Quaker” Butler

Maj. Gen. Smedley Butler was born into a Quaker family in Pennsylvania in 1881. Despite the Quakers’ aversion to violence, Butler lied about his age to become a Marine Corps second lieutenant in 1898, developed a reputation for being fierce in a fight, and made his way to major general while receiving two Medals of Honor in his career.

Butler also received a brevet promotion to captain when he was 19 for valorous action conducted before officers were eligible for the Medal of Honor. In recognition of his huge brass ones, his men started calling him “The Fighting Quaker.”

9. “The Constable” Gen. Charles de Gaulle

Gen. Charles de Gaulle was the highest ranking member of France’s military in World War II and led Free French Forces against the Nazis after the fall of France.

De Gaulle gained the nickname “The Constable” on two occasions. First, in school where he was known as the “Grand Constable.” After the fall of France, the nickname was bestowed anew when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called him “The Constable of France,” the job title of ancient French warriors who served Capetian Kings until the 10th century.

10. Staff Sgt. William “Wild Bill” Guarnere

Photo: US Army

Personeel Sers. William Guarnere fought viciously against the Germans as a paratrooper in Europe and gained a reputation for it, leading to his nickname “Wild Bill” and his portrayal in Broederbond.

Because of his exotic last name, he also gained the unfortunate nickname of “gonorrhea.”

11. Francis “The Swamp Fox” Marion

Brig. Gen. Francis Marion was best known for leading guerilla fighters through the woods and swamps of the southern colonies during the American Revolution. After repeatedly being harassed by Marion and his men, the British sent Col. Banastre Tarleton to hunt him down.

Marion evaded Tarleton over and over again. When a 26-mile chase through the swamps game up empty, Tarleton complained that he would never find that “swamp fox” and the name stuck.

MAGTIGE GESKIEDENIS

< Previous - 1918 - Next >

The RFC, RNAS, and RAF suffered 16,623 casualties and the French Aéronautique Militaire approximately 8,500 casualties during World War I, while the German Air Service has suffered about 15,000.

The American Air Service used 45 squadrons to cover 85 miles of front in 1918. A total of 211 squadrons of all types trained in Great Britain. In France, its 740 combat planes were approximately 11 percent of the Allied strength from Pont-à-Mousson to Sedan. 71 pursuit pilots became aces as they were credited with shooting down five or more German aircraft. Overall the US Air Service destroyed 756 enemy aircraft with combat losses of 289 airplanes and 48 balloons with 235 airmen killed in action, 130 wounded, 145 captured, and 654 Air Service members of all ranks dead of illness or accidents.

Since the entry of the United States into World War I on April 6, 1917, the United States Marine Corps '​ aviation force has grown from seven officers and 43 enlisted men to 282 officers and 2,180 enlisted men.[41]


Affiliations

The University Museum, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

Institute of Oceanography, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 10617, Taiwan

Department of Geology, National Museum of Nature and Science, Ibaraki, 305-0005, Japan

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Bydraes

Y.Ka. designed research. T.K., and Y.Ka. prepared and analyzed the data Y.Ka., S.J., and Y.Ku. wrote the paper.

Corresponding author


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