Artikels

Wat was die interne Sowjet -reaksie op die maanlanding?

Wat was die interne Sowjet -reaksie op die maanlanding?



We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

Die Sowjetunie was 'n beroemde beperkende plek wat nuus en ideologiese draai betref, en hulle houding teenoor die Verenigde State was duidelik minder ondersteunend en warm. Die Space Race was baie mededingend tussen die twee lande, maar toe die Verenigde State 'n man op die maan laat beland, was die taal wat hulle gebruik baie universeel. Hulle het dit baie beskryf as 'n oorwinning "vir die hele mensdom", en daar is baie gepraat dat alle mense op aarde "een" is.

Dit is natuurlik maklik om te sê wanneer jy pas die wedloop gewen het.

Wat was die interne reaksie van die Sowjet op die nuus? Het die Sowjet -burgers geweet dat dit destyds gebeur? Is dit gespin as 'n oorwinning vir die mensdom, of 'n oorwinning vir die Verenigde State, of 'n verlies vir die Sowjetunie, of wat? Is die verhaal akkuraat gerapporteer, of is die besonderhede in die hervertelling verander?


TL; DR: Landing op die maan was gedek in die Sowjet -pers, en was algemeen bekend in die Sowjetunie. Dit het egter baie minder aandag gekry as die Sowjet -ruimtemissies.

Net om iets feitelik by vorige antwoorde te voeg.

NASA oor VSR -reaksie

NASA's Astronautika en Lugvaartkunde, 1969 (15 MB PDF -lêer) bevat 'n paar nuttige inligting oor die persdekking van maanlanding in die USSR:

16 Julie (p. 225) Wêreldwye gehoor het gefokus op die bekendstelling van Apollo 11:

U.S.S.R. -radio en -tv het feitelike verslae gegee oor die bekendstelling van Apollo 11, maar het die derde dag van stilte op Luna XV gehandhaaf. Groot Sowjet -nuusprogram om 20:30 in Moskou -tyd het 'n band van Apollo 11 -opname uit die regstreekse comsat -dekking getoon.

17 Julie (bl. 230): Izvestia het die eerste VSR -verslag gegee van president Nixon se aankondiging van 17 Julie dat medaljes van twee dooie Sowjet -kosmonaute deur Apollo 11 -ruimtevaarders op die maan geplaas sal word. Die feitelike verslag van die sending het geen kommentaar gelewer nie (W Post, 19/7/69, A10)

20-21 Julie (p. 233): Sowjet-premier Alexsey Kosygin het die VSA gekomplimenteer met die maanlanding en het tydens die gesprek op 21 Julie in Moskou met die voormalige vise-president Hubert H. Humphrey, wat die Sowjet-besoek beëindig het, belangstelling getoon om die ruimte-samewerking tussen die VSA en die USSR uit te brei. Sowjet -TV het nie lewendige dekking van die maanlanding van Apollo 11 op 20 Julie nie; Tass -aankondiging is deur die koerant gelees en gedra in twee-paragraaf-item op Pravda se voorblad. Aandpapier, Izvestiya het die verhaal meer ruimte gegee en 'n foto van ruimtevaarders op die maan. Op TV het kosmonaut Konstantin P. Feoktistov die landing as 'n belangrike oriëntasiepunt beskryf en gesê die bemanning het die missie "briljant" hanteer. Georgy Petrov, direkteur van die Sowjet -instituut vir kosmisnavorsing, noem Apollo 11 'uitstekende prestasie', maar sê dat meer data per roebel deur onbemande probes ingesamel kon word.

24 Julie (bl. 244):… In die USSR het TV -kykers vir die eerste keer regstreekse dekking gehad tydens 'n sending op die Moskou TV -stasie wat by die Oos -Europa se Intervision -netwerk aangesluit het vir lewendige oordrag van ruimtevaarders wat op die vervoerder Hornet gedeponeer word. Later het die stasie die eerste twee derdes van die laaste nuusuitsending aan Apollo 11 gewy en aangekondig dat die Sowjet-president Nikolay V. Podgorny 'n telegram aan president Nixon gestuur het en 'ons gelukwense en beste wense aan die ruimtevlieëniers' gestuur het.

President van die Sowjet -Akademie vir Wetenskappe, Mstislav V. Keldysh, noem reis "'n groot bydrae tot die verkenning van ruimte en verdere vordering van wêreldwetenskap." Kosmonaute stuur 'n boodskap aan die bemanning van Apollo 11: "Ons ... het u vlug noukeurig gevolg. Ons wens u van harte geluk met die voltooiing van u wonderlike reis na die maan en 'n veilige terugkeer na die aarde."

Sowjet -koerante

Beeld geskandeer uit die Sowjet -koerant, beskikbaar op hierdie bladsy van arhivtime.ru. Daar word beweer dat dit uit die "Pravda" -uitgawe van 22 Julie 1969 kom.

Uittreksels uit 'n artikel:

Первая лунная экспедиция комментирует академик А.П. Виноградов

  • Как вы оцениваете достижение экипажа "Аполлона-11"? Какие новые проблемы ему приходится решать по сравнению with предыдущими пилотируемыми полетами к Луне

Полет американского космического корабля "Аполлон-11", в результате которого два человека - Нейл Армстронг и Эдвин Олдрин впервые ступили на поверхность Луны, мы оцениваем высоко. Серьезную проверку выдержал космический корабль en его многочисленные системы. Нельзя не восхищаться мужеством en выдержкой космонавтов, которые смело встретили неизвестность. Они впервые совершили посадку on поверхность нашего естественного спутника в лунном аппарате. Dit is 'n goeie idee vir my en 'n nuwe onderneming - 'n aankoop van Луны en стыковка met 'n korporatiewe onderneming.

П П ч,, ч ч ч п

Ruwe vertaling:

Die eerste maan ekspedisie
onderhoud met akademikus AP Vinogradov

  • Hoe beoordeel u die prestasie van die bemanning van "Apollo 11"? Wat is die nuwe probleme wat hulle moes oplos in vergelyking met vorige bemande vlugte na die maan?

Ons waardeer die vlug van die Amerikaanse ruimteskip "Apollo -11", waarin twee mense - Neil Armstrong en Edwin Aldrin - die eerste keer op die maanoppervlak gesit het. Ruimteskip en sy vele stelsels het 'n ernstige uitdaging deurstaan. 'N Mens kan niks anders doen as om die moed en selfbesit van kosmonaute te bewonder wat dapper die onbekende ontmoet het nie. Hulle het eers op die oppervlak van ons natuurlike satelliet in die maaneenheid beland. Nuwe uitdagings is nie minder kompleks nie - klim van die maanoppervlak af en ontmoetings met 'n wentelende ruimteskip

Ek gebruik die geleentheid om die kosmonaute geluk te wens met uitstekende sukses en wens hulle 'n veilige terugkeer na die aarde toe.

Neil Armstrong se besoek aan die USSR in 1970

In Mei 1970 reis Armstrong na die Sowjetunie. Hy het 'n toespraak gehou tydens die 13de jaarlikse konferensie van die International Committee on Space Research. Hy het premier Alexei Kosygin ontmoet en 'n rondleiding deur die Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center gekry.

Uittreksel uit Astronautika en Lugvaartkunde, 1970:

2 Junie (p. 190): Apollo 11 Astrounaut Neil A. Armstrong, op welwillendheidsreis na die USSR, kyk na die TV -uitsending van die bekendstelling van Soyuz IX tydens 'n partytjie ter ere van hom in Moskou en die kosmonaut Georgy Beregovoy het hom meegedeel dat die missie 'veral ter ere' was van u reis hierheen. "

Armstrong het later 'n maanfragment en 'n klein Sowjet -vlag wat op Apollo 11 -sending gestuur is, aan die Sowjet -premier Aleksey N. Kosygin voorgehou. Kosygin het gesê dat hy hierdie geskenk altyd sal koester as 'n simbool van 'n groot prestasie. Hy het aan Armstrong gesê: "Die Sowjet -mense bewonder u moed en kennis."

V & A

VRYWARING: Die res van hierdie antwoord bevat 'n persoonlike mening en gedeeltelik gebaseer op die ervaring van kommunikasie met die mense wat in die 1960's in die Sowjetunie gewoon het.

Wat was die interne reaksie van die Sowjet op die nuus?

Sowjet -amptenare en media het ruimtevaarders geprys en die eerste maanlanding word as 'n uitsonderlike prestasie erken.

Terselfdertyd het maanlanding aansienlik minder aandag gekry as die prestasies van die Sowjet -ruimteprogram (sputnik, eerste mens in die ruimte, lunokhod). Daar is baie meer inligting gepubliseer oor Sowjet -missies, soos Luna 15.

Het die Sowjet -burgers geweet dat dit destyds gebeur?

Sowjet -mense is beslis hieroor ingelig. Koerante publiseer artikels oor maanlanding, berigte is op TV en radio uitgesaai. Neil Armstrong en Buzz Aldrin was wyd bekend in die Sowjetunie.

Is dit gespin as 'n oorwinning vir die mensdom, of 'n oorwinning vir die Verenigde State, of 'n verlies vir die Sowjetunie, of wat?

As 'n prestasie van die Amerikaanse ruimteprogram en 'n oorwinning vir die mensdom. Dit is beslis nie beskryf as 'n oorwinning vir die Verenigde State/verlies vir die Sowjetunie nie.

Sowjet -publikasies oor ruimte was grotendeels gesentreer rondom die Sowjet -ruimteprogram en die prestasies daarvan. Sputnik, Gagarin se vlug, die eerste wandeling in die ruimte, verskillende onbemande sondes is grootliks geprys as belangrike prestasies. Ter vergelyking word maanlanding selde genoem en is dit nooit as 'n politieke oorwinning vir die VSA voorgehou nie.

Is die verhaal akkuraat gerapporteer, of is die besonderhede in die hervertelling verander?

Die verhaal is akkuraat gerapporteer. Die Sowjetunie het nooit die waarheid van die maanlandings probeer betwis nie. Weereens is waarskynlik nooit gedetailleerde verslae oor die gebeurtenis in die USSR gepubliseer nie.


Die USSR het die gebeurtenis nie vir die publiek verberg nie. Die amptelike standpunt kan soos volg beskryf word:

  • Die landing bevestig weer die materialistiese wêreldbeskouing. Die Amerikaanse medewerkers het nie engele of duiwels daar gesien nie, ook nie die God nie.

  • Die landing toon die mate wat 'n mens kan bereik met arbeid en tegnologiese vooruitgang, dit toon dat mense nie net kan besoek nie, maar ook aan die ander ruimte -liggame kan werk.

  • Die landings het eers moontlik geword nadat die Sowjet -ruimtevaarder Yuri Gagarin sowel as ander Sowjet -prestasies die pad na die ruimte gebaan het.

  • Die USSR het nie die landing gedoen nie, want dit is nie so wetenskaplik belangrik per belêde roebel nie; ons kan met outomatiese middele doen wat ons wou.

  • Die uitruil van die maangrond en ander wetenskaplike resultate bewys die belangrikheid van vreedsame internasionale samewerking in wetenskap, ens.

  • Maar (iemand in) die VSA bou moontlik planne van militaristiese uitbreiding in die ruimte (daar is eksperimente met ruimtewapens, ens.)


Propaganda

Dit is wel berig, maar as 'n nie-gebeurtenis, begrawe in die middel van die koerant. 'N Mens moes baie aandag skenk om daaroor te leer en die belangrikheid van die gebeurtenis te besef.

Net soos in hierdie grap:

Napoleon lees "Pravda" terwyl Ney, byvoorbeeld, kyk na die TV -verslag van die 7de November se militêre parade in Moskou.

  • Ney: "Kyk, U Majesteit - hierdie gewere! As ons sulke gewere gehad het, sou ons nooit die Waterloo -stryd verloor het nie!"
  • Napoleon: "hou stil ..."
  • Ney: "Kyk, u Majesteit - hierdie tenks! As ons sulke tenks gehad het, sou ons nooit die Waterloo -stryd verloor het nie!"
  • Napoleon: "hou stil ..."
  • Ney: "Kyk, u Majesteit - hierdie missiele! As ons sulke missiele gehad het, sou ons nooit die Waterloo -geveg verloor het nie!"
  • Napoleon: "hou stil Ney, lees hierdie koerant! As ons sulke koerante gehad het, sou niemand weet dat ons die Waterloo -stryd tot vandag toe verloor het nie!"

Meer nog, die maanlandings is vergelyk met die Sowjet -programme, byvoorbeeld Lunohods

  1. triviale (onwaar - dit verg baie kragtiger enjins wat die US nie kon produseer nie)
  2. gevaarlik vir die mens se lewe (waar)
  3. wetenskaplik gelykwaardig (onwaar - Amerikaners het baie meer grondmonsters teruggebring en hierdie monsters was baie interessanter omdat dit nie-ewekansig was).

Mense

Diegene wat 'in die kennis' is (dit wil sê diegene wat kon sien alhoewel die propaganda en/of binne -inligting gehad het) was beïndruk (sien Черток "Ракеты и люди" - Chertok "Rockets and People") en, afhangende van persoonlike neigings, gelukkig, jaloers, afgunstig, ens. Maar dit was 'n klein minderheid.


Aangesien die antwoorde tot dusver teenstrydige weergawes gee oor die hoeveelheid en/of toon van verslagdoening, het ek besluit om materiaal by te voeg sodat almal self kan oordeel.

Pravda

Die verslag in Pravda op 21.07, getiteld "Cosmonauts on Moon", lyk so: Dit is duidelik uit die teks dat die grootste deel daarvan geskryf is toe die uitkoms van die landing onbekend was en na die druk gelei het, omdat dit snaaks oscillerend tussen toekomstige en verlede tyd beskryf hoe die landing veronderstel was om te verloop (tussen die tyd van skryf en tyd van publikasie). Slegs een paragraaf dui aan dat alles volgens plan verloop het.

Op 22.07 kom Pravda hieruit uit:

en hierdie Die eerste is 'n baie duidelike weergawe van die missie (met die aanhaling van 'reuse -sprong', grappies tussen ruimtevaarders en Houston, ens.) En biografieë van ruimtevaarders. Dit word afgesluit met 'n paragraaf dat die ruimtevaarders persoonlik baie soos Sowjet -kosmonaute is - gemaklik en vriendelik, dapper en toegewyd aan hul missie om ruimte te verken.

Die tweede een is 'n kommentaar/onderhoud van die vise-president van die Akademie vir Wetenskap. default_locale het reeds 'n vertaling van die antwoord op die eerste vraag aangebied, maar ander aanhalings is ook van belang. Byvoorbeeld: "Eeue lank het mense gedroom om na ander planete te vlieg, van die dag dat mense op die maan sal wees. En nou kyk ons ​​hoe die droom waar word"; hoogste lof moontlik. Die onderhoudvoerder vra ook of die wetenskaplike na die vertaling van die maan gekyk het, en die antwoord is "ja", nogal verwarrend: - genoeg Sowjet -TV het dit nie regstreeks vertoon nie? Die laaste deel bespreek wetenskaplike besware van die missie; die wetenskaplike prys die belangrikheid daarvan; gesê dat veral die vind van seismiese aktiwiteit van die maan 'n groot probleem sou wees. Hier word geen melding gemaak of vergelyk met Sowjet -ondersoeke nie. Dit is miskien nie 'n verrassing nie, aangesien Sowjet -sondes nog nie daarin geslaag het om monsters te lewer nie - in werklikheid het Luna 15, die laaste poging, presies in die maan gestamp dieselfde dag 21.07.

Maar niks hiervan was op die eerste bladsy van Pravda nie. Die hele eerste bladsy is gewy aan die besoek van Brezjnef aan Pole ter geleentheid van sy 25-jarige bestaan. Dit was tipies - omdat dit die amptelike uitlaatklep van die party was, was die eerste bladsy altyd gewy aan die regeringsadresse en amptelike nonsens; lesers het geweet waar om die interessante dinge verder te soek.

Izvestiya

Vir volledigheid, hier is die skandering van die eerste bladsy van Izvestiya op 21.07:

Hierdie een het wel maanlanding op die eerste bladsy (regter onderste hoek), met beriggewing op bladsy 3. Die regter boonste hoek is Luna-15 en sê dat dit om die maan draai. Die res is Brezjnef in Pole.

Al met al kan ons nie sê dat dit begrawe, afgemaak, onder -gerapporteer of gekritiseer is nie - die beriggewing was taamlik uitgebreid en entoesiasties. Ek het nie 'n woord van kritiek gevind nie, en ek het ook geen melding gemaak as ek dit opgebou het op vroeëre Sowjet -suksesse nie. Dit is natuurlik waar dat dit niks was in vergelyking met die beriggewing van die Sowjet -ruimteprogram nie:

Dit is 'n redelike roetine-lansering van Soyuz 8 in Oktober 1969, 'n redelike roetine, natuurlik 'n 8-ste bekendstelling van Soyuz en 'n totaal van 16de. Die onderskrif sê: "Dit was nog nooit tevore gesien nie - drie Sowjet -ruimtetuie in 'n wentelbaan!", Die groot portrette is van die ruimtevaarders en die hele bladsy behalwe die boks regs onder is gewy aan die missie. Miskien was hulle net gelukkig dat Brezjnef die dag nie Pole besoek het nie!


Eerste na die maan: Apollo 8 en die Sowjetunie

Terwyl ons die 50ste herdenking van die baanbrekende Apollo 8 -sending vier, sal baie kommentators en nuusberigte beweer dat NASA Frank Borman, Jim Lovell en Bill Anders na die maan gestuur het om die Sowjetunie te verslaan. Trouens, die Sowjets was van plan om twee kosmonaute te stuur om die maan te loop, maar die verklaring van die bedoeling van die agentskap is op sy beste halfwaar.

Eerstens is 'n paar agtergrond in orde. Apollo 8 was die tweede missie in die program om 'n bemanning te vervoer, net meer as twee maande nadat Wally Schirra, Donn Eisele en Walter Cunningham die Command and Service Modules (CSM) in die aarde -baan getoets het - die eerste ruimtevaardervlug sedert 'n Januarie 1967 lanseerplank-vuur het die oorspronklike eerste bemanning doodgemaak. Die volgende missie na Apollo 7 sou 'n gekombineerde vlug van die CSM en die maanmodule (LM — die maanlander) in 'n lae wentelbaan wees. Dit sou ook die eerste menslike missie wees op die reusagtige Saturn V Moon -vuurpyl, wat 'n moeilike tweede toets op Apollo 6 gehad het.

Die resultaat was een van die gewaagdste en opwindendste ruimtevlugte in die geskiedenis. Borman, Lovell en Anders, het die eerste mense geword wat 'n lae baan om die aarde verlaat en die ruimte in vlieg.

Jim McDivitt, Dave Scott en Russell Schweickart sou veronderstel wees om Apollo 8 te vlieg, maar teen die somer van 1968 het probleme met die LM beteken dat dit ten minste 'n paar maande na 1969 sou verbygaan. 1961 -uitdaging om teen die einde van die dekade ''n man op die maan te land', en so 'n vertraging kan 'n gaping van maande veroorsaak. George Low, destyds die hoof van die ontwikkeling van die Apollo -ruimtetuig by die Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, het in Augustus 1968 voorgestel dat hulle die CSM alleen na die maanbaan moet vlieg - 'n vlugprofiel wat vroeër in die verbygaan bespreek is. Die bemanning van McDivitt het verkies om hul beplande missie te behou, en daarom het hoof -ruimtevaarder Deke Slayton vir Frank Borman gevra of sy bemanning belangstel. Hulle sou die CSM/LM -kombinasie na 'n hoë baan om die aarde op Apollo 9 vlieg. Borman was inderdaad geïnteresseerd, en die volgorde van die spanne was omgekeer.

Borman, 'n vurige Cold Warrior, onthou Slayton wat klem gelê het op die inligting van die Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) dat die Sowjets kosmonaute sou probeer om die maan as 'n rede vir hierdie verandering van planne maak. Volgens CIA se intelligensieberamings is die toenemende waarskynlikheid van so 'n omseilvlug laat in 1968 aangetoon, maar 1969 was waarskynliker. Die onbemande Zond (Probe) 4-ruimtetuig in Maart 1968 het na die maanafstand gevlieg, maar nie om die maan nie, en die kapsule het weer outomaties selfvernietigend geword, maar nie ver van die koers af nie. Die geheime UR-500/L1-program het die booster wat vandag bekend staan ​​as die Proton, gebruik om 'n 7K-L1-kapsule soortgelyk aan die Soyuz-ruimtetuig, wat ook vandag gebruik word, op 'n reis rondom die aarde te gooi. Die 7K-L1 sou nie die vuurpylkrag hê om in 'n maanbaan te gaan nie. Die program het oorspronklik gehoop om kosmonaute te begin teen die 50ste herdenking van die Bolsjewistiese rewolusie in November 1967, maar tegniese probleme, insluitend versterkingsfoute en die dood van Vladimir Komarov tydens die onsuksesvolle eerste toetsvlug van Soyuz in April 1967, het dit onmoontlik gemaak.

Teen die tyd dat Low vroeg in Augustus 1968 sy voorstel gemaak het, was daar min meer bekend oor Sowjet -omliggende planne as die waarskynlikheid dat die Sowjets ten minste nog 'n onbemande toets sou vlieg, gegewe die mislukte herbetreding van Zond 4. Ruimtehistorikus Dwayne Day, in sy onlangse gedetailleerde oorsig van die bewyse in die aanlynpublikasie Die Space Review, merk op dat dit moontlik is dat bykomende hoogs geheime intelligensie oor 'n nuwe vlug NASA-leiers in hierdie tydperk bereik het, maar daar is geen gedeklassifiseerde bewyse daarvoor nie. Al die papierwerk wat Low en NASA -leierskap oor hul besluit in Augustus gegenereer het, fokus op die skeduleringsprobleem en die waarde vir Apollo om 'n maanbaanmissie uit te voer om operasionele ervaring op te doen vir 'n maanlanding in 1969. Die Sowjet -faktor word slegs skuins genoem, en terwyl daar nie na dokumente op 'n lae klassifikasievlak verwys kon word na hoogs geheime intelligensie nie, merk Day op dat Low en ander nie eens melding maak van die persberigte oor Zond 4 wat in die publieke domein was nie. Die besluit om Apollo 8 na die maan te stuur, het tot by die NASA -administrateur, James Webb, gegaan, maar einde Augustus het hy die finale toestemming weerhou totdat Apollo 7 'n suksesvolle vlug gemaak het. As dit misluk, herhaal Apollo 8 die lae aarde -missie.

'N Maand voordat die Schirra-bemanning op 11 Oktober met hul 11 ​​dae lange vlug begin het, het die Sowjetunie op 14 September Zond 5 gelanseer. Dit het twee skilpaaie, meelwurms en ander klein lewensvorme gedra tydens die eerste suksesvolle omseiling van die maan. Zond 5 slaag egter nie daarin om die beplande herintogbaan uit te voer nie en beland in die Indiese Oseaan, waar 'n inligtingsvliegtuig van die Amerikaanse vloot die kapsule kon afneem voordat Sowjet -skepe dit herstel het. Zond 6, wat op 10 November opgestyg het, het wel die beplande herprofielprofiel uitgevoer en op Sowjet -gebied geland, maar die druk in die kajuit het misluk en die proefpersone van die dier doodgemaak, en die valskerm het te gou oopgemaak, wat tot 'n ongeluk gelei het. Die mislukkings is geheim gehou. In die openbaar het dit geblyk dat die Sowjetunie 'n kans gehad het om Apollo 8 op die maan te slaan, en inderdaad Tyd Die tydskrif het vroeg in Desember 'n voorblad gedoen waarin 'n ruimtevaarder en 'n ruimtevaarder in 'n voetwedloop na ons naaste hemelse buurman gewys word. Maar die Sowjet -ruimteleierskap het reeds enige menslike vlug uitgestel met die oog op die ontnugterende resultate van Zond 6. Na die Amerikaanse sukses met Apollo 8 en verdere maanvlugte in 1969, is al hierdie missies gekanselleer.

Ruimtevaarders van Apollo 8 en bevelvoerder van die herstelskip U.S.S. Yorktown loop op die rooi tapyt van die vliegdek na die herstel in die Stille Oseaan. Krediet: NASA

Hoeveel invloed het die inligting oor die Sowjets die finale besluit van NASA vroeg in November om die riskante Apollo 8 -sending te doen, beïnvloed? Zond 6 kom na die finale besluit, en hoewel die Sowjet -kompetisie ekstra motivering bygedra het tot die denke van Jim Webb, George Low en ander, dui alles daarop dat probleme met skedulering en die operasionele voordele van die vlug om die maan so gou moontlik uitgevoer word. as moontlik, was primêr. Die resultaat was een van die gewaagdste en opwindendste ruimtevlugte in die geskiedenis. Borman, Lovell en Anders het die eerste mense geword wat 'n lae wentelbaan verlaat en die ruimte in vlieg toe hulle op 21 Desember 1968 gelanseer word. Op Oukersaand het hulle die eerste mense geword wat die omgewing van die maan bereik en om hom wentel, wat het gelei tot die historiese Earthrise -prentjie en die beroemde lesing van Genesis. Die meeste sou dit as die tweede belangrikste Apollo -vlug beskou, na die eerste landing in Julie 1969 deur die bemanning van Apollo 11. Maar aangesien die Apollo 8 -ruimtevaarders die eerste in die diep ruimte en na die maan was, kan 'n mens selfs beweer dat dit eerste moet wees.

Michael J. Neufeld is 'n senior kurator in die Museum se ruimtegeskiedenisafdeling en hoofkurator vir Bestemmingsmaan, 'n nuwe uitstalling wat in 2022 in die National Mall Building oopmaak, en vir Destination Moon: The Apollo 11 Mission, 'n reisuitstalling met die opdragmodule Columbia. Hy onthou Apollo 8 lewendig, nadat hy in die weste van Kanada grootgeword het as 'n onverbeterlike ruimtebuffer.


Tydens die eerste maanlanding het die Sowjette in die maan neergestort

Terwyl Neil Armstrong en Buzz Aldrin die mensdom se eerste Moonwalk afgesluit het, het die Sowjets 'n oopsie gemaak: hul Luna 15 -sonde het op die maan neergestort. Die ongeluk was ongeveer 530 myl van die See van Rustigheid af.

Op 21 Julie 1969 is mense regoor die wêreld vasgeplak op TV -beelde van die Apollo 11 -ruimtevaarders op die maan. Maar ruimtespesialiste was ook besig om die Sowjet -sonde Luna 15 op te spoor, wat drie dae voor die Apollo -sending gelanseer is. Luna 15 was net een in 'n lang ry Sowjet-sonde wat die maan bereik het-Luna 2 was die eerste mensgemaakte voorwerp wat in Augustus 1959 in die maan neergestort het (ander Luna-missies was die eerste maanvliegbane, eers foto's van die ander kant van die maan, ensovoorts).

Robotte en radio's

Die primêre missie van Luna 15, hoewel die Sowjette dit toe nog nie toegegee het nie, was om te land, monsters van die maanoppervlak te versamel en dan die monster terug te stuur met 'n klein kapsule. As dit gewerk het, sou die monster die eerste robotiese terugkeer van maanmateriaal gewees het, wat 'n PR -oorwinning behaal het vir die Sowjet -ruimteprogram. Dit het natuurlik nie uitgewerk nie.

Frank Borman op die Apollo 8 -sending. Beeld met vergunning van NASA.

Die tydsberekening van die Luna 15 -sending was vir NASA 'n bietjie freaky, aangesien dit op dieselfde tyd as Apollo 11 om die maan sou wentel, en albei radioseine na die aarde sou stuur. NASA het die bevelvoerder van Apollo 8, Frank Borman, ingeroep om inligting oor Luna 15 se vlugplan te kry. Borman was vriendelik met die Sowjets en het pas teruggekeer van 'n reis na die USSR (inderdaad, hy was die eerste ruimtevaarder wat dit gedoen het). NASA se bekommernis was dat Luna 15 moontlik radiostoring sou veroorsaak as sy wentelbaan te naby was aan dié van Apollo 11. Borman se inligting van die Sowjets bevestig dat dit nie 'n probleem sou wees nie en dat 'n wêreldwye sug van verligting gevolg sou word.

Luna 16 -beeld met vergunning van NASA.

Die Luna 16 -missie (hierbo op die foto) het later geslaag waar Luna 15 misluk het. Luna 16 was die eerste robotiese sonde wat op die maan geland het en 'n monster na die aarde terugbesorg het. Die monster het op 24 September 1970 teruggekeer. Dit het 101 gram maanregoliet huis toe gebring. (Die Apollo 11 -ruimtevaarders het meer as 20 kilogram materiaal teruggebring, hoewel dit 'n dramaties groter en duurder missie was. Dit is opmerklik dat die Sowjets in 1970 robotte in staat is om hierdie werk te verrig - dit is 'n groot prestasie.)

Drama van die hoogste orde

Daar is 'n klankopname van wetenskaplikes wat die Luna 15-missie monitor (wat strek van 19 tot 21 Julie 1969). Die klank is in 2009 vrygestel om saam te val met die 40ste herdenking van die maanlanding. Die klank is afkomstig van Britse wetenskaplikes by die Jodrell Bank -sterrewag en bevat sterrekundige Sir Bernard Lovell en ander wat na die Amerikaanse en Sowjet -radiouitsendings geluister het via die Lovell -radioteleskoop.

Die opnames strek oor verskillende sessies, en die eerste drama was 'n verandering van Luna 15 -kursusse op Sondag 20 Julie. Die kursusverandering het dit nader gebring aan die landingsplek van Apollo, wat 'n bietjie skok was, gegewe die Sowjet -vlugplan wat voorheen voorsien is. Die volgende dramatiese oomblik kom op 21 Julie toe die sonde begin daal, dit word skielik duidelik vir Lovell se span dat Luna 15 ontwerp is om te land, en nie net om foto's te neem soos die Sowjets aangedui het nie. Dit het almal in die luisterkamer verbaas, en jy kan hoor hoe hulle 'n gerug bespreek van 'n bron in Moskou wat daarop dui dat die sonde ontwerp is om 'n monster terug te stuur. Die span luister daarna terwyl die sonde beland en roep 'Dit land!' en "Phew!" Die heel laaste reël is klassiek: 'Ek sê, dit was regtig so drama van die hoogste orde! "


Sending resultate

Die Apollo -program het 'n omwenteling in menslike begrip van die maan gemaak. Die monsters wat ingesamel is en die menslike en instrumentele waarnemings is tot in die 21ste eeu bestudeer. Ontledings van monsters van die Luna -missies het ook voortgegaan en is waardevol omdat dit uit oostelike ekwatoriale gebiede ver van die Apollo -terreine versamel is.

Een nuwe en fundamentele resultaat is die radiometriese ouderdomsdatum van die monsters. As 'n rots van die gesmelte na die vaste toestand afkoel, word sy radioaktiewe isotope in mineraalkristalroosters geïmmobiliseer en verval dan op hul plek. Wetende dat die tempo van verval van een kernspesie (nuklied) in 'n ander, wetenskaplikes in beginsel die verhoudings van vervalprodukte as 'n horlosie kan gebruik om die tyd wat verloop het sedert die rots afgekoel het, te meet. Sommige nukliede, soos isotope van rubidium en strontium, kan gebruik word om gesteentes wat miljarde jare oud is, te dateer (kyk rubidium-strontium-datering). Die vereiste metings word bedreig deur besmetting en ander probleme, soos gebeure in die verlede wat die klok moontlik kon herstel. Tog, met groot sorg in die voorbereiding van monsters en massaspektrometrie, kan die isotopiese verhoudings gevind word en omgeskakel word in ouderdomsberamings. Teen die tyd dat die Apollo -monster teruggekeer het, het wetenskaplikes hierdie kuns verfyn, en met behulp van meteorietmonsters het hulle reeds die vroeë geskiedenis van die sonnestelsel ondersoek.

Ontleding van die eerste maanmonsters het bevestig dat die maan 'n ontwikkelde liggaam is met 'n lang geskiedenis van differensiasie en vulkaniese aktiwiteit. Anders as die aardkors, word die maankors egter nie deur tektoniese prosesse herwin nie, en dit het die rekords van antieke gebeure bewaar. Rotsmonsters uit die Hoogland wat deur die latere Apollo -missies teruggestuur is, is byna vier biljoen jaar oud, en onthul dat die maankors reeds stewig was kort nadat die planete uit die sonnewel gekondenseer het. Alhoewel dit oor 'n wye verskeidenheid ouderdomme strek, toon die merriebasale dat die vulkaniese uitstortings wat vol was, lank na die vorming van die hooglande plaasgevind het. die oorspronklike verhitting gebeurtenis. Spoorelementontledings dui aan dat die magmatiese prosesse van gedeeltelike smelting tot verskillende lawas aanleiding gegee het.

Benewens die insameling van monsters, het Apollo-ruimtevaarders geologiese waarnemings gemaak, foto's geneem en langlewende instrumentskikkings en retroreflektore op die maanoppervlak geplaas. Nie net die landingsekspedisies nie, maar ook die Apollo -baanobservasies het belangrike nuwe kennis opgelewer. Op elke missie het die Maan-wentelende bevel- en diensmodules kameras en afstandswaarnemingsinstrumente gedra vir die versameling van komposisionele inligting.

Die ruimtetuig Clementine en Lunar Prospector, wat in polêre maanbane werk, het komplimentêre suites van afstandswaarnemingsinstrumente gebruik om die hele maan in kaart te bring en sy oppervlaktesamestelling, geomorfologie, topografie en gravitasie- en magnetiese afwykings te meet. Die topografiese gegewens het die enorme Suidpool -Aitken -kom beklemtoon, wat, net soos die ander wasbakke aan die ander kant, nie lavavul is nie. Met 'n deursnee van ongeveer 2500 km (1,550 myl) en 13 km (8 myl) diep, is dit die grootste impakfunksie op die maan en die grootste wat in die sonnestelsel bekend is vanweë die ligging daarvan, maar die bestaan ​​daarvan is eers bevestig tydens die maanbaan missies in die 1960's. Die swaartekragdata wat deur die ruimtetuig ingesamel is, gekombineer met topografie, bevestig die bestaan ​​van 'n dik, rigiede kors, wat nog meer bewys lewer dat die hittebron van die maan verstryk het. Beide ruimtetuigmissies dui op die moontlikheid dat daar ys bestaan ​​in polêre kraters wat permanent in die skadu staan. Die mees oortuigende bewyse kom van die neutronspektrometer van Lunar Prospector (sien onder Maanhulpbronne).


Stel jou 'n wêreld voor waar Sowjets en Amerikaners hande op die maan gevat het

Die spel van “what-if ” is 'n gewilde spel as dit kom by historiese gebeure. Programme soos “The Man in the High Castle ” bespiegel oor wat sou gebeur het as die asmoondhede die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gewen het, maar historici bestudeer ook meer realistiese moontlikhede. As dit kom by die Space Race, wat 'n hoogtepunt bereik het met die maanlanding van 20 Julie 1969, is daar 'n oorvloed aan alternatiewe geskiedenisse, waaronder president Richard Nixon se toespraak wat nooit gelewer is by mislukking nie.

'N Ander toespraak, wat eintlik deur president John F. Kennedy gehou is, bied nog 'n geleentheid om te vra:' Wat as? '& Kennedy, voordat hy in 1963 gesterf het, het Kennedy voor die Verenigde Nasies gepraat, wat daarop dui dat NASA met die Sowjette saamwerk oor die doel om te land op die maan. Terwyl sommige meen dat Kennedy se voorkoms van ruimteverkenning, en wie dit moet doen, 'n aanduiding was van hoe baie hy ruimte -oorheersing as 'n belangrike deel van die oorwinning van die Koue Oorlog beskou het, het baie nog steeds gewonder of Russe en Amerikaners sou geleef het saam op die maan geloop?

Wat die ruimteprogram betref, was Kennedy aanvanklik nie lus nie. He’d run for president advocating against spending money on space exploration, and in his first month in office, January of 1961, he’d argued in the State of the Union address that space might be a better place for cooperation than competition, stating “Today this country is ahead in the science and technology of space, while the Soviet Union is ahead in the capacity to lift large vehicles into orbit. Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War. The United States would be willing to join with the Soviet Union … to increase the exchanges of scientists and their knowledge.”

Yet three months later, Kennedy was in trouble. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was supporting Fidel Castro’s nascent communist government of Cuba, disturbingly close to American shores. The Bay of Pigs invasion to topple Castro, backed by Kennedy, had just ended in disaster and defeat. It was a humiliating foreign policy failure. Kennedy needed something to regain his stature on the world stage, and upstage Khrushchev.

Fortunately, or perhaps coincidentally, the era of human spaceflight had just begun.

On April 12, 1961, the Soviet Union launched Yuri Gagarin, the first person in space, into orbit around the Earth. America was three weeks away from sending its first astronaut, Alan Shepard, into space, on a much smaller rocket. For the Soviets, the victory was clear. At a celebration for Gagarin, writes William Taubman in Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, the Soviet leader boasted that “once-illiterate Russia” was now a powerful player in the race to conquer the next great frontier.

Kennedy saw an opportunity to turn a setback into a challenge with the space race. “If somebody could just tell me how to catch up,” he reportedly said to his team, “Nothing is more important.” He asked his advisers how it could be done, and they told him that with the Soviets already ahead, any goal had to be incredibly ambitious and audacious. Only then could both countries be considered to be starting from the same point. Kennedy understood, and agreed.

In a joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961, Kennedy delivered a speech that surprised many who remembered his words from earlier in the year. "I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth,” he declared, before asking for an additional $7 to $9 billion to fund the program. He made no mention of racing the Soviets, but the implication was obvious. It did not mean, however, that Kennedy did not continue to talk both of cooperation and competition for the rest of his presidency.

In June of 1961, only ten days after his remarks before Congress, Kennedy and Khrushchev met for the first—and only—time in Vienna. Kennedy did not press home his point of racing to the moon. Instead, he invited the Soviet leader to join America in a cooperative lunar venture. Khrushchev turned him down, dismissing Kennedy as a lightweight, unprepared politician, a fact Kennedy himself seemed to acknowledge—“Worst thing in my life. He savaged me,” the president apparently said after the meeting. Khrushchev, in his memoirs, remembered that at their last meeting during the days-long summit, “Kennedy was very gloomy. He was not preoccupied but actually glum. When I looked at the expression on his face, I sympathized with him and felt sorry for him.”

Kennedy’s ever-changing use of the space program for potential political gain also matched Khrushchev’s. In the NASA publication “The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project,” the Soviet leader’s style at the time was summarized thusly: “There appeared to be two Khrushchevs: one, a ‘coexistentialist’ eager for enhanced intercourse between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dropping hints … about the necessity for a virtual alliance of the two powers the other, a militant Communist and bully ready to cash in on each and every weakness and hesitation of the West.”

Kennedy may have simply been matching his opponent’s approach. It was an ever-changing, delicate balancing game for both leaders. Each championed themselves as forward-looking, while defusing aggressive actions that could lead to war.

In early 1962, Khrushchev congratulated Kennedy on America’s first mission to place a human (astronaut John Glenn in this case) in orbit. “If our countries pooled their efforts—scientific, technical, and material—to master the universe,” he said, “this would be very beneficial for the advance of science and would be joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for ‘Cold War’ purposes and the arms race.”

Kennedy responded positively, but the list of possible collaborations was limited to weather satellites, spacecraft tracking and science experiments. Human space missions were mentioned only as a vague, possible future item. Sharing more rocket technology, after all, meant sharing military secrets. But as productive conversations and agreements on what was possible were made between officials of both nations, the possibilities widened.

In late September of 1963, Kennedy met with Jim Webb, the head of NASA. The president previewed the remarks he would make at the United Nations about greater cooperation with the Soviets in space and inquired if Webb would be able to turn NASA in this new direction if needed. Kennedy had been advised that, if such a plan was followed, the ambitious end-of-the-decade lunar landing deadline could be eased. In fact, Kennedy thought, he could argue that it was the breakneck competition itself that had enticed the Soviets to cooperate. Webb told the president that it was possible, though according to historian Robert Dallek, “Webb bristled at Kennedy’s policy directives, interrupting and speaking over the president” and encouraging him to consider moon landing as just a small part of space exploration. Two days later, Kennedy made his speech, describing “a joint expedition to the moon.”

It did not go as Kennedy had hoped. The Soviet press ignored the story, and Soviet officials did not comment. Public reaction in America was sharply divided the idea seemed dead in the water.

Shortly after Kennedy’s assassination, Congress passed an appropriations bill stating that no money would be given to any international moon program. President Lyndon Johnson, newly in office, assertively championed the space race for the rest of the decade, and by the time he left office in 1969, an American moon landing that year was a virtual certainty.

The question many ponder is: Would Kennedy have pushed harder for a cooperative moon program had he not been killed? The evidence suggests he would have only if it had been politically expedient. At the time of his assassination, the concept was divisive and generally unpopular. Serious talks on cooperation only began after the Apollo 11 mission, when a race no longer mattered, culminating in crewed American and Soviet spacecraft docking in orbit in 1975.

Today, the joint Russian and American International Space Station is a wonderful example of where such collaboration can lead, and a reminder of Kennedy’s efforts at the beginning of the Space Age to always keep the door of collaboration open, even when faced with a fearsome competitor.


Inside the Soviets' Secret Failed Moon Program

Om hierdie artikel weer te gee, besoek My profiel en bekyk dan gestoorde verhale.

Om hierdie artikel weer te gee, besoek My profiel en bekyk dan gestoorde verhale.

By Matt Hardigree, Jalopnik

The Soviet lunar program was covered up, forgotten after failing to put a man on the moon. These rare photos from a lab inside the Moscow Aviation Institute show a junkyard of rarely-seen spacecraft, including a never-to-be-used Soviet lunar lander.

Soviet scientists were well ahead of their American counterparts in moon exploration before President John F. Kennedy pronounced the U.S. would put a man there first. The Soviets had already landed the probe Luna 2 on the surface of the moon in 1959 and had an orbiting satellite in 1966.

The Soviets developed a similar multi-step approach to NASA, involving a module used to orbit the moon and one for landing. Their version was decidedly less complex and lighter to account for inferior rockets. These photos show the LK "Lunar Craft" lander, which has a similar pod-over-landing gear structure but numerous key differences.

All the activities done by two astronauts is done by one. To make the craft lighter, the LK only fits the one cosmonaut, who was supposed to peer through a tiny window on the side of the craft to land it. After landing the vehicle the pod separates from the landing gear, as with the Apollo Lunar Module, but uses the same engine for landing as it does for take off as another weight savings.

The L2 Lunar Orbit Module designed to transport the LK into orbit around the moon was similarly stripped down. There's no internal connection between the two craft so the cosmonaut had to space walk outside to get into the LK and head towards the surface. When the LK rejoined the L2 for the return trip home, the now likely exhausted would then climb back out into the abyss of space. The LK would then be thrown away.

There were numerous political, scientific and financial reasons why the Soviets didn't make it to the moon first, including a space agency with split priorities and therefore not single-mindedly dedicated to this goal. Neil Armstrong walked on the moon first on July 20, 1969, besting the Russians, who were still planning to visit the moon in the upcoming years.

They had the equipment, but they didn't have the rockets.

Getting to the moon requires launching a command module and a lander. Both are heavy objects and require massive amounts of thrust to get into orbit. The Soviet's planned to use their N-1 rocket, but two failed launches in 1971 and 1972 destroyed dummy landing and control modules, as well as the rockets themselves, and led to the program being shelved for lack of a proper launch vehicle.


What was the soviets reaction to the Apollo moon landing?

That would depend of which Soviets you were asking about. For the general public, it was limited, as it was given little coverage (a small notice on an inside page of Pravda, if I recall correctly).

Reaction among cosmonauts was obviously different, given their careers as well as access to much more information. Alexey Leonov, the the first man to walk in space as well as the one in training to be the Soviets' first man on the moon, described the feeling as "white envy" (meaning, he was very happy for the Americans who did it, but jealous that they did it first). He was also upset that Soviet media did not broadcast the landing as was done in the west. I can't say much about the government response, other than that it eventually led to the cancellation of the Soviet lunar landing program.

Source for both of those is Two Sides of the Moon: Our Story of the Cold War Space Race, co-written by Leonov himself along with David Scott, commander of Apollo 15. I recommend it highly, both on it's own merits as well as an interesting view of the Soviet program.


What was the internal Soviet reaction to the moon landing? - Geskiedenis

Searching for details:

Soviet probe makes world's first soft landing on the Moon

On Feb. 3, 1966, after many failed attempts, a Soviet robotic lander accomplished the world's first soft landing on the surface of the Moon and lived to tell about it. The pioneering mission finally dispelled old fears that a visiting spacecraft could drown in a thick layer of lunar dust. As the Luna-9 (E6) spacecraft began transmitting the first images from another world, the invisible race to decipher the precious information began simultaneously in the USSR. United Kingdom and the United States!

Flight scenario and key milestones of the Luna-9 mission.

Van die aarde na die maan

The USSR's 12th attempt to conduct a soft landing on the Moon was launched on Jan. 31, 1966, at 14:41:37 Moscow Time. The 8K87M rocket No. U103-32 (later known as Molniya-M) lifted off from Site 31 in Tyuratam, carrying the E6 spacecraft (serial number No. 13/202).

After reaching a 224 by 173-kilometer parking orbit around the Earth with an inclination nearly 52 degrees toward the Equator, the Block-L upper stage fired, sending the 1,583-kilogram probe toward the Moon. The mission was officially announced as Luna-9.

Measurements of the probe's actual orbit conducted during the night from January 31 to February 1 showed that it was on a flyby trajectory passing around 10,000 kilometers away from the Moon around 3.5 days after liftoff. Based on that data, ground controllers programmed the spacecraft to conduct a trajectory correction maneuver on February 1, 1966, at 22:29 Moscow Time. The engine firing pushed the vehicle from a flyby trajectory to a collision course with the Moon. After the successful maneuver had been completed at a distance of around 233,000 kilometers from the Earth and 190,000 kilometers from the Moon, the spacecraft was spin-stabilized.

On February 3, around an hour before hitting the Moon and 8,300 kilometers from its destination, Luna-9 successfully oriented itself with its tail down. Also, a pair of soft-landing bags of the lander were inflated and the two no-longer needed avionics containers were jettisoned from the spacecraft. At an altitude of 75 kilometers above the Moon, and just 48 seconds before reaching its surface, the probe fired its braking engine on a command from its altitude-measuring antenna. (770) Western listening posts monitoring doppler shift from the probe's radio signals detected a rapid slowdown of the vehicle beginning at 18:44:09.5 GMT. All signals stopped at 18:45:05 GMT. (769)

Landing scenario of the Luna-9 mission.

As it transpired later, at the final phase of the Luna-9's landing, the main engine was cut off at an altitude of around 150 meters and the spacecraft continued its descent under the thrust of four vernier engines. At an altitude of around five meters, the 100-kilogram ball-shaped lander split itself from the rest of the spacecraft on a command from a special probe extended from the vehicle.

According to the Soviet announcement, Luna-9 successfully landed on Feb. 3, 1966, at 21:45:30 Moscow Time on the eastern edge of the Ocean of Storms (Oceanus Procellarum). The local morning landing time was chosen to provide the best temperature conditions for onboard equipment and for TV imaging. (770)

The lander hit the surface inside an inflatable cocoon with an impact speed estimated between four and seven meters per second. The inflatable air bags were programmed to jettison from the lander four minutes after the touchdown, followed by a 10-second deployment of the lander and the unrolling of its antennas. Sure enough, at 18:49:45 GMT, western listening posts heard again from the Soviet spacecraft.

(A command from the ground to release air bags could also be used if needed.)

A museum replica of the E6 spacecraft in deployed position.

According to the Soviet TASS news agency, on February 4, Luna-9 was in contact with ground control for a total of three hours 20 minutes during four communications sessions. At 04:50 Moscow Time, a signal from the ground commanded the lander's camera to begin a scan of the surrounding landscape and transmitting images back to Earth.

More communications sessions were planned from 18:40 Moscow Time on the same day and on February 5 at 04:00 Moscow Time, TASS gesê.

During the communications session on February 4, from 18:30 to 19:55 Moscow Time, Luna-9 transmitted a 360-degree panorama of the lunar surface with a vertical view angle of around 30 degrees. In addition, ground control sent commands to the spacecraft to conduct detailed imaging of certain areas selected by the scientists, TASS said, promising to publish the imagery in the near future.

Volgens TASS, the first communication session of the day, starting around 04:00, was dedicated to the telemetry transmission. The pressure, temperature and voltage onboard the spacecraft were within acceptable parameters, the official Soviet agency said. The next communications session was scheduled for 19:00 Moscow Time, which would conclude the planned research program onboard Luna-9, TASS said, hinting that the spacecraft was about to run out of power.

The next official release confirmed that the lander was in touch with ground control from 19:00 to 20:41 Moscow Time, concluding the planned program.

Still, the next day, another official report announced that thanks to remaining power in onboard batteries, an additional two-hour session had been held with the spacecraft beginning at 23:37 Moscow Time on February 6. During this final contact, both telemetry and new photos of already imaged areas had been received. During the session, practically all remaining power resources of the spacecraft had been exhausted, ending its operation, TASS aangekondig.

Volgens TASS, a total of seven communications sessions with the spacecraft lasted eight hours five minutes. (770)

Panoramic images of the lunar surface from Luna-9.

During the mission of Luna-9, a total of 40 square images were transmitted back to Earth. (767) Details as small as one or two millimeters in size could be resolved in areas nearest to the camera. The spacecraft appeared to be sitting on a largely flat plane with a horizon around 1.5 kilometers away.

Photos of the same areas taken at different time revealed changing shadows as the Sun moved across the lunar sky. As a result, scientists could make a detailed profile of the landscape and determine size and shape of rocks and craters. (766)

Ironically, astronomers at Jodrell Bank observatory near Manchester, UK, were the first to publish intercepted images from Luna-9 on February 4, though in distorted form. Chained by secrecy and bureaucracy, Soviet scientists were able to present properly formatted images only a day later, along with their consternation toward their enterprising colleagues abroad.

On February 10, Soviet scientists held a triumphant press-conference chaired by the head of Academy of Sciences Mstislav Keldysh on the results of the Luna-9 mission.

Mstislav Keldysh presents results from the Luna-9 mission.

Since the veil of secrecy has been lifted from the Soviet space program at the end of the 1980s, the most significant information on the history of the Luna-9 mission actually came from the US.

As recently unclassified documents reveal, the mission of Luna-9, as well as the failed attempts of its predecessors to make soft landing on the Moon, attracted very close attention from American intelligence services. They correctly perceived Soviet probes as possible precursors to a manned landing or even to a permanent lunar base.

Along with the British radio astronomers and the Soviet ground controllers, US telemetry analysts at the National Security Agency, NSA, (among several other organizations) listened to transmissions from Luna-9 from its liftoff. Soon after the spacecraft reached the Moon on February 3, a routine flow of telemetry from the probe was complemented with a new type of signal. It was easily identified as a photo-facsimile transmission similar to those used for wire photo services on Earth. The image transmission continued as late as February 6 in the United States. (769)

On February 4, the NSA scrambled to figure out how to reproduce the priceless imagery. When some of the NSA officers expressed skepticism at the possibility of printing the actual photos, one of their superiors said that "the entire White House and Congress were looking to NSA for answers and we were not producing."

Fortunately, a young electrical engineer John O'Hara from the telemetry division of the NSA sketched a possible solution combining his own hardware with existing recording equipment from the NSA's contractor Honeywell.

Early in the afternoon, the NSA officers were able to improvise the process, however an initial attempt to print pictures produced just gibberish. The spectral analysis of the signal indicated that its frequency had to be adjusted to be readable by available hardware. O'Hara hastily fashioned another piece of electronics to correct the signal. The new printing attempt finally produced images from the Moon, though with the wrong proportions.

One image showed what analysts believed was a foot of the lander. The image was clear enough to resolve Russian letters and numbers. To the relief of NSA officers, these were just meaningless serial numbers, not taunting messages for the Americans. Like their Russian colleagues, US analysts noticed changing shadows on different photos of the same areas as the Sun moved across the lunar sky. The photos also revealed that the spacecraft had moved slightly from its initial position on the surface, possibly as a result of shifting soil below it.

In order to resolve the problem with the aspect ratio of printed images, O'Hara had to circumvent the normal bureaucratic and secrecy process to obtain a recorder with an appropriate speed from Honeywell.

By the morning of February 5, the NSA was able to produce perfectly sized images from Luna-9 and that afternoon, they were reportedly on the desk of President Lyndon Johnson! No doubt, Soviet pictures provided a powerful incentive for the White House to press ahead with the Apollo program, aimed to land a man on the Moon.

The agency's security bosses later attempted to charge O'Hara with "exceeding his authority" but the case was dropped after the intervention of Charley Travis, the head of Director's Advisory Group on the Electronic Reconnaissance at the NSA. (768)

Page author: Anatoly Zak Last update: February 3, 2021

Page editor: Alain Chabot Last edit: February 8, 2016

Pre-launch processing of the E6 landers. Credit: RKK Energia

The E6 lunar lander in pre-launch configuration. Credit: NPO Lavochkin

Stills from film footage often attributed to the launch of a Molniya rocket with the Luna-9 spacecraft.

Avionics containers separate from the E8 probe upon its approach to the Moon.

The altimeter of the E8 spacecraft responsible for the soft-landing braking maneuver. Copyright © 2011 Anatoly Zak

A painting depicting the Luna-9 spacecraft after landing.

The Luna-9 lander in deployed configuration. Copyright © 2009 Anatoly Zak

The thermal-control system of the E6 lander before installation of other internal equipment.

Yuri Gagarin, who flew the world's first space mission five years earlier, looks at a panorama transmitted by Luna-9 on Feb. 4, 1966.

Commemorative pennants delivered to the surface of the Moon onboard Luna-9.


Moon landing shock: How Soviet Luna 15 spacecraft beat Apollo 11 to the Moon by two days

Skakel gekopieer

Neil Armstrong makes first moon landing 1969

As u inteken, gebruik ons ​​die inligting wat u verskaf om hierdie nuusbriewe aan u te stuur. Soms bevat dit aanbevelings vir ander verwante nuusbriewe of dienste wat ons aanbied. Ons privaatheidskennisgewing verduidelik meer oor hoe ons u data en u regte gebruik. U kan te eniger tyd u inteken.

NASA landed the first man on the Moon half-century-ago on July 20, 1969. But when Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin arrived at the Moon on July 19, the Russians were already waiting. Three days before the historic Apollo 11 mission flew into space, an unmanned space probe dubbed Luna raced the US to the Moon. Luna 15 was the Soviet Union&rsquos second attempt at landing a spacecraft on the Moon for a sample return mission.

Verwante artikels

Up until that point, the Soviet Union had the upper hand over virtually every stage of the Cold War Space Race.

Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin was the first man in space, cosmonaut Alexei Leonov was the first to perform an extravehicular activity (EVA) and Luna 3 was the first spacecraft to fly past the far side of the Moon.

And on September 13, 1959, the Luna 2 probe was the first manmade object to crash into the Moon&rsquos surface.

So, when President John F Kennedy announced in 1961 his dream of putting a man on the Moon, the Soviet Union was spurred into action.

NASA said: &ldquoLuna 15, launched only three days before the historic Apollo 11 mission to the Moon, was the second Soviet attempt to recover and bring lunar soil back to Earth.

Moon landing: The Soviet Luna 15 entered lunar orbit two days before Apollo 11 (Image: NASA/GETTY)

Moon landing: The Luna 1 was the first space probe to reach the Moon (Image: NASA)

&ldquoIn a race to reach the Moon and return to Earth, the parallel missions of Luna 15 and Apollo 11 were, in some ways, the culmination of the Moon race that defined the space programs of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s.&rdquo

Luna 15 entered a lunar orbit on July 17, 1969, a whole two days before Apollo 11 reached the lunar orb.

But the Russian probe&rsquos journey to the Moon was not without any hiccups.

On the way to the Moon, the probe risked exploding after one of its propellant tanks began to boil in the Sun&rsquos heat.

A midcourse flight correction kept the fuel tank out of the heat allowing the probe to safely reach the Moon.

In the 2007 book Soviet and Russian Lunar Exploration, author Brian Harvey argued the situation was tense around the Moon.

Verwante artikels

He wrote: &ldquoOn July 19, tension rose. Apollo 11, with the astronauts on board, had now slipped into lunar orbit.

&ldquoThe world&rsquos focus shifted to the brave men on Apollo 11 carrying out their final checks before descending to the surface of the Moon.

&ldquoNow on its 39th orbit, Luna 15 fired its motor behind the Moon to achieve pre-landing perigee of 16km.

&ldquoThis was its final orbit, for at 16 km there was barely clearance over the mountain tops and was about as low as an orbit could go.

&ldquoThe probe could only be preparing to land.&rdquo

But even at that crucial stage of the mission, the Luna 15 was forced to undergo another two delayed course corrections.

Moon landing: Yuri Gagarin was the first man to fly into space (Image: GETTY)

Moon landing timeline: Detailed look back at the Apollo 11 Moon landing (Image: GETTY)

The Moon&rsquos pockmarked surface was too rugged for Luna&rsquos controllers to chart a safe descent trajectory.

NASA said: &ldquoLess than six hours after the second correction, Apollo 11 began its descent to the Moon, landing at 8.17pm UT on July 20, 1969.

&ldquoThe original plan was for Luna 15 to embark on the Moon less than two hours after Apollo 11, but it was not to be.

&ldquoUnsure of the terrain below, controllers delayed the landing by another 18 hours.

&ldquoDuring this critical period, Apollo 11 astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E 'Buzz' Aldrin walked on the Moon.&rdquo

In the end, the Luna 15 failed on its mission to retrieve a soil sample from the Moon.

Just two hours before Apollo 11 blasted off from the Moon and back into lunar orbit, the Luna 15 descended to the Moon&rsquos surface.

Neil Armstrong almost exploded ‘in ball of fire’ reveals Pence

However, four minutes into the flight communications with the probe ceased, suggesting something went wrong.

A subsequent analysis of the mission concluded the Luna probe likely crashed into the side of a lunar mountain 298mph (480kph).

The failure was attributed to an incorrect descent angle that threw the probe off-course.

After the success of Apollo 11, NASA landed 10 more men on the moon by the end of 1972.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, landed its first unmanned Lunokhod 1 probe on the Moon on November 17, 1970.


Fellow New Yorkers: It's time to move on — to unmask ourselves and our kids

As America prepares to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Apollo moon landing, The New York Times is busy celebrating the Soviet space program and bashing America’s.

A Times op-ed Thursday highlighted how the Soviet Union was oh-so-diverse, sending women and people of color into space long before stuffy, old America got around to doing the same.

As the USSR retreats into the rearview mirror of history, there is a growing tendency to romanticize its disastrous reign through the lens of contemporary wokeness.

Sure, Communists tortured and executed dissidents, starved their own people by the millions and operated gulags — but have you heard about their amazing space feminism and space intersectionality?

“Cosmonaut diversity was key for the Soviet message to the rest of the globe,” the writer, Sophie Pinkham, wrote. Her piece reads like something from an old issue of the Soviet newspaper Pravda boasting of the achievements of the Soviet space program.

Pravda, meaning “truth,” rarely offered what its name advertised. It functioned as a propaganda organ for the broken, failing state. But even Pravda might have demurred at publishing Pinkham’s hilarious follow-up line: “Under socialism, a person of even the humblest origins could make it all the way up.”

Someone should alert Pinkham to the news that the Soviet system collapsed and the Marxist tyranny lost the Cold War, its pretend-diversity notwithstanding. People of the “humblest origins” making it “all the way up” were just a show for the West. That old American leftists like Bernie Sanders fell for it then is sad. That hip young columnists for The New York Times continue to fall for it now is downright scary.

Fact is, the Soviets promoted minorities to burnish their international image and check boxes — exactly the kind of fake representation modern liberals claim to disdain.

Pinkham’s article was only one of (at least) two published by the Times bashing the US space program ahead of the 50th anniversary of the Apollo landing. Also this week, the newspaper published an essay headlined: “To Make It to the Moon, Women Have to Escape Earth’s Gender Bias.”

It slammed the space program for forcing male and female astronauts to wear the same space suit, deemed problematic, since the two sexes have “different sweat patterns.”

She added: “Men sweat more than comparably fit women, and the areas where they sweat the most occur in different parts of the body. In other words, when it comes to temperature-controlling garments, the needs are different for men and women.” Outer-space sexism, she went on to suggest, is much like office-space oppression: “We are already aware of this in relation to office temperatures. Temperatures are set for men, which leaves women carrying sweaters to work.”

Astonishingly, amid this endless America-bashing and gender-griping, the essay didn’t pause to mention Margaret Hamilton, the remarkable computer scientist, systems engineer and Medal of Freedom recipient who played a leading role in developing software for the Apollo project.