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Geveg van Sabugal, 3 April 1811

Geveg van Sabugal, 3 April 1811



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Geveg van Sabugal, 3 April 1811

Die geveg van Sabugal van 3 April 1811 was die laaste ernstige geveg tydens Masséna se terugtrekking uit Portugal in 1811, en was 'n gemiste kans vir 'n groot geallieerde oorwinning oor 'n geïsoleerde deel van Masséna se leër.

Masséna het relatiewe veiligheid by Celorico bereik en besluit om terug te keer na Ciudad Rodrigo, en in plaas daarvan te probeer om die berge van Sentraal -Portugal oor te steek om die Taagrivier te bereik, waarvandaan hy hoop om Lissabon weer te bedreig. Dit was 'n heeltemal onpraktiese idee, en op 29 Maart, na 'n paar dae se harde optog in die berge, was Masséna gedwing om hierdie plan te laat vaar. In plaas daarvan beveel hy sy verspreide korps om bymekaar te kom rondom Sabugal, aan die suidelike punt van die Coa -vallei. Van daar af sou hulle noord kon marsjeer, in die vallei af in die rigting van Almeida, of ooswaarts na die Spaanse grens.

Wellington het die beweging na die berge waargeneem, maar het aanvaar dat Sabugal die oorspronklike teiken was. Hy het eers besluit om te verhuis toe die Franse blykbaar besluit het om in die bergdorp Guarda te stop. Op 29 Maart het drie van Wellington se afdelings Loison se 6de korps sonder stryd gedwing om uit hul posisie by Guarda te kom. Teen 31 Maart het al die korpsen van Masséna die Coa -vallei bereik en kon hulle sonder verdere inmenging die veiligheid bereik.

Masséna se eindbestemming was die Spaanse grens rondom Ciudad Rodrigo, aan die rand van die vlaktes van Leon, waar sy weermag uiteindelik voorrade kon vind. Maar in plaas van sy opmars na Spanje voort te sit, nadat hy die Coa bereik het, het Masséna besluit om sy manne 'n paar dae te laat rus.

Die drie Franse korps aan die Coa was taamlik dun langs die rivier gespan. Reynier se 2de korps was suid van die lyn by Sabugal. Die naaste eenhede van die 6de korps was sewe kilometer verder noord, begin by Bismula. Uiteindelik was die 8ste korps tien myl na die ooste by Alfayates.

Wellington het besluit om sy hele veldleër bymekaar te maak en 'n verpletterende nederlaag op Reynier se 2de korps te probeer toedien. Hy het nou 38 000 man in sy ses afdelings (1ste, 3de, 5de, 6de, 7de en Lig) gehad. Masséna se totale mag op die Coa was effens groter, met 39 905 man, maar Wellington het gehoop om Reynier te verslaan voordat Junot of Loison hom kon bystaan.

Wellington se plan het al ses sy afdelings gebruik. Die 6de afdeling is noord gestuur om Loison vas te hou. Die Ligte Afdeling, onder die tydelike bevel van generaal Erskine, ondersteun deur twee kavallerie -brigades, sou om die Franse linkerflank beweeg. Sy rol was om agter Reynier te kom en te keer dat hy ooswaarts terugtrek. Sodra Erskine aan die gang was, sou die 5de afdeling aanval op Sabugal, en die 3de afdeling 'n entjie verder suid, met die 1ste en 7de afdeling agterna.

Wellington se plan is ontspoor deur 'n kombinasie van mis en generaal Erskine. Die oggend van 3 April was mistig. Die doelwitte van Picton en Dunlop, die bevelvoerders van die 3de en 5de afdeling, kon hulle nie sien nie en het Wellington gevra vir nuwe bevele. Ongelukkig was Erskine minder versigtig en het hy verder in die mis gebars, met Beckwith se brigade aan die voorpunt (die 1/43ste van die lyn, vier kompagnies van die 1/95ste geweer en die Portugese 3de Caçadores). In die mis steek Beckwith se manne die Coa byna 'n kilometer noord van die beoogde kruispunt oor. Hulle het toe deur die mis gegaan en 'n ry Franse pikkewyne teruggedruk.

Wat die manne van Beckwith nog nie geweet het nie, was dat hulle reguit op pad was na Merles se afdeling, aan die suidpunt van die Franse lyn. Merle is op die Britse aanval gewaarsku deur die geluid van muskietvuur in die mis, en het pas daarin geslaag om die 4de Léger in 'n nuwe lyn na die suide te vorm toe Beckwith uit die mis kom. Alhoewel die Franse vier bataljons in hul nuwe lyn gehad het, was hulle eintlik in die minderheid deur Beckwith se twee en 'n half bataljonne. Desondanks het Merle probeer om die Britse en Portugese lyn in vier kolomme aan te val, en is voorspelbaar afgeweer.

Beckwith jaag die terugtrekkende Franse totdat hy te staan ​​kom teen die volgende twee Franse regimente, die 36ste van die lyn en die 2de Léger. Hierdie keer was dit Beckwith wat eers gedwing is om terug te trek, maar sy manne vind toe skuiling agter 'n paar klipmure en veg teen die twee Franse regimente. Daarna het Beckwith 'n derde keer gevorder en van Merle se afdelingsartillerie afgery. Hierdie derde opmars het geëindig met die vierde Léger wat saamgetrek en Beckwith se linkerkant aangeval het, terwyl twee eskaders Franse kavaleries sy regterkant aangeval het. Weer eens moes Beckwith terugtrek na die klipmure.

Op hierdie stadium word die 1500 man van Beckwith deur 3 500 aangeval en was dit in werklike gevaar, maar gelukkig het hulle op hierdie stadium 2 000 man van Drummond se brigade op die toneel aangekom. Tog, toe die mis uiteindelik lig, was die geïsoleerde Light Division steeds in gevaar.

Toe die mis opkom, kon albei bevelvoerders uiteindelik sien wat gebeur. Die derde afdeling van Picton kon teen die heuwel opklim om die regterflank van die Franse magte aan te val wat na die ligte afdeling kyk, en Reynier moes noodgedwonge 'n terugtog beveel. Aanvanklik het Picton agtervolg, maar toe begin dit reënwindig, wat alle sigbaarheid blokkeer, en eerder as om die gevaar te loop dat die manne van Picton sterk Franse versterkings sou laat verdwaal, het Wellington die jaagtog afgeskakel.

Alhoewel die mis Wellington verhinder het om 'n groot oorwinning op Sabugal te behaal, het die Light Division 'n noemenswaardige geringe sukses behaal. Reynier het minstens 760 slagoffers gely (72 dood, 502 gewond en 186 gewond), terwyl Wellington 162 mans (17 dood, 129 gewond en 6 vermis) verloor het. Van die Britse slagoffers was 80 in die 1/43ste voet, wat drie afsonderlike Franse aanvalle beveg het.

Na die geveg moes Masséna sy oorblywende posisies op die Coa laat vaar en vinnig na die ooste terugtrek. In die volgende paar dae het die Franse uiteindelik relatiewe veiligheid in Spanje bereik. Selfs toe was die geveg nie verby nie. Toe Wellington 'n blokkade van Almeida begin, het Masséna probeer om die beleg te verbreek, maar is vir 'n laaste keer verslaan in Fuentes de Onoro, 3-5 Mei 1811. Kort daarna is hy amptelik vervang in bevel van die leër van Portugal, en beëindig sy militêre loopbaan.

Napoleontiese tuisblad | Boeke oor die Napoleontiese oorloë | Onderwerpindeks: Napoleontiese oorloë

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Blokkade van Almeida

In die Blokkade van Almeida (14 April-10 Mei 1811) 'n Franse garnisoen onder Antoine François Brenier de Montmorand was omring deur ongeveer 13 000 Anglo-geallieerde soldate onder leiding van generaals sir Alexander Campbell, 1st Baronet en sir William Erskine, 2de Baronet. Nadat 'n Franse hulpverleningspoging misluk het, het Brenier en sy troepe snags uitgebreek nadat hulle dele van die vesting opgeblaas het. Tot die grimmigheid van die Britse weermagbevelvoerder Arthur Wellesley, burggraaf Wellington, het die meeste Franse ontsnap vanweë hul bevelvoerder se eensydige vasberadenheid, Britse geritsel en merkwaardige geluk. Die aksie het plaasgevind tydens die deel van die Skiereilandoorlog van die Napoleontiese oorloë. Almeida, Portugal, is naby die Spaanse grens ongeveer 300 kilometer (186 myl) noordoos van Lissabon geleë. Die stad is oorspronklik verower uit 'n Portugese garnisoen tydens die beleg van Almeida in 1810.


Inhoud

Die eerste drie "Rifle Battalion" van die Britse weermag is in 1797–99 deur die 60ste (Royal Americans) opgewek. [1] Die bevel van hierdie eerste geweerbataljon is gegee aan Francis de Rottenburg, wat uitgebreide ervaring met ligte infanterie gehad het. Alhoewel die 60ste nie amptelik deel geword het van die Ligte Afdeling nie, was dit en Rottenburg invloedryk in terme van die leër van die Britse weermag rakende gewapende ligte infanterie.

In 1800 word 'n 'Experimental Corps of Riflemen' opgerig deur kolonel Coote Manningham en luitenant-kolonel eerw. William Stewart - afkomstig van offisiere en ander geledere uit konsepte van 'n verskeidenheid Britse regimente. Die korps het in verskeie opsigte verskil van die Line -infanterie van die Britse leër. Die belangrikste was dat dit gewapen was met die formidabele Baker -geweer, wat meer akkuraat en langer was as die muskiet, hoewel dit langer geneem het om te laai. Aangesien die geweer korter was as die muskiet, is dit met 'n swaardbajonet van 21 duim uitgereik. Geweerders het donkergroen baadjies gedra eerder as die helderrooi jasse van die Britse infanterie -regimente van daardie tyd, pantaloons, eerder as 'n broek van swart leer en gordels eerder as wit en 'n groen pluim op hul "stoofpyp -shakoes". Hulle is opgelei om alleen of in pare te werk, in oop orde en om self te dink.

Vier maande na die stigting daarvan is die Rifle Corps gereed geag vir sy eerste operasie. Op 25 Augustus 1800 was drie kompanye, onder bevel van luitenant-kolonel William Stewart, aan die spits van 'n Britse amfibiese landing in Ferrol, Spanje, waar die Rifles gehelp het om die Spaanse verdedigers op die hoogtes te verdryf. Die ekspedisie is egter verslaan en die volgende dag onttrek. In 1801 dien een kompanie van die korps, onder bevel van kaptein Sidney Beckwith, as skutters aan boord van die Royal Navy -skepe tydens die Eerste Slag van Kopenhagen. Tydens die geveg het die Rifle Corps een luitenant gedood, die eerste offisier wat geval het, en twee ander geledere gedood en ses gewond, waarvan sommige later gesterf het. (In 1847 maak die Admiraliteit die Naval General Service Medal met die gesp "Kopenhagen 1801" opeisbaar deur oorlewende veterane, insluitend lede van die Rifle Corps.)

In Januarie 1803 word die korps 'n gevestigde gereelde regiment en word die 95ste Regiment of Foot (Rifles) herdoop.

Op 17 Julie 1803 word 'n nie -amptelike "Corps of Light Infantry" gevorm deur die

(Die naam 'Light Division' is eers 'n paar jaar later gebruik.)

Generaal Sir John Moore het in September 1805 die 43ste, 52ste en 95ste opleiding voltooi.

Omdat die drie geweerbataljons van die 60ste koninklike Amerikaners reeds die groen klere en swart leeruitrusting gedra het wat tipies was vir kontinentale ligte infanterie, [3] het die 95ste geweer dieselfde uniform as die 60ste aangeneem. Maar ondanks die beste pogings van Moore, is die ander ligte infanterieregimente beveel om aan die regulasies vir ligte kompanie van lynregimente te voldoen deur hul rooi baadjies te behou. [4]

Gewapen met die Baker -geweer en donkergroen uniforms, was die Green Jackets moeilik om raak te sien en spandeer hulle tyd om vyandelike offisiere, onderoffisiere en enige ander gesag in 'n vyandelike formasie te sluip. 'N Goed doelgerigte skoot kan 'n vyand se bevelvoerder met gemak laat val en die moraal in die vyand verlaag. Die Baker Rifle het 'n veel groter akkuraatheid en reikafstand gehad as die standaard muskette van die tyd, en die manne wat dit gebruik het, is as skerpskutters beskou en verwoestende vuurkrag verruil vir uitstekende akkuraatheid en reikafstand.

In 1807 word Denemarke, hoewel dit amptelik neutraal was, deur die Britte vermoed dat hy van plan was om hom met Frankryk te verbind. Die korps van ligte infanterie (43ste, 52ste en 95ste regiment) onder leiding van Sir Arthur Wellesley, die toekomstige hertog van Wellington, was deel van 'n mag wat die Deense magte verslaan het by die beleg van Køge en die tweede slag van Kopenhagen, en daarmee saam die hele Deense vloot.

Die Corps of Light Infantry, onder Moore, seil na Spanje vir wat bekend sou staan ​​as die Skiereilandoorlog. Die veldtog het die waarde van ligte infanterie gewapen met gewere bepaal.

Vier verdere bataljons is gedurende Mei 1808 deur Rottenberg opgelei in die Curragh van Kildare in Ierland. Later keer Rottenberg terug na Engeland en, by Brabdourn Lees -kaserne in Ashford, heropleiding van die 68ste, 85ste en 71ste regiment as ligte infanterie, om te help in die vraag vir sulke troepe op die Skiereiland. [5]

Tydens die Skiereilandoorlog van 1808-1809, Caçadores Bataljons van die Portugese leër was verbonde aan die ligte afdeling.

Slag van Corunna Edit

Die Slag van Corunna, (16 Januarie 1809), was 'n aanval deur 16,000 Franse onder Marshal Soult tydens die amfibiese ontruiming van 16,000 Britte onder generaal Sir John Moore. Moore het gehoop om die Franse leër van Portugal af weg te trek, om toe te laat dat die klein Britse mag in daardie land versterk word en dat die Spaanse leërs kan hervorm. Moore was baie in die getal en moes noodgedwonge terugtrek. In 'n strawwe winter en onder konstante druk, het die toevlugsoord sy manne ernstig beproef. Die uitputtende optogte, koue weer en gereelde skermutselings met die agtervolgende Franse eenhede het veroorsaak dat baie siektes of uitputting tot gevolg het, of om na alkohol te gaan en so dronk geword het dat hulle agtergebly het. Die Ligte Afdeling (destyds die Ligte Brigade) was een van die min eenhede wat sy dissipline behou het en saam met eenhede van die Britse kavallerie 'n reeks agterhoede -optrede teen die Franse beveg het. Die brigade het toe by Corunna geveg waar die Franse afgeweer is. Dit is daarna na Vigo gestuur vir aanvang.

Thomas Plunket was 'n geweer in die 95ste geweer. Tydens die terugtog het Plunket die Franse Général de Brigade Auguste-Marie-François Colbert op 'n afstand van tussen 200 en 600 meter met 'n Baker-geweer geskiet. [6] [7] Plunket het vorentoe gehardloop om hierdie skoot te maak, en voordat hy na sy eie lyne teruggekeer het, herlaai hy en skiet 'n trompet-majoor wat die gevalle generaal te hulp gesnel het. Hierdie tweede prestasie het getoon dat die eerste skoot nie 'n toeval was nie, en dat die sterftes voldoende was om die hangende Franse aanval in die wiele te ry. [6] Die skote was op 'n voldoende lang afstand om ander in die 95ste Rifles te beïndruk, wie se skerpskutter (met die Baker -geweer) baie beter was as die gewone Britse soldaat wat, gewapen met 'n Brown Bess -musket, opgelei is om in 'n liggaam van mans op 50 meter met vlugvuur. [8]

Slag van Talavera Edit

Tydens die hervorming in Engeland na hul ontruiming uit Corunna, is Brigadier-generaal Robert Craufurd beveel om sy brigade, wat nou bestaan ​​uit die 1ste Bataljon van die 43ste, 1ste Bataljon van die 52ste en 1ste Bataljon [9] van die 95ste, terug te neem na die Skiereiland. [10] Die brigade het op 2 Julie 1809 in Lissabon geland en 'n reeks uitmergelende optogte in die Julie -hitte onderneem om by Arthur Wellesley, 1ste hertog van Wellington se leër, aan te sluit. Wellesley het geveg en die stryd gewen terwyl die Ligte Brigade nog sweet op die pad gestort het, hoewel dit soms 30 myl per dag was. Die Riflemen van die 60ste het in hul afwesigheid uitstekende diens verrig, en was een van die min regimente wat by die naam van Wellesley aan die Britse regering genoem is. [10] Tydens die herorganisasies wat gevolg het, het Craufurd die bevel gekry oor die 3de afdeling, wie se vorige bevelvoerder, generaal-majoor Mackenzie, by Talavera vermoor is. [11] Met die daaropvolgende toevoeging van kaptein Hew Ross se troep Royal Horse Artillery, het die 1ste Huzars van die K.G.L. en die Portugese 3de Caçadores Bataljon (onder bevel van luitenant-kolonel George Elder [12]), het dit die Ligte Afdeling geword. ' [11] Craufurd het ook die eerste geskryf Permanente bestellings vir die ligte afdeling, 'n opleidingshandleiding en handboek. [13]

Slag van die rivier Côa Edit

Craufurd se operasies op die Côa en Águeda in 1810 was waagmoedig om die Franse magte in die slag van die Côa -rivier te begin raak (24 Julie 1810). verwydering uit bevel. Alhoewel Wellington hom vir sy optrede veroordeel het, vergroot hy terselfdertyd sy mag tot 'n volledige afdeling deur die toevoeging van twee uitgesoekte bataljons Portugees Caçadores, Kastanje -troep, Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) en deel van die 14de en 16de, Light Dragoons [14] [15]

Slag van Bussaco Edit

Die Slag van Bussaco (27 September 1810) was 'n verdedigingsgeveg wat deur die Geallieerdes gewen is, wat Wellington in staat gestel het om terug te trek van sy leër na die voorheen versterkte lyne van Torres Vedras. Hy het dit teen 10 Oktober bereik. Omdat die lyne te sterk was om aan te val, het die Franse hulle in die winterkwartiere teruggetrek. Omdat hulle nie kos gehad het nie en deur die Britse tref-en-trap-taktiek, het die Franse 25 000 mans verloor wat gevang of dood is van hongersnood of siekte voordat hulle vroeg in 1811 in Spanje terugtrek, en Portugal bevry van die Franse besetting behalwe Almeida, naby die grens. Tydens die terugtog is die Slag van Sabugal ook gevoer.

Slag van Sabugal Edit

Die Slag van Sabugal (3 April 1811), Craufurd het siek geword en was tuis in Engeland, sodat die Afdeling onder bevel was van generaal-majoor William Erskine, die plan was vir die Ligte afdeling en twee brigades kavallerie om agter die Franse oop linkerflank te draai terwyl die ander vier afdelings die voorkant aanval. Op die dag van die geveg was daar 'n hewige mis, die ander bevelvoerders het besluit om te wag totdat die sig verbeter het. Erskine beveel die luitenant-kolonel Thomas Sydney Beckwith se eerste brigade onbevrees. In plaas daarvan om die Côa anderkant die Franse oor te steek, het die brigade in die mis na links gedryf, op die verkeerde plek gekruis en die Franse linkerflank getref. Erskine, wat baie bysiende en geestelik ongebalanseerd was, raak toe versigtig en gee uitdruklike instruksies aan kolonel George Drummond om nie sy mede -brigade -bevelvoerder te ondersteun nie. Op hierdie stadium het Erskine weggery om by die kavalerie aan te sluit en die Ligte afdeling leierloos vir die res van die geveg. Die Franse het die grootste deel van hul korps van 10 000 man teen die 1500 van Beckwith geskakel en die ligte infanterie teruggedruk. Toe Drummond die geluide van die geveg nader hoor, het hy afgelei dat die manne van Beckwith terugtrek. Drummond, wat die bevele nie gehoorsaam het nie, het sy 2de brigade oor die Côa gelei en by Beckwith aangesluit. Saam het hulle die Franse teruggery.

Slag van Fuentes De Onoro Edit

In die Slag van Fuentes de Onoro (3 Mei 1811) het die 51ste Voet en 85ste Ligte Infanterie, tesame met die Ligte Afdeling, getoon hoe die Franse Kavalerie verslaan kan word deur 'n kombinasie van vinnige bewegings, akkurate geweervuur ​​en gedissiplineerde formasies. Tydens die geveg is die Ligte Afdeling gestuur om die 51ste en 85ste Ligte Infanterie te versterk, wat in die oop grond vasgevang was en omring was deur die Franse Kavallerie. Toe dit versterk is, kon die hele mag vinnig terugtrek - agtervolg deur die Franse kavalerie. Elke keer as die Franse naby gekom het, het die ligte infanteriste, gewere en caçadores vinnig op die laaste veilige oomblik vierkante gevorm en die kavallerie afgeslaan. Hierdie reeks vinnige bewegings, gekombineer met die gedissiplineerde vorming van vierkante - buite die lyn, was 'n skouspel wat min kon glo dat dit moontlik was. [16]

Belegging van Ciudad Rodrigo Edit

Die Afdeling, wat nou weer onder bevel van generaal-majoor Robert Craufurd was, was betrokke by die beleg van Ciudad Rodrigo (8 Januarie 1812), waar hulle stormloop en die Grand Teson-afrit neem. Op 19 Januarie is hulle saam met generaal-majoor Thomas Picton se derde afdeling beveel om die stad te bestorm. Die afdeling van Picton val die groter inbreuk in die noordweste van die stad se mure aan, terwyl die ligte afdeling teen die mindere inbreuk in die noorde gestuur word.

Die aanranding was om 19.00 uur heeltemal suksesvol, hoewel onder die dooies die generaal-majoor Henry Mackinnon en Craufurd was. Die oorwinning was ietwat bederf toe die Britse staatsamptenare die stad deeglik ontslaan het, ondanks die pogings van hul offisiere.

Slag van Salamanca Edit

Na afloop van die beleg van Ciudad Rodrigo en die dood van Crauford, is die afdeling nou onder bevel van Charles Alten gehou as die reserwe -afdeling vir die Slag van Salamanca (22 Julie 1812) en het dit nie 'n groot rol in die geveg geneem nie.

Slag van Vitoria Wysig

Tydens die Slag van Vitoria (21 Junie 1813) was die afdeling onder die persoonlike leiding van Wellington deel van die Right Center Column. Wellington het sy aanval in vier kolomme geloods, en na harde gevegte was die vyand se middelpunt gebreek en gou het die Franse verdediging verbrokkel. Ongeveer 5 000 Franse soldate is dood of gewond en 3 000 is gevange geneem, terwyl Wellington se magte ongeveer 5 000 dood of gewond is. 152 kanonne is gevang, maar koning Joseph Bonaparte het skaars ontsnap. Die geveg het gelei tot die ineenstorting van die Napoleontiese bewind in Spanje. [17]

Slag van die Pireneë Redigeer

Tydens die Franse terugtrekking oor die Pireneë en na Frankryk was die Ligte Afdeling betrokke by die Slag van die Pireneë (25 Julie 1813) en die Slag van die Bidassoa (1813) (7 Oktober 1813), waartydens die moeilikste gevegte van die dag plaasgevind het in die sentrumsektor van generaal -majoor Bertrand Clausel. John Colborne se brigade van Charles Alten's Light Division aangeval La Bayonette. Die Franse het nie op die aanval gewag nie, maar afdraande geloop en die 95ste Rifles teruggery. Skielik verskyn die 52ste en draai vinnig die tafels om. Nadat hulle die agteruitgangende Franse gevolg het, het hulle die twyfel met verrassende gemak oorrompel. Intussen het James Kempt se tweede ligafdeling -brigade en Francisco de Longa se Spaanse afdeling twee spore van Mont Larroun aangeval om 'n paar posisies te verseker. Die volgende dag het die Franse die posisie laat vaar om omsingeling te voorkom.

Slag van Nivelle Edit

Die Slag van Nivelle (10 November 1813) het net voor dagbreek begin toe die Ligte Afdeling op die top van die Groter Rune na die plato gegaan het (die beraad is deur Franse troepe bewaak, maar hulle het gevlug na die skermutseling aan die Bidassoa -rivier, uit vrees om van hul eie leër afgesny te word). Die doel van die afdeling was om die drie verdedigende forte wat deur die Franse gebou is, uit die geveg te vee. Hulle het in die kloof voor die Klein Rhune ingeskuif en beveel om te gaan lê en wag op die bevel om aan te val. Na die sein van 'n battery kanon, het die aanval begin. Dit het begin met die 43ste, 52ste en 95ste - met die Portugese Caçadores ter ondersteuning, wat op die kruin van die Rhune die redouboms bestorm het. Ondanks die feit dat dit 'n riskante stap was en die manne amper uitgeput was, het die Britte se verbasing en vrymoedigheid die Franse gestuur om na ander forte op ander heuwels te vlug.

Terwyl die 43ste en 95ste met die Franse op die Rhune te doen gehad het, het daar nog steeds 'n baie sterk stervormige fort onder op die Mouiz-plato gebly wat na die kus gestrek het. Dit is aangeval deur Colborne se 52ste, ondersteun deur gewere uit die 95ste. Die Franse was weer eens verras en die Britte het daarin geslaag. In die Franse oë het hulle van die grond af verskyn, waarna die Franse soldate in gevaar was om afgesny te word en Colborne in besit van die fort en ander loopgrawe verlaat het sonder om 'n enkele noodlottige slagoffer te verloor.

Slag van Toulouse Wysig

Die laaste aksie van die Skiereilandoorlog was die Slag van Toulouse, (10 April 1814). Op die aand van 10 April 1814 het Marshall Soult 'n amptelike mededeling van Parys ontvang wat hom meegedeel het dat Napoleon oorgegee het aan die koalisiemagte in Noord -Frankryk. Onseker oor wat om te doen, het die generaals van Soult hom aangeraai om die stad oor te gee, aangesien versterkings waarskynlik nie sou kom nie en verdere nuus by Toulouse kom en Soult in kennis stel van die oorgawe van die Franse leërs in Frankryk. Dit het die Skiereilandoorlog beëindig.

Die Light Division, wat beweer word dat dit een van die sterkste afdelings in die Britse leër in die Skiereilandoorlog was, het sy taai aard bewys in die talle aksies waarby dit betrokke was vanaf die berugte terugtog na Corunna tot en met die inval in Frankryk in 1814 en die afsluiting van die oorlog in die Slag van Toulouse. [18]

Struktuur tydens die Skiereilandoorlog wysig

  • Kommandant -generaals: Robert Craufurd, William Erskine, Charles Alten
  • 1ste Brigade
  • 3/95ste gewere (hoofkwartier en 5 ondernemings)
  • 3de Portugees Caçadores. [19]

Na die abdikasie van Napoleon in 1814 en sy ballingskap na die eiland Elba, is die skiereiland se leër afgebreek en verdeel. Na Napoleon se ontsnapping en terugkeer aan bewind in Frankryk, was daar nog 'n stryd om te veg.

A Ligte afdeling by Waterloo se naam is nie gevorm nie, maar die Ligte Infanterie bataljons, behalwe die 1ste bataljon van die 95ste wat aan die 5de afdeling toegewys is, is in die 3de Britse Brigade toegedeel aan die 2de afdeling. Die 3de Brigade was onder bevel van die destydse generaal-majoor Frederick Adam. Die ander brigades was buitelandse troepe met die 1ste brigade wat bestaan ​​uit 4 lynbataljons van die Kings German Legion en 3de brigade bestaande uit vier bataljons van Hanoverian Landwehr (milisie). Aangesien die Britse weermag so min ligte troepe gehad het, kom 16 van 21 ligte infanteriebataljons in die Geallieerde Weermag by Waterloo van geallieerde magte. Die derde Britse afdeling het byvoorbeeld meer as 2300 ligte infanterie in King's German Legion en Hannoveriaanse bataljons gehad. [20]

Tydens die laaste optrede van die dag het sir John Colborne die 52ste ligte infanterie-ronde meegebring om die ou garde van die Franse keiserlike garde te oortref terwyl dit na die Britse sentrum gevorder het in 'n laaste poging om Wellington te verslaan. Toe die kolom sy brigade verbysteek, het die 52ste beskuldigde 'n vernietigende vlug in die linkerflank van die Chasseurs afgevuur en met die bajonet aangeval. Die hele wag is teruggedryf teen die heuwel en begin 'n algemene terugtog na die roep van "La Garde recule"

Na hul onsuksesvolle aanval op die Britse sentrum, het die Franse keiserlike wag 'n laaste stand in vierkante aan weerskante van die La Belle Alliance gemaak. Die 3de (Ligte) Brigade laai die plein wat op stygende grond gevorm is, aan die (Britse) regterkant van La Belle Alliance, en bring dit weer in 'n toestand van verwarring. Die ander plein is deur die Pruise aangeval. Die Franse trek terug van die slagveld na Frankryk.

Struktuur by Waterloo Edit

  • 2de (Ligte) Brigade
      , (die grootste bataljon by Waterloo) [21]
  • 2de Bataljon, 95ste Rifles
  • Afsondering, 3de Bataljon, 95ste Rifles
    • 1st Line Bataljon, KGL
    • 2de lyn bataljon, KGL
    • 3de lyn bataljon, KGL
    • 4de Lyn Bataljon, KGL
    • Landwehr Bataljon Bremervörde
    • Landwehr Bataljon 2de Hertog van York (Osnabrück)
    • Landwehr Bataljon 3de Hertog van York (Quakenbrück)
    • Landwehr Bataljon Salzgitter

    Die Krimoorlog (1853–1856) is geveg tussen die keiserlike Rusland aan die een kant en 'n alliansie van Frankryk, die Verenigde Koninkryk, die Koninkryk Sardinië en die Ottomaanse Ryk aan die ander kant. Die grootste deel van die konflik het op die Krim -skiereiland plaasgevind, met bykomende aksies wat in die weste van Turkye en die Baltiese See -gebied plaasgevind het en word soms beskou as die eerste "moderne" konflik en "het tegniese veranderings aangebring wat die toekomstige verloop van die oorlog beïnvloed het." [22]

    A Ligte afdeling is weer vir diens gevorm, maar dit was slegs in naam omdat geen ligte infanteriebataljons daaraan toegewys is nie. Die afdeling was betrokke by die Slag van die Alma (20 September 1854), wat gewoonlik as die eerste geveg van die Krimoorlog beskou word, het in die omgewing van die Alma -rivier in die Krim plaasgevind. 'N Anglo-Franse mag onder generaal St. Arnaud en Lord Raglan het generaal Menshikov se Russiese leër verslaan, wat ongeveer 6.000 troepe verloor het. Hulle was ook besig met die beleg van Sewastopol (1854–1855) en die slag van die Slag van Inkerman (5 November 1854) voor die einde van die vyandelikhede.

    Struktuur tydens die Krimoorlog wysig

    Teen die einde van die 19de eeu was die konsep van gevegsvorming aan die afneem en het die onderskeid tussen ligte en swaar infanterie begin verdwyn. In wese het alle infanterie in die praktyk ligte infanterie geword. Sommige regimente het die naam en gebruike behou, maar daar was in werklikheid geen verskil tussen hulle en ander infanterieregimente nie.

    Gedurende die Eerste Wêreldoorlog twee Ligte afdelings is die 14de (Ligte) Afdeling gevorm (dit was die eerste afdeling wat deur Duitsers aangeval is met vlamwerpers), en die 20ste (Ligte) Afdeling. Albei het aan die Westelike Front gedien en was betrokke by die groot gevegte, waaronder die Slagge van die Somme, Slag van Arras en die Slag van Ieper.

    Na die einde van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog het die Britte 'n besettingsleër in Duitsland gevorm: British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). In Februarie 1919 is die 2de Afdeling herontwerp as die Ligte Afdeling, en het dit by die BAOR aangesluit.

    Die Britse leër het nie 'n Ligte afdeling vir diens tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, met die uitsondering van die 61ste Afdeling, wat in die laaste maande van die oorlog kortliks as een herontwerp is. Die etos van die Ligte Afdeling is egter voortgesit in nuwe infanterieformasies soos die Commandos, Parachute Regiment en die Chindits, almal liggies gewapende vinnige en rats eenhede.

    Na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die Britse leër veertien infanteriedepote gehad, elk met 'n brief. Infanteriedepot J te Farnborough was die hoofkwartier vir die ses Engelse ligte infanterieregimente en Infanteriedepot O by Winchester was die hoofkwartier vir die twee geweerregimente en die Middlesex Regiment. [24]

    In 1948 het die depots name aangeneem en dit het die Light Infantry Brigade en Green Jackets Brigade geword. [25]

    In 1968 is die Light Division hervorm as 'n administratiewe afdeling met die regiment van die Light Infantry Brigade en die Green Jackets Brigade. [26]

    Soos gevorm, bestaan ​​die ligte afdeling uit sewe gereelde infanteriebataljons:

    Die Ligte Infanterie het sy 4de Bataljon in 1969 verloor, terwyl beide regimente 'n bataljon in 1992 verloor het.

    In 2005 is nog twee regimente aan die Ligte Afdeling verbonde:

    Dit was ter voorbereiding op die samesmelting van al vier regimente in 'n enkele groot regiment met die naam The Rifles, wat in Februarie 2007 gestig is. Regimentele name van die regimente wat The Rifles gevorm het, is nie gehandhaaf nie. As gevolg hiervan, by die vorming van The Rifles, die naam Ligte afdeling nie meer gebruik sou word nie. [27]


    Slag van Sabugal 04 Apr 1811 - 'n Polemos Refight

    Prolific games -skrywer Howard Whitehouse (nou deel van die Pulp Action Library -span) het 'n scenario vir die bestryding van Sabugal in Miniature Wargames 37 geskryf.

    Dit was in die Arthur Harman -styl, met gedetailleerde spelbriefings en die verwagting van 'n skeidsregter: perfek vir 'n heerlike aand met klubspel. As solo -speler moes ek dit egter eerder anders laat werk - sien die spelnotas aan die einde vir die meganika hiervan.

    Die Anglo-Portugese leër:

    C-in-C Lord Wellington (beslissend)

    Ligte afdeling: Erskine (plodding)
    Beckwith's Bde: 1 Vet/El Infanterie SK2, 1 Veterinêre Infanterie SK1, 1 Opgeleide Infanterie SK2, 1 x 6lb Hs Bty
    Drummond's Bde: 1 Veearts/El Infanterie SK2, 1 Veearts Infanterie SK2, 1 Veearts Infanterie SK1, 1 Opgeleide Infanterie SK2
    Slade's Bde: 2 x Veteraan Dragoons, 1 x Veteraan Ligte Kavallerie
    Arendtschildt's Bde: 3 x Veteraan Ligte Kavalerie

    Drummond's Brigade arriveer na 6 beurte (ongeveer 30 minute) die Kavallerie en Erskine self na 12 draaie (1 uur)

    3de afdeling: Picton (beslissend)
    Mackinnon's Bde: 1 x Veteraan Infanterie SK2, 3 x Veteraan Infanterie SK1
    Colville's Bde: 1 x Veteraan Infanterie SK2, 3 x Veteraan Infanterie SK1
    Power's Bde (Portugees): 3 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK1
    Arty: 1 x 6lb Ft Bty

    5de afdeling: Dunlop (Plodding)
    Hay's Bde: 1 x Veteraan Infanterie SK2, 2 x Veteraan Infanterie SK1
    Dunlop's Bde: 1 x Veteraan Infanterie SK2, 2 x Veteraan Infanterie SK1
    Spry's Bde: 1 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK2, 2 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK1
    Arty: 1 x 6lb Ft Bty

    Franse II Korps: Reille (bekwaam)

    1ste afdeling: Merle (bekwaam)
    Sarrut's Bde: 1 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK2, 4 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK1
    2de Bde: 1 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK2, 1 x Opgeleide Infanterie SK1
    Arty: 1 x 8lb Ft Bty

    2nd Division: Heudelet (Capable)
    Arnaud's Bde: 1 x Trained Infantry SK2, 6 x Trained Infantry SK1
    Godard's Bde: 1 x Trained Infantry SK2, 3 x Trained Infantry SK1
    Arty: 1 x 8lb Ft Bty

    Cavalry Bde:
    1 x Trained Dragoons, 2 x Trained Light Cavalry, 1 x 4lb Hs Bty

    The Weather:
    The weather is foggy until turn 18. There is the chance of intermittent showers (on each turn, roll a D6 and 1 = rain)


    3rd (UK) Division 3rd (UK) Armoured Division "The Iron Division"

    The 3rd (UK) Division is the only division at continual operational readiness in the United Kingdom. Based in Bulford, Wiltshire, England, the Division is made up 1st Mechanized Brigade, 4th Mechanized Brigade, 12th Mechanized Brigade, and 19th Light Brigade. It is also supported by the 101st Logistic Brigade, technically assigned to Headquarters, Theater Troops, as well as its own divisional troops.

    In the planned Third Division, the only area of weapons system to weapons system overmatch is probably the very high degree of protection that is designed into the Challenger 2 tank. Challenger 2 has a good gun, a 120 millimetre. It probably overmatches most Russian 125 millimetre guns, but of course it has fewer of them. The division has quite a few Javelin anti-tank guided weapons, which is a very effective anti-tank guided weapon, but an equivalent Russian formation has about four times the number of vehicles that can fire anti-tank guided weapons, and from underneath armour. That includes the T-72 tank and the other tanks, all of which can fire a missile from their main gun.

    One weakness of the British division compared with an equivalent Russian division is artillery. Broadly speaking, Russian brigades and divisions have three times as much gun and rocket artillery as their NATO equivalents. Whereas a British armoured infantry brigade would be supported by a single AS-90 regiment, a Russian motor rifle brigade would have two battalions of gun artillery and a battalion of multiple rocket launchers. There is another area in which the British Army is overmatched, and that is ground-based air defence. Broadly speaking, the Army has two regiments of ground-based air defence, one of Rapier and one of Javelin. The can assume that Rapier would be behind the division, but Javelin would be with the division. Most Russian brigades have an air defence battalion and divisions have air defence brigades. They have an impressive array of layered air defence. Many of their missile and radar systems are very capable.

    That is important, because it would complicate efforts to use fixed-wing air power to help offset Russian numerical superiority. It is also important because it would limit the options for manoeuvring Apache helicopters around the battlefield to attempt to apply their tank-killing power to the battlefield. This is not just a British Army problem. It is a NATO land forces problem.

    Future Developments

    The most challenging peer adversary for the 3rd Divisions capability is Russia. To match Russian tank or motor rifle formations, in 2025, the division will need to exploit its strengths, but find ways of overcoming its weaknesses. It will have two armoured infantry brigades with Challenger 2 tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). It will have many Javelin anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), but its adversary would have many armoured vehicles with integral ATGW that can be fired from under armour. The British division has no such capability. The division s anti-armour capability would be greatly enhanced by allocating it the Apache helicopters of the British aviation brigade. Whilst the division s armoured engineer capability is a strength, its organic artillery is outnumbered and outranged by much more numerous Russian artillery. This could constrain armoured manoeuvre. The obsolete FV 432 and Spartan AFVs currently filling many support roles would be particularly vulnerable to indirect fire. Modernising British artillery does not appear to be funded.

    In 2025, the division will have re-organised an armoured infantry brigade into a strike brigade. This will have much greater operational and strategic mobility than the formation it replaces, increasing options for rapid deployment of medium armour over extended distances, including in Europe. But reducing tank strength by one third means that divisional anti-armour capability, particularly against tanks, will be less. Over time, Russian AFVs are increasingly likely to be fitted with active protection systems (APS) that would reduce the effectiveness of British Javelin and Hellfire ATGW. The disruptive challenge to the effectiveness of ATGW posed by APS does not appear to be publicly acknowledged by most NATO armies, including the British.

    • Divisional Headquarters. This provides the command and control for the warfighting division.
    • Armoured Infantry Brigade (Challenger 2, Warrior). An Armoured Infantry brigade consists of armoured capabilities such as tanks and IFVs, armoured engineers, armoured artillery and signals assets. It is designed to counter enemy armoured forces through greater levels of protection and firepower.
    • Strike Brigade (Ajax and Boxer). The Strike brigade is a new concept designed to be more mobile than the Armoured Infantry brigade, to allow rapid deployment and re-deployment, while still possessing sufficient firepower to deal with the enemy's less well protected assets and threats that do not include heavy armour or where direct confrontation with heavy armour can be avoided. The Strike Brigade will also gather information and intelligence for the divisional commander, manoeuvre critical assets into a position of advantage and disperse widely, to seek to cause uncertainty in the mind of the enemy.
    • Air Assault Brigade. The Air Assault brigade can move at very high readiness using transport aircraft or heavy lift helicopter aviation. It provides the means to demonstrate intent ahead of the divisional main body's deployment, and secure vital battlespace for the division until it can link up with other forces.
    • Combat Aviation Brigade. The Combat Aviation brigade is anticipated, by 2025, to include upgraded Apache Attack Helicopters grouped with Wildcat reconnaissance helicopters, providing vital air support to troops on the ground.
    • Divisional enablers. Divisional enablers comprise a significant part of the warfighting division (c. 40% of the troops) and consist of: Signals, Artillery, Air Defence, Engineers (including Explosive Ordnance Disposal), Aviation, Royal Military Police, Medical, Logistics and REME.

    Geskiedenis

    On 2 July 1809, the 3rd Division was formed tactically on the frontier of Portugal and Spain. This was part of developments in the early years of the Peninsular War, when the future Duke of Wellington decided to adopt, for the first time in the British Army, a permanent divisional structure to help him combat the French. By the winter of 1811, the 3rd Division was generally known by the nickname 'The Fighting Division', since it always seemed to be in action against the French enemy. Between 1809 and 1815, the 3rd Division took part in the following battles: Talavera on 28 July 1809, Bussaco on 27 September 1810, Torres Vedras during Winter 1810-1811, Sabugal on 3 April 1811, Fuentes D'Onoro on 5 May 1811, Cuidad Rodrigo on 19 January 1812, Badajoz on 6 April 1812, Salamanca on 22 July 1812, Burgos between September and October 1812, Vittoria on 21 June 1813, Pyrenees on 30 July 1813, Quatre Bras on 16-17 July 1815, and Waterloo on 18 July 1815.

    The 3rd Division, along with the rest of the British Army, had a rather uninspired campaign in the Crimea between 1854 and 1855. The Division participated in 3 battles during the conflict: Alma on 20 September 1854, Inkerman on 5 November 1854, and Sebastopol during 1854-1855.

    The 3rd Division deployed to southern Africa to participate in the Boer War between 1899 and 1900. During that conflict, the Division participated in another 3 battles: Stormberg on 10 December 1899, the advance into the Orange Free State on 12 March 1900, and Reddersburg on 3 April 1900.

    The 3rd Division deployed to France during the Great War and it was during that war that the Third Division's gained the nickname 'The Iron Division'. During the Great War, the Division was present at numerous battles, including Mons in 1914, Ypres in 1915, the Somme in 1916, Arras in 1917, and was finally part of the occupation force of the Rhineland during 1918 and 1919.

    The Division's participation in the Second World War had 2 distinct phases. Firstly it was part of the British Expeditionary Force to France to stem the German advance, but having fought hard yet ultimately unsuccessfully, it was evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940. The Division went on to lead the assault on Sword Beach on the coast of Normandy, France on D-Day. The Division participated in the fighting around Caen during the breakout from the beachhead. After the landing and the breakout, the Division continued fighting as part of 21st Army Group across northern Europe. It went on to participate in Operation Goodwood and Operation Market Garden. The Division ended the war with fighting in the Rhineland in Germany in 1945.

    In the post war years, the Division had many roles. The Division saw service in Palestine from 1945 and 1947, at which point it was disbanded. In 1951, the Division was reformed and became part of the Army Strategic Command, an element of the UK's Strategic Reserve. As part of the Army Strategic Command, the unit deployed for the Suez Crisis in 1956 and for peacekeeping duties in Cyprus in 1964.

    In 1978, what had become the 3rd (UK) Armoured Division had moved to Korbecke on the Mohnesee in the Federal Republic of Germany to become part of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) with 3 armoured brigades, the 4th, 6th, and 33rd Armoured Brigades. There it remained until the decision was made following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 to dramatically reduce the size of the BAOR. The unit was subsequently restructured to a mechanized division and relocated to Bulford, Wiltshire, England.

    The Division was deployed as part of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s and as a headquarters to Kabul, Afghanistan in 2001. The Division headquarters was also deployed to Iraq in 2003, 2006, and 2008.

    The headquarters also force generated and prepared 12th Mechanized, 52nd Infantry, 19th and 11th Light Brigades for operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and took command of 4th Mechanized Brigade on their return from Operation Herrick's rotation 13 in 2011.


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    Combat of Sabugal, 3 April 1811 - History

    A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War

    Die Skiereilandoorlog

    But what about other British versus French encounters? After all, we have the words of the Great Duke himself writing after the April 3, 1811 combat at Sabugal: "Really these attacks in column against our lines are very contemptible". [47] This stereotype, repeated by most contemporary historians who rely heavily on the writings of Oman and Fortescue, overlooks an important component of the tactical mosaic comprising the column versus line encounter.

    Oman wrote the first volumes of his Peninsular War history while still supremely confident about his tactical understanding. Consider his description of the first important Franco-British encounter in the Peninsula, the Battle of Vimeiro. He writes: "The French came on in their usual style, a thick line of tirailleurs, supported by battalion columns close in the rear." [48] He depicts the fight between Solignac's brigade and the defending British as a classic column versus line affair. Only after British fire has shattered the French infantry, do the remnants try to deploy.

    In contrast are the words of a British participant who described the French reaction when their columns encountered Ferguson's brigade: "nor did they make the slightest pause, till they beheld the 36th, the 40th, and the 71st regiments in close array before them. Their line was likewise formed in a moment". [49] From the first French‑British encounter at Vimeiro to the last great battle at Waterloo, when British lines engaged French columns the French tried to deploy into line. A French staff officer observed the ascent of the II Corps at Busaco: "At last it reached the summit. The column began to deploy as if at an exercise". [50] A French officer wrote regarding Albuera, "General Gerard is in the midst of the danger he attempts, in this critical position, to deploy his troops. but the passage of lines, which requires space and coolness, cannot be effected under so violent a fire." [51] The pattern is repeated all the way through Waterloo. At the final French assault of the Imperial Guard a soldier in Halkett's Brigade writes: "Within fifty yards of them, the enemy. attempted to deploy". [52] A different Imperial Guard unit faced the fire of the British Guards: "they now wavered, and several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy". [53]

    The French tendency to try to deploy their columns was so prevalent that Oman occasionally mentioned it. He relates a British soldier's account of the Battle of Albuera fought in 1811: "I saw their officers endeavouring to deploy their columns, but all to no purpose. For as soon as the third of a company got out, they would immediately run back in order to be covered by the front of the column". [54] However, he under emphasizes it because of his basic misunderstanding of French tactics. Worse, most subsequent historians overlooked the issue entirely.

    In his effort to explore French tactical diversity, Oman cites the French formation employed at Albuera. While concluding that the French habitually fought in column, he points to Albuera as an exception: "Albuera is the only fight in the war in which I have definite proof that the enemy fought in the ordre mixte& quot. [55] His proof is a pre-battle order explaining the intended French dispositions to be used. However, the actual French advance was not performed in the mixed order formation, according to a staff officer who advanced with the attacking wing of the French army. Accordingly to this officer, the French advanced in close column and initially displaced the allied defenders. Eager to capitalize upon this success, the corps commander, "General Gerard, thought that he had only to precipitate his attack, to complete the confusion and disorder. [he did] not stop to deploy his columns. in short, General Gerard committed the fatal imprudence of advancing the 5th Corps still in close column, and of attacking the enemy in that order". [56] This interpretation of the French advance is seconded by the writings of Perrin-Solliers who analyzed the French defeat at Albuera. [57] The Battle of Albuera is another example of Oman's muddled understanding of French tactics and deployments.

    "A Row of Columns of the Heaviest Sort"

    There are two famous examples of French column attacks most often cited as illustrative cases of French tactical abuse, MacDonald's attack at Wagram and D Erlon's attack at Waterloo. Criticized by French and British authors alike, MacDonald's advance on Wagram's second day, July 6, 1809, is typically identified as an extreme example of Napoleon's increasing reliance upon mass tactics.

    A careful reading of MacDonald's post-battle report and his memoirs challenges this viewpoint. MacDonald relates how he was preparing to attack the Austrian position along the Russbach when he received orders from the Emperor to redirect his advance. Archduke Carl had surprised Napoleon by launching an offensive against the French left. There was a gap in the French line toward which an Austrian cavalry force was headed. [58] Macdonald commanded the nearest available troops to oppose the Austrian cavalry. MacDonald wrote,

    "The Emperor. kept sending officers, one after another, to me to hasten my movements. Vexed and anxious to know the reasons for these reiterated orders, I galloped toward the Emperor. The enemy, who were in great number at this point, were marching the more boldly as they encountered no resistance: I then understood (as the Emperor afterwards admitted) that his intention in thus hurrying me was to show that he was not in retreat. It was therefore necessary to risk something in order to carry this out with the utmost speed". [59]

    MacDonald formed his first units, which advanced at the double, in two lines of four battalions each. As his other units arrived he formed them in column to secure his flanks. This unusual formation, necessitated by the dual pressures of time and the presence of enemy cavalry, successfully repulsed the Hapsburg horsemen. Only then did the French proceed to make an attack. MacDonald's formation can be explained as one extemporized in haste. No such satisfactory answer can account for the formation of D'Erlon's Corps at Waterloo.

    These unfortunates formed in columns of battalion by division. Each division marched on a deployed battalion frontage with successive battalions, also formed in line, marching to their rear. Durutte, the commander of D'Erlon's 4th Division, says that the formation was dictated by the staff officers carrying the attack order. [60] Whether Napoleon or Ney expressly willed the awkward formation is unknown. Ney had used a similar formation with Marchand's Division in 1807 at Friedland. At Friedland, however, Marchand had been hurrying to achieve a flank position from which to launch an assault and therefore had not the time to deploy. In contrast, at Waterloo there was ample time to prepare. Regardless of how D'Erlon's deployment came about, the unwieldy French formation caused the attack to fail dismally.

    Why the French Failed

    At the end of the day, there remains a set of immutable facts that are hard to square with one another. The Napoleonic French army was thoroughly professional with battlefield leadership largely based upon meritocracy, the officers honed by years of warfare. French tactical philosophy well understood that columns were the most handy formation for approach marches. Columns were not intended as assault formations except under special circumstances. Yet, under Wellington's inspired tactical leadership, British infantry repeatedly defeated French columns. Part of the explanation rests with Wellington's selection of reverse slope positions.

    Customarily, European armies on the defensive chose to occupy the crest of available high ground. The French attack at the Battle of Thann in Bavaria in 1809 provides a model of how to tackle such a defensive position. On April 19, 1809, Saint-Hilaire's Division of Davout's III Corps unexpectedly encountered Austrian infantry in the steeply rolling terrain between Teugen and Hausen. The Austrians occupied the Hausen Berg, a steep ridge top position similar to the Peninsular ridges chosen by Wellington. As Austrian skirmishers formed on the heights, Davout personally launched the 3rd Ligne up slope in skirmish order. After a stiff combat, the 3rd retired and rallied on the lower slopes. The attack gained time for the 57th Ligne to organize a set-piece assault. The 57th formed in battalion columns and struggled to the top of the Hausen Berg while enduring intense artillery and musketry and then deployed into line. The 3rd advanced again to support the 57th by extending the line. After a protracted fight, the Austrians retreated. To conquer a tenaciously defended ridge top, French commanders had skillfully blended skirmish order, line, and column. [61]

    In the Peninsula, Wellington's novel tactical positioning negated such French maneuverability. At battle's onset, a thick British skirmish line screened Wellington's main line of resistance, which was hidden on the reverse slope. Experience taught the French that the British were somewhere behind the hill, but they never managed to solve how to attack the hidden foe.

    A second major factor accounting for French failure in the Peninsula relates to the decline in troop quality. The Grande Arm e suffered terrible cumulative losses by the 1809 Battle of Wagram. The conscripts who replaced the fallen veterans never received the prolonged training enjoyed by the Grande Arm e. A young French conscript, Phillipe Gille, provides a detailed account of the inadequate manner in which French soldiers were rushed to the front. [62] Mobilized in France in 1808, Gille apparently did not even receive his musket until arriving at the Spanish border. Daar het hy hom aangesluit by 'n voorlopige eenheid wat saamgestel is uit medepligtiges, die grens oorgesteek en kort voor lank met guerilla gevegte aangegaan het. Uiteindelik het sy eenheid saamgesmelt met soortgelyke ad-hoc formasies om Dupont se noodlottige weermag uit te maak. Naby die Spaanse stad Jaen het hulle die eerste teenkanting van Spaanse stamgaste ondervind. Ten spyte van hul onervarenheid, het die dienspligtiges 'n lyn gevorm, met slepende arms gevorder, 'n vlugvuur van naby ontvang, op die bajonet gelaai en die Spanjaarde gelei. Terwyl sulke onverskrokke skokaksie teen swak opgeleide Spaanse infanterie gewerk het, was dit nie geskik vir meer professionele teenstanders soos die Britte nie. Three points deserved emphasis from Gille's account: the conscripts entered combat virtually untrained they formed line for combat and they did not attempt to engage in a musketry duel but relied upon shock action.

    During the Peninsula years, how large a numerical contribution to the French armed forces were conscripts such as Gille? Vir die beslissende jare 1808 tot 1812 het die Franse jaarlikse dienspligte van 181 000 tot 217 000 gewissel. [63] During 1810 and 1811, when France was at peace in the rest of Europe, the majority of these conscripts went to the Peninsula and substantially diluted the quality of the French forces serving there. Terselfdertyd het die kwaliteit van die troepe verder verswak, aangesien veterane van die byna 100 000 ongevalle in die Skiereiland in 1810-1811 gely het. [64] The impact of this dilution is clearly stated by General Anne Savary. Savary's report on the 1809 Battle of Essling, where he fought with troops substantially better than the average Peninsula soldier, observes, "if instead of troops consisting of war levies [raw conscripts], we had opposed to them such soldiers as those of the camp of Boulogne [the Grande Arm e], which we might easily have moved in any direction and made to deploy under the enemy's fire without any danger their being thrown into disorder". [65] Innumerable Peninsular battlefields demonstrated this need.

    In addition, French replacement policy was poorly calculated to maximize the soldier's potential. The lack of veteran officers caused replacement units returning to Spain to be led by mutilated veterans or inexperienced National Guard officers. This problem is illustrated by the fact that while officer schools in France turned out about 4,000 graduates from 1802 to 1815, this number was insufficient to meet the officer losses suffered in two such major battles as Wagram and Borodino. [66]

    Die probleem het vererger namate die Skiereiland 'n sekondêre front geword het. 'N Tipiese skiereilandregiment van 2500 man sou 120 tot 200 man terugstuur na Frankryk as 'n depoteenheid, 50 na die artillerie, 10 na die gendarmes en 12 van die beste manne na die keiserlike garde. Hierdie aftrekkings, tesame met die ongekende guerilla-verliese wat in die nooit veilige agtergebiede ondervind is, het die uithouvermoë van die infanterieregiment ernstig geknou. It got worse in 1811 and thereafter when Napoleon withdrew the best troops from the Peninsula to prepare for the Russian invasion.

    An analysis of French tactical failure in the Peninsula cannot overlook the complex interplay of strategic factors that greatly determined the morale, manpower, and logistical support affecting French battlefield efficiency. Some of the salient factors were: outdated central direction from Paris lack of command continuity so that officers and men seldom were able to learn from the experience of fighting the British lack of cooperation among the French senior leaders, particularly the marshals who jealously ran their areas of operation like personal fiefdoms and crippling supply constraints caused by active guerilla that often forced the French to rush into battle before they ran out of food rather than rely upon maneuver.


    Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900/Whichcote, George

    WHICHCOTE, GEORGE (1794–1891), general, born on 21 Dec. 1794, was the fourth son of Sir Thomas Whichcote, fifth baronet (1763–1824), of Aswarby Park, Lincolnshire, by his wife Diana (d. 1826), third daughter of Edmund Turnor of Panton and Stoke Rochford. In 1803 he entered Rugby school, where he fagged for William Charles Macready, the great actor. In December 1810, on leaving Rugby, he joined the 52nd foot as a volunteer, and received a commission as ensign on 10 Jan. 1811. In the same year he embarked on the Pompey, a French prize, to join the British army in the Spanish peninsula, where his regiment, with the 43rd and the 95th, formed the famous light division. He took part in the battle of Sabugal on 3 April, and in the combat of El Bodon on 25 Sept., though his regiment was not engaged. He assisted in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo on 19 Jan. 1812, and of Badajoz on 6 April. On 8 July he became lieutenant, and on 22 July was present at the battle of Salamanca and at that of Vittoria on 21 June 1813, where the 52nd carried the village of Magarita with an impetuous charge. He took part with his regiment in the combats in the Pyrenees in July and August, the combat of Vera on 3 Oct., the battle of the Nivelle on 10 Nov., the battle of the Nive on 10–13 Dec., the battle of Orthes on 27 Feb. 1814, of Tarbes on 12 March, and of Toulouse on 12 April. He was the first man in the English army to enter Toulouse. While in command of an advanced picket he observed the French retreat, and, boldly pushing on, took possession of the town. At the close of the war the regiment was placed in garrison at Castelsarrasin on the Garonne, and afterwards was sent to Ireland. Whichcote took part in the battle of Waterloo, where the 52nd completed the rout of the imperial guard. He was quartered in Paris during the occupation by the allies, and on his return home received the Waterloo medal and the silver war medal with nine clasps, before he had attained his majority. After the peace the 52nd was ordered to Botany Bay, and Whichcote exchanged into the buffs.

    On 22 Jan. 1818 he obtained his captaincy, and in 1822 again exchanged into the 4th dragoon guards. He was made major on 29 Oct. 1825, lieutenant-colonel on 28 June 1838, and colonel on 11 Nov. 1851. In 1825 he was placed on half-pay, and on 4 June 1857 he attained the rank of major-general was promoted to be lieutenant-general on 31 Jan. 1864, and became a full general on 5 Dec. 1871. In 1887 he received a jubilee medal from the queen in recognition of his services, accompanied by an autograph letter. He died on 26 Aug. 1891 at Meriden, near Coventry, where he had resided since retiring from active service, and was buried there on 31 Aug. With the exception of Lieutenant-colonel Hewitt, he was the last officer of the English army surviving who had been present at Waterloo. In 1842 he married Charlotte Sophia (d. 1880), daughter of Philip Monckton. He had no issue.

    [Times, 27 Aug. 1891 Coventry Standard, 28 Aug. 1891 Burke's Peerage and Baronetage Rugby School Register Army Lists.]


    TWA flight 847 is hijacked by terrorists

    TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome is hijacked by Shiite Hezbollah terrorists who immediately demand to know the identity of ”those with Jewish-sounding names.” Two of the Lebanese terrorists, armed with grenades and a 9-mm. pistol, then forced the plane to land in Beirut, Lebanon.

    Once on the ground, the hijackers called for passengers with Israeli passports, but there were none. Nor were there any diplomats on board. They then focused their attention on the several U.S. Navy construction divers aboard the plane. Soon after landing, the terrorists killed Navy diver Robert Stethem, and dumped his body on the runway.

    TWA employee Uli Derickson was largely successful in protecting the few Jewish passengers aboard by refusing to identify them. Most of the passengers were released in the early hours of what turned out to be a 17-day ordeal, but five men were singled out and separated from the rest of the hostages. Of these five, only Richard Herzberg, an American, was Jewish.

    During the next two weeks, Herzberg maintained to his attackers that he was a Lutheran of German and Greek ancestry. Along with the others, he was taken to a roach-infested holding cell somewhere in Beirut, where other Lebanese prisoners were being held. Fortunately, the TWA hostages were treated fairly well.

    On June 30, after careful negotiations, the hostages were released unharmed. Since the terrorists were effectively outside the law’s reach in Lebanon, it appeared as though the terrorists would go free from punishment. Yet, Mohammed Ali Hammadi, who was wanted for his role in TWA Flight 847 attack, was arrested nearly two years later at the airport in Frankfurt, Germany, with explosives.


    Since the French Revolution, conscription or the Draft has been how countries have found additional manpower for their armed forces in modern times.

    Prior to this Britain practiced a cruel but effective way of combating the manpower shortage in their navy: impressment.

    Impressment, or &ldquopress gang&rdquo as it was more commonly known, was recruitment by force. It was a practice that directly affected the U.S. and was even one of the causes of the War of 1812.

    The British navy consistently suffered manpower shortages due to the low pay and a lack of qualified seamen. During wartime the navy forced unwilling individuals into service. Residents of seaports lived in fear of the press gangs that patrolled waterfronts and raided taverns, pouncing on deserters and idle mariners. Prints from the time show armed gangs kidnapping men in their beds, or barging into weddings and hauling the groom out much to the distress of the bride.

    But generally &ldquopressing&rdquo took place at sea where the armed gangs would board merchant ships. These ships were ransacked of their men and often left without sufficient hands to take them safely into port.

    Impressment was first made lawful during Elizabethan times, though it had been a common practice of drafting soldiers dating back to the 13th century. In 1563 Queen Elizabeth passed "an Act touching politick considerations for the maintenance of the Navy" which defined more clearly the liability of sailors who may be forced to serve as mariners.

    The legalization was taken further in 1597 when the Vagrancy Act was passed, which now allowed for men of disrepute to be impressed for service in the fleet.

    While essential for the strength of the British Navy, the brutal nature of impressment was deeply unpopular. Many viewed it as an inhumane and unconstitutional system.

    In the 18th century a raft of legislation was introduced aimed at moderating the practice. A 1740 act declared that all men under 18 and over 55 and foreigners who served on British ships were declared exempt from enforced service.

    In reality, however, these laws were ignored and impressment of foreigners was commonplace. In fact, only 40-years later the exemptions from impressment were withdrawn, so desperate was the British Navy for seamen.

    American merchant vessels were a common target. Between 1793 and 1812, the British impressed more than 15,000 U.S. sailors to supplement their fleet during their Napoleonic Wars with France. By 1812 the United States Government had had enough. On 18 June, the United States declared war on Great Britain, citing, in part, impressment.

    After the Napoleonic Wars impressment was ended in practice, though not officially abandoned as a policy. The last law was passed in 1835, in which the power to impress was reaffirmed. It limited the length of service of a pressed man to five years, and added the provision that a man couldn't be pressed twice.


    Combat of Sabugal, 3 April 1811 - History

    The legendary guru of the combat 1911, Jeff Cooper, came up with the “Condition” system to define the state of readiness of the 1911-pattern pistol. They are:

    • Condition 0 – A round is in the chamber, hammer is cocked, and the safety is off.
    • Condition 1 – Also known as “cocked and locked,” means a round is in the chamber, the hammer is cocked, and the manual thumb safety on the side of the frame is applied.
    • Condition 2 – A round is in the chamber and the hammer is down.
    • Condition 3 – The chamber is empty and hammer is down with a charged magazine in the gun.
    • Condition 4 – The chamber is empty, hammer is down and no magazine is in the gun.

    The mode of readiness preferred by the experts is Condition One. Generally speaking, Condition One offers the best balance of readiness and safety. Its biggest drawback is that it looks scary to people who don’t understand the operation and safety features of the pistol.

    Condition Two is problematic for several reasons, and is the source of more negligent discharges than the other conditions. When you rack the slide to chamber a round in the 1911, the hammer is cocked and the manual safety is off. There is no way to avoid this with the 1911 design. In order to lower the hammer, the trigger must be pulled and the hammer lowered slowly with the thumb onto the firing pin, the end of which is only a few millimeters away from the primer of a live round. Should the thumb slip, the hammer would drop and fire the gun. Not only would a round be launched in circumstances which would be at best embarrassing and possibly tragic, but also the thumb would be behind the slide as it cycled, resulting in serious injury to the hand. A second problem with this condition is that the true 1911A1 does not have a firing pin block and an impact on the hammer which is resting on the firing pin could conceivably cause the gun to go off, although actual instances of this are virtually nonexistent. Finally, in order to fire the gun, the hammer must be manually cocked, again with the thumb. In an emergency situation, this adds another opportunity for something to go wrong and slows the acquisition of the sight picture.

    Condition Three adds a degree of “insurance” against an accidental discharge since there is no round in the chamber. To bring the gun into action from the holster, the pistol must be drawn and the slide racked as the pistol is brought to bear on the target. This draw is usually called “the Israeli draw” since it was taught by Israeli security and defense forces. Some of the real expert trainers can do an Israeli draw faster than most of us can do a simple draw, but for most of us, the Israeli draw adds a degree of complexity, an extra step, and an opening for mistakes in the process of getting the front sight onto the target.

    Using the “half-cock” as a safety

    The half-cock notch on the M1911 is really intended as a “fail-safe” and is not recommended as a safety. However, it has been used as a mode of carry. From Dale Ireland comes this interesting piece of service history from WWII:

    When the hammer is pulled back just a few millimeters it “half cocks” and pulling the trigger will not fire the gun [on genuine mil-spec G.I. pistols]. I imagine this is an unsafe and not a recommended safety position. The reason I bring it up however is that it was a commonly used position especially by left-handers in WWII. My father carried his 1911 (not A1) to Enewitok, Leyte, first wave at Luzon, the battle inside Intramuros, and until he was finally shot near Ipo dam. He tells me that he regularly used the half cocked safety position especially at night and patrolling because bringing the weapon to the full cocked position from the half cocked created much less noise and he was left handed so he couldn’t use the thumb safety effectively. He said using the half cocked position was all about noise reduction for lefties while maintaining a small amount of safety that could quickly be released.

    Again, the half-cock is intended as a fail-safe in the event that the sear hooks were to fail, and it is not recommended as a mode of carry. It should also be noted that on guns with “Series 80” type hammers, the hammer will fall from half-cock when the trigger is pulled. This would include guns from Springfield Armory and modern production Colts. But, if you happen to be a south paw and find yourself in the jungle with a G.I. M1911A1 and surrounded by enemy troops, the half-cock might be an option.

    For more detailed discussion of the safety and internal functions of the M1911, see “Is Cocked and Locked Dangerous?”


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